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Abstract
This research concerns the history of how the stories—narratives—which people
tell about the Port of New Orleans and its related freight transportation have impacted
Port-related traffic congestion on the last mile. “Last mile” refers to the last segment of a
freight journey. In the context of the Port, it is the distance between the Tchoupitoulas
Street exit ramp on US 90 and the entrance/exit of the Clarence Henry Truckway. The
Clarence Henry Truckway is a 3.5-mile one way in/one way out dedicated truck route
behind the floodwall of the Port on Tchoupitoulas street. Its access is threatened by
proposed tourism-related developments.
Chapter one is an overview congestion at the Port and developments which will
impact access. It gives the context of freight and logistics, economic development,
congestion, and the environment. It then turns to an overview of the Port’s history and
importance. Chapter two reviews urban studies and anthropology literature relative to
freight. Chapter three discusses the primarily archival methodology. Chapter four
discusses narrative in nine freight options: the Riverfront Expressway, freight on
Decatur Street, Louisiana Avenue and other uptown arterials, extending Leake Avenue
behind Audubon Park, a ship lock and channel connecting the Mississippi River with the
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), the MRGO itself, replacing the Inner Harbor
Navigational Canal (IHNC or “Industrial canal”) lock, New Orleans Public Belt Railroad
(NOPB) cars parked along Leake Avenue; and the Port’s proposed shipping container
terminal at the Sinclair tract in Meraux, St. Bernard parish. Chapter five discusses the
history of the Port freight narrative from organized Port dockworker labor. Chapter six
covers the rise of the tourism/convention narrative. Chapter seven is about gentrification

vi

and the Port. Chapters eight and nine are a concluding discussion with policy
recommendations.
This research argues that community narratives are primary in the facilitation of
freight transportation infrastructure, rather than economic concerns about its benefit to
the Port. The histories of these narratives show that the social and political capital of the
potentially affected residents was more powerful than the economic development and
job creation narratives of the business community and the Port.

Keywords: Port of New Orleans, last mile, freight congestion, ethnohistory, narrative,
freight, shipping containers, maritime, trucking, Clarence Henry Truckway
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Overview of Port Freight Congestion
The Port of New Orleans was once seen by its residents as the heart of the city,
the entity which kept it alive. This is a rather literal analogy. In the context of
Councilman Singleton’s 1984 published statement that “The port is the lifeblood of our
city,” the transportation industry’s reference to freight truck routes as “arterials” is
appropriate. These arterials were seen by residents of the city as a necessary evil, with
accent upon either “necessary” or the “evil” depending on where one resided. Beginning
in the 1980s, deregulation of the Port, along with the impact of technological changes
which had become acute by the 1970s—the shipping container, containership
technology, and the cranes which supported this maritime freight infrastructure—
decreased the Port’s employment share in the city. This coincided with the mid-80s fall
of the oil and gas industry in Louisiana. Simultaneously, an anti-freight narrative on the
part of uptown residents gained enough momentum to force all truck freight off the
traditional arterials and onto the Clarence Henry Truckway behind Tchoupitoulas St.
See Figure 1.
This resulted in severe freight trucking congestion for the Port of New Orleans, a
problem made worse by proposed tourism-oriented developments near the Truckway,
on the last mile of freight shipments arriving at the Port. Last mile congestion is a major
problem for port cities globally, and it is necessary to understand its human elements
when cultivating policy and planning solutions.
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Figure 1.The Clarence Henry Truckway.
Legend: Truckway in Blue, Religious St. Entrance, Tchoupitoulas St. Exit in Green

Source: Ash et al. 2016b
Proposed Tourism-Related Developments
The New Orleans Convention Center (NOCC) and local developers are preparing
to embark upon a major development project (Admin 2016; New Orleans Convention
Center 2015; Sayre and Times-Picayune 2016). One component covers an area
bordered by Henderson, Orange, and Tchoupitoulas streets, and the Port of New
Orleans floodwall. From Henderson to Orange, it directly borders the exit route for the
port on the Tchoupitoulas from Felicity Street. The other consists of developments to
Convention Center Boulevard and adjacent properties. See Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Relationship of Proposed Developments to Last Mile.
Legend: Port Last Mile in Red; Trade District in Blue NOCC Developments

Source: Webb 2018

The impact of the resulting congestion from changes in traffic patterns on the last
mile to the Port’s only access point is a major concern. This congestion occurs primarily
between trucks and between passenger vehicles and trucks. These developments will
directly impact the Port’s last mile access to the Clarence Henry Truck Way behind the
Port’s floodwall, which is entered/exited at the intersections of Religious/Felicity and
Tchoupitoulas streets. Last mile concerns are not unique to the Port of New Orleans,
but rather are a global problem with ports and intermodal freight terminals, having
significantly increased during the last 25 years (Patier 2006). These proposed
developments threaten the efficiency of one of the world’s historically most significant
freight ports.
3

Freight Context
Logistics and economic development.
Much freight literature qua freight literature is focused upon the issues of logistics
and economic development. Some of it involves complex mathematical modeling. In
2004, Peter Hall wrote that studies of global logistics too often focused on ocean
carriers, while leaving out the perspectives of “shippers and public authorities” (Hall
2004:135). His concern with ensuring that all the freight actors’ perspectives are taken
into consideration resonates somewhat with this research focus on the outcomes of
residents’ perceptions. He used descriptive statistics of changing patterns in automobile
imports at US container facilities to demonstrate the interrelationship of ocean carriers,
shippers, and public authorities in an increasingly global economy. Hall maintained that
this demonstrated how Castell’s “spaces of flows,” that is, information technology-driven
rapid financial transactions between crucial urban nodes, were becoming more solidified
as trade routes (ibid). At the same time, Jean-Paul Rodrigue utilized an analysis of the
Boston-Washington megaregion corridor to show how local freight flows are actually
functions of world and regional economics (Rodrigue 2004). Rodrigue demonstrated
how on-time and “door-to-door” delivery practices were manifestations of global and
regional freight flows at the local scale (Rodrigue 2004:147). Rodrigue saw increased
consumer utilization of freight transportation as responsible for fragmenting the
traditional locations of distribution centers from intermodal marine and rail terminals to
the intersections of air and truck freight (Rodrigue 2004:147). Intermodal freight
transportation is the “movement of containerized (unitized) cargo over air, land, or sea
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through the use of different transport modes (aircraft, truck, rail, boats, ships, barges,
etc.) capable of handling containers” (WebFinance Inc. 2018).
Ducruet et. al. 2015 studied ports in Japan, the US and Europe. They found that
economically powerful outlying areas tended towards more valuable and diverse freight,
and that less economically significant central areas showed a higher concentration of
bulk freight (Ducruet, Itoh, and Joly 2015). They also found a point key to this research,
which is that ports with industries that processed incoming freight by value-adding
manufacturing of incoming commodities were in socioeconomically wealthier regions
than those that were only through ports, such as the Port of New Orleans (Ducruet et al.
2015:607). A through port is one in which goods and commodities are shipped through
for import and export, rather than stopping for manufacture or processing. Currently
coffee is the only commodity which stops in the city for processing. Anand et al. 2015
argued that urban freight transportation needs to be studied from the perspectives of
both its producers and consumers (Anand et al. 2015:703). The research of this thesis
tends to accent how residents, as potential Port-based freight stakeholders, have often
thwarted the production of freight transportation. This focus on a need to include the
residents of urban freight transportation corridors in data considerations has been noted
elsewhere (Gatta and Marcucci 2016). Additionally, Anand et al. listed six objective
domains which they encountered in their overview of freight modelling studies. They
are: informative, economic, road safety, efficiency, environment, infrastructure and
management, and urban structure (Anand et al. 2015:704 Figure 1). Significantly
however, they came across four stakeholders: shipper, carrier, administrator, and
receiver. Residents near freight transportation nodes were not included as stakeholders
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in the analyses which they reviewed (Anand et al. 2015:712 table 3) These residents
are the primary focus of this thesis. It must be noted, however, that the studies Anand et
al. 2015 reviewed range from 1982-2010. More recent studies have included a focus on
the effects of freight transportation on communities; however, these are mostly rail
oriented (Blumgart 2016; Edward Elgar Publishers 2015; Hanson and McPhee 2016;
Infrastructure Australia 2017; Lemer 2014; Prendergast and Staff 2017; Qiao et al.
2016; Smith, Heaney, and Ramachandran 2018; U.S. Government Accountability Office
2014; Waddington et al. 2015). Cui et al. 2015 recognized this deficiency of the human
element in the freight transportation literature, and “… [identified] … key directions for
further research, particularly around the land-use, environmental and institutional
dimensions of urban freight management” (Cui, Dodson, and Hall 2015:583). These
concerns are directly related to the concept of freight congestion.
Freight congestion.
In 2005, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) reported that “The nation is
entering the early stages of a freight transportation capacity crisis … [due to] ‘freight
bottlenecks’” (Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 2005:ES-1). A local example of a freight
bottleneck, and the primary one with which this research is concerned, is the
Tchoupitoulas exit off US-90 West towards the Port of New Orleans. In the 2005 FHWA
study, reported annual truck delay time due to these bottlenecks was 243 million hours,
at a cost of approximately $7.8 billion a year (White and Grenzeback 2007:5). In 2015,
the delay time was about 996 million hours at a cost of $63.4 billion (American
Transportation Research Institute 2017).
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White and Grenzeback reported on one of the approaches to ameliorating this
problem as it relates to freight bottlenecks on the last mile to ports. The PierPASS
model at the ports of Los Angeles-Long Beach (ports LA-LB) is a nonprofit entity under
the auspices of the marine terminal operators at the ports (White and Grenzeback
2007). “PierPASS shifts truck travel to nonpeak hours by charging a congestion fee for
loads moved during peak hours (Monday through Friday, 3:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.)” (White
and Grenzeback 2007). Hensher and Puckett reported that the idea of expanding
congestion fees to encompass all freight trucking was gaining ground in Australia and
the European Union (Hensher and Puckett 2008).
Another approach taken by the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT)
involved minor shifting of merge lanes or repositioning single ramps, “… coupled with
improved corridor traffic management …” (White and Grenzeback 2007). The ramp
meters on the Ponchartrain Expressway are an example of this kind of management,
although they do not sit well with the truckers as it is difficult to accelerate heavy loads
up a ramp from a full stop (Nobles 2016; Parsons 2015:slide 19). However, an
overarching solution for freight transportation congestion should be at the forefront of
policy considerations.
In 2010, Tiron discussed the Maritime Administration’s (MARAD) Marine
Highway program. The plan of the Obama administration was to use the nation’s inland
waterway system and “short sea shipping” (barge tows “hopping” up coastlines port to
port) to shift the freight burden from trucking to the waterways, thereby relieving
congestion and reducing pollution (Tiron 2010:42). Tiron pointed out that “…one 15barge tow removes 1,050 tractor-trailers from the highways. And with just a gallon of
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diesel fuel, a barge can move one ton of cargo 576 miles” (Tiron 2010:42). This is
important because of the projected increase in freight trucking traffic on the roadways
during the next 30 years. Any multimodal (using rail and water, and sometimes air, to
transport freight in addition to the truck mode) solution which can take freight trucks off
the roads should therefore be pursued. In addition, the much-reduced burning of diesel
by barge tows would have a positive environmental effect.
In 2012, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act extended the goals of
the marine Highway program to include “… [generating] public benefits by increasing
the utilization or efficiency of domestic freight or passenger transportation on Marine
Highway Routes between U.S. ports. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016 added to the definition of short sea shipping to include cargo shipped in
discrete units or packages that are handled individually, palletized or unitized for
purposes of transportation; or freight vehicles carried aboard commuter ferry boats” as
opposed to simply barge tows filled with shipping containers (Maritime Administration
2018). And in 2018, the Port of New Orleans received grant money from MARAD to
expand its operations at the France Road terminal to include participation in the
shipping of empty containers to exporters in Baton Rouge and Memphis (MARAD Public
Affairs 2018:8). In addition, on August 17, 2018, the office of Louisiana Gov. John Bell
Edwards announced that the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) Director of Civil Works,
James C. Dalton gave approval to a report which outlined the process whereby the
Mississippi River Ship Channel would be deepened to 50 feet, paralleling the depth of
the expanded Panama Canal (Office of the Governor 2018). While this project, if it is
fulfilled, will mean more commerce for the Port of New Orleans, it will also mean more
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container traffic and accentuate the need of the Port for more container handling
facilities and enhanced last mile traffic flow. The new acquisition of the NOPB by the
Port is key to achieving this.
Freight in the rail mode.
One constant in the literature on urban freight transportation is the assertion that
shifting significant amounts of freight from the trucking mode to rail can alleviate urban
freight stress (Peirce 2004). In 2006, the federal government began experimenting with
allowing railcars to stack two containers on top of each other, in Ohio, Virginia, and
West Virginia. The specific aim was to reduce freight congestion on the roads from the
Virginia coastal ports to Chicago (a major freight hub), and to increase the speed with
which freight was moved, notwithstanding the fact that some bridges and tunnels would
need to be raised in order to fit the stacked containers (Hammer 2006). In 2009, the
Surface Transportation Board (STB), the federal agency which regulates railroad traffic,
agreed to a plan to shift some of the rail burden from the inner freight hub of Chicago to
outlying regions in order to ease congestion (Coon 2009:3). In addition to addressing
the efficiency of freight movement, the goal was to ameliorate commuter train related
traffic and environmental impacts in inner-city Chicago. The residents of the outlying
areas were concerned that they would be the victims of the STB simply shifting the
freight rail burden from one place to another. Then-director of the Chicago Metropolitan
Agency for Planning, Randy Blankenhorn, said “The movement of freight is a national
issue, but it has local impact. What’s the balance” (Coon 2009:3)?
In 2010, Pazour et al. turned the traditional approach to high-speed rail regarding
congestion relief on its head. Traditionally, high-speed rail was a way to ameliorate
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commuter traffic, but Pazour et al. modeled the potential for a national high-speed rail
freight network, using data from a major motor carrier, the engineering constraints of
high-speed rail regarding freight, and Census figures (Pazour, Meller, and Pohl
2010:119). In 2018, Webber declared “a new age of rail,” by elucidating how much
cleaner and efficient rail freight was than trucking (Webber 2018). Webber pointed out
that the freight rail system had been dis-invested in due to the advent of the interstate
highway system. While acknowledging the utility of trucking for last mile freight
concerns, Webber stated that “… more than two-thirds of the ton-miles of freight travel
more than 500 miles and the efficiency of rail transportation means that even if the route
is longer than what is possible with point-to-point trucking, shipping by rail would still
use far less energy” as well as detailing the road safety benefits of shifting much of the
freight burden to rail (Webber 2018:46). The demonstrated decrease in energy usage is
significant for the environment concerning issues of emissions and sustainability.
Emissions.
In 2007, Facanha and Horvath studied the contributions of the truck, rail, and air
transportation mode across their “life-cycles” to correct an underestimation of the impact
of freight on air quality. That is, they accounted not only for air pollution during
transportation itself, but also for air impacts derived “… from vehicle manufacturing,
maintenance, and end of life; infrastructure construction, operation, maintenance, and
end of life; and petroleum exploration, refining, and fuel distribution” (Facanha and
Horvath 2007:7138). They found that quantifying air pollution solely in terms of activelymoving transportation (what they refer to as “tailpipe emissions”) can underestimate the
real impact on air quality by a factor of 38% for carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide. For
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carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide, the “life-cycle” totality of emissions is seven times
greater than from actively-moving transportation alone (Facanha and Horvath
2007:7138). Air quality control policy is more effective for nitrogen oxide, because it is
mainly caused by actively-moving transportation, but sulfur dioxide and particulate
matter are not as impacted by air quality control because they are derived primarily from
the other phases of the freight transportation life-cycle (Facanha and Horvath
2007:7138).
In 2009, Kim and Wee compared the trucking and rail modes, of the activelymoving transportation phase only, in Europe. They found that rail emits less carbon
dioxide than trucking, although for electric rail, if fossil fuels were used to generate
electricity, then the net carbon dioxide emissions from rail were greater (Kim and Wee
2009:313). In 2014, Bakker et al. noted that there were no policy formulations which
consistently linked economic development, climate change, and transportation, of which
freight was a significant component due to its demonstrated positive impact on
economic development (Bakker et al. 2014:335, 337). They proposed linking the AvoidShift-Improve (Avoid unnecessary motorized trips, Shift to cleaner transit modes, and
Improve fuel efficiency) paradigm, originally developed to address climate change, with
transport and economic development schema (Bakker et al. 2014:339, 351). Also in
2014 Hjelle demonstrated the efficiency necessary for pallet-based European short sea
shipping operations to produce less carbon monoxide than trucking (Hjelle 2014).
Hwang and Ouyang investigated the relationship between air quality, freight mode, and
oil prices. They found that as crude oil prices increase, freight is shifted to the rail mode,
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and therefore air polluting emissions decline, as there is less truck usage, and rail
produces less emissions than trucking (Hwang and Ouyang 2014).
McKinnon examined the possibility of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions by
slowing down truck and ocean container vessel shipping, as well as “widening delivery
time-windows” (McKinnon 2016:420). McKinnon concluded that slowing down the
delivery phase of the logistics process could be time-compensated for by speeding up
other variables, such as “… processing of inbound order; internal administration/checks;
order picking; order awaiting loading; vehicle loading; vehicle waiting time; waiting time
at reception point; vehicle off-loading and put-away; and [shortening the length of time
of] product storage prior to use-sale …” and that such a delivery-phase slowdown would
reduce carbon emissions (McKinnon 2016:430 Figure 2).
Herold and Lee showed that emissions research on freight logistics between the
years 2000 and 2015 focused only on “carbon reduction,” and neglected the issues of
“… carbon strategy, carbon risk assessments, carbon target setting, … and carbon
performance and reporting. [This is especially true for] … carbon performance and
carbon reporting” (Herold and Lee 2017:79). These strategic angles, not only for
carbon, are key to environmental sustainability.
Sustainability.
In 2008, Behrends at al. proposed a definition of “sustainable urban freight
transportation,” or SUFT. It consisted of the following elements:
•

[Ensures] the accessibility offered by the transport system to all categories of
freight transport;
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•

[Reduces] air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, waste and noise to levels
without negative impacts on the health of the citizens or nature;

•

[Improves] the resource- and energy-efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the
transportation of goods, taking into account the external costs and;

•

[Contributes] to the enhancement of the attractiveness and quality of the
urban environment, by avoiding accidents, minimising the use of land and
without compromising the mobility of citizens (Behrends, Lindholm, and
Woxenius 2008:704).

In 2011, Russo and Comi reported on the expectations of European urban freight
policy interventions and the observed results. Their definition of sustainability was
derived from the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, “… to
meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their needs …” (Commission of the European Communities 2007; Russo and
Comi 2011:142). They concluded that freight transportation sustainability has three
domains: economic, social, and environmental (Russo and Comi 2011:151). For
economic sustainability, they recommended reducing the number of freight vehicles on
the road, increasing the speed of the non-transport components of logistics (per
McKinnon 2016), and increasing vehicle efficiency by developing a network of dedicated
freight roads and / or “urban distribution center(s)” (Russo and Comi 2011:151). For
social sustainability (which they defined mostly in terms of safety), in addition to a
network of dedicated freight roads, they suggested off-peak freight delivery hours,
congestion pricing, and dedicated zones for loading and unloading freight vehicles
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(Russo and Comi 2011:151). For environmental sustainability, they advocated the use
of low emissions/alternative fuels for freight (Russo and Comi 2011:151).
Arvidsson, et al. also proposed slower driving times for urban freight deliveries,
as well as the use of smaller delivery vehicles, to ameliorate truck emissions (Arvidsson,
Woxenius, and Lammgård 2013:119). In their study, these two measures were found to
be acceptable to all the stakeholders they reviewed: truckers, freight forwarders,
shippers, and residents (Arvidsson et al. 2013:123 Table 3). Akyelken and Keller wrote
of the increase in emissions in the European Union (EU) due to the lengthening of
supply chains associated with globalization (Akyelken and Keller 2014:674). They
noted, however, that the literature of the time viewed these emissions through the lens
of “… macro-level [economics] and [politics] … [ignoring] the interdependencies
amongst micro-level economic actors, including firms and businesses in the private
sector” (ibid). They held that the growing global interdependence of industry, shipping
arrangements, and freight transportation should reflect the effects on the environment
and economy at multiple levels in the EU, including regions, states, and economic
sectors particular to individual enterprises (Akyelken and Keller 2014:675–76).
Intermodal freight transportation as the key to European environmental
sustainability was the focus of Viorela-Georgiana in 2014. Viorela-Georgiana focused
on the use of rail and the inland waterway system, and lessening the dependence on
trucking, to minimize “… accidents, air pollution, [and] noise …]” (Viorela-Georgiana
2014:147). Alternately, Ahani et al. focused on the use electric delivery vehicles in the
urban environment to attain sustainability (Ahani, Arantes, and Melo 2016). They used a
mathematical model to show that electric vehicles have the capacity to be both
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environmentally sustaining, and economically beneficial to freight transportation
businesses (Ahani et al. 2016:357).
In 2016 the American Planning Association (APA) published the summary of the
APA Freight Policy:
The American Planning Association recognizes the significance of freight
transportation to the economy. APA acknowledges that, in spite of its
economic benefits, freight transportation has impacts on all three areas of
sustainability – societal, environmental, and economic. To address these
conflicts the APA Legislative and Policy Committee is developing a Freight
Policy.
APA’s Freight Policy would guide planners by advising them of innovative
ways to:
SUPPORT economic development by improving economic efficiency,
productivity, and competitiveness.
ADDRESS freight safety and security concerns and local communities.
IMPROVE the freight transportation system.
ADDRESS local environmental and community impacts.
REDUCE and minimize freight congestion and bottlenecks.
PROPOSE innovative technology and best practices to operate, maintain,
and optimize the freight transportation system (Blumgart 2016:21).

Specifically, the APA proposed, among many ideas, enhancing multimodalism;
increased utilization of the marine highway system to reduce trucking; limiting
hazardous material freight routes; promoting greater fuel efficiency and noise reduction
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technologies for trucking; off-peak trucking hours; gate appointments and congestion
pricing; fuller investment in rail; and public-private partnerships to enhance freight
technology (American Planning Association 2010:6, 7, 8, 9, 10).
One proposed way to achieve these goals is through the implementation of
freight villages. “A freight village is a defined area within which all activities relating to
transport, logistics and the distribution of goods, both for national and international
transit, are carried out by various operators” (Mann 2010:2). The ideal freight village,
then, would incorporate all modes of freight transport in one intermodal node, as well as
containing warehouses and just-in-time (JIT) distribution centers, customs, and freight
forwarders (Mann 2010:16). It might also include amenities such as hotels and
restaurants (Rodrigue 2018). As of 2010, freight villages existed in Italy, Spain,
Germany, Denmark, Portugal, Luxembourg, Greece, France, Hungary, and Ukraine, as
well as in the US (Mann 2010:15). Modern examples of US freight villages are to be
found in the “logistics zones” of BNSF Logistics Park, Chicago; CenterPoint-KCS
Intermodal Center, Kansas City; Rickenbacker Inland Port, Columbus, Ohio; Logistic
Centric Industrial Park, Wheatland, Pennsylvania; and Raritan Center, New Jersey
(Rodrigue 2018). In 2017, however, Baydar et al. found in their literature search
concerning freight villages “… that [they do not] fulfill their purpose in terms of
sustainability and social equity” (Baydar, Süral, and Çelik 2017:1208). These
deficiencies, particularly when related to issues of social equity, are some of the
discursive building blocks for the anti-freight narrative relative to the Port of New
Orleans.
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Overview of Port History and Importance
The historic economic importance of the Port of New Orleans due to its strategic
location near the mouth of the Mississippi River is well known (Lewis 2002; Marler
2013). The economic significance of the inland waterway system still makes the port
potentially one of the greater maritime entities in the nation, because of the centrality of
the Mississippi to this system (Henrickson, Wilson, and Hofseth 2005). The Mississippi
drainage of the inland waterway system moved over 307 million short tons1 of cargo in
2016, impacting the US economy by more than $200 billion (Duffy 2017; Navigation and
Civil Works Decision Support Center U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2017). However,
since the advent of containerization in 1956, and its intensification during the 1970s the
importance of the port’s historic geographic primacy has been surpassed by the
question of whether or not it can effectively move the freight which it receives in a timely
fashion (Jaffe 2010). It has never had a manufacture-oriented, value-added commodity
flow. Both before and after the Civil War, it was primarily a point of import and export;
pre-war for slaves, and post-war for raw materials (Marler 2013). Coffee is the notable
historic exception to this, and recently plastics from the TCI corporation at its France
road terminal and warehouse on the river at Esplanade and Elysian fields (Bonura
2010; TCI Packaging 2013). TCI is moving its warehousing operations from the edge of
the French Quarter to France Road as well, in a land swap whereby the Port received
the city-owned NOPB in exchange for the city acquiring the Esplanade and Governor
Nichols Street wharves for a riverfront park expansion (Sayre 2017b). This acquisition is

1

A short ton is 2,000 pounds.
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of major importance for the Port’s continued growth as the only deep-water container
port in Louisiana.
Containerization and the Port.
For the maritime freight industry, the growth of containerization from the 1950s
through 1970s culminated in greater control of shipping lines over individual ports
through the US shipping act of 1984 (Hayuth 1988; Parsons 2015:18). Intermodal
freight transportation generated the competitive economic pull of peripheral ports away
from central ones. Containerization drives intermodal freight transportation. This has
been especially hard on the uptown container facilities of New Orleans for three
reasons. First, the development of the rail “minibridge,” that is, the shorter rail-based
east-west freight route from the heartland to the West Coast ports for trade with Asia,
driven by rail containerization, has had a deep impact on the Port (Drew 1982b).
Second, although the Truckway is a very effective operation within its perimeter, the
concern is that this efficiency will be nullified by constrained last mile access. The
uptown container facilities’ narrow crescent-shape is inadequate to keep pace with
major container ports, as it is blocked off by surrounding development and historic
preservation statutes from further container-accommodating expansion. Surrounding
ports such as Houston, Mobile, and Miami began to overtake it as they have the
necessary space and / or soil types, unlike the Port of New Orleans’ uptown terminals,
to expand for shipping containers (LaRose 2016c). Third, this situation is exacerbated
and becoming increasingly problematic with the advent of larger and larger ships
unloading ever-increasing amounts of containers to be transported by trucks which have
access only at the Truckway (Parsons 2015:9, 10, 2016:6). The larger of these vessels
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are unable to access the Port from down river due to the restricted height of the
Crescent City Connection Mississippi River Bridge (CCC). The geographically
peripheral ports of Houston, Mobile, and Miami, even with their own last mile issues, are
leaving the Port behind economically, primarily because of issues of container yard
expansion and freight trucking access in the Panamax and post Panamax environment;
that is, maritime freight vessels consonant with both the expansion of the Panama canal
and the increase in ocean-going vessel calls at American ports (Hayuth 1988). The
Ports of Houston and Miami moved over 2 million and 1 million twenty-foot equivalent
units (TEUs; the size of a standard shipping container) respectively in 2016, while the
Port of New Orleans moved 522,000 in the same year (U.S. Department of
Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2017:A-55, A-99, A-107). Two major
actions, one of which is prohibitively expensive, could remedy this situation. One would
be the previously mentioned dredging of the Lower Mississippi River to a 50-foot draft
all the way to the mouth of the channel by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), so that
the Port can take greater advantage of the expansion of the Panama Canal (ICIS News
2016). The draft is the the channel depth for a ship’s underside. The other would be
raising the CCC to a height where its air draft could accommodate these larger ships, as
was done with the Bayonne Bridge in New York-New Jersey; this cost $1.6 billion at that
port (Morley 2017). Facilitating container access to the Port is critical for its continued
economic contribution to the city and the state.
Economic Empact of the Port and Obstacles to Its Development
As of 2018, economic activity derived from the Port of New Orleans generated
$100 million. “Port-related industries generate 1 in 5 jobs in Louisiana. The average
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salary of companies located on Port NOLA property is $63,000 per year — 37% higher
than the average local salary” (Port of New Orleans 2018a).
The NOCC and Trade District development proposals underscore two dilemmas
for the port: it is imperative for the Port to counteract these developments, and the
status quo congestion is unsustainable. As it is, developments in containerization and
technology (which shrunk the economic base of longshoremen to a very small fraction),
exacerbated by the difficulty of access at the last mile, constrain the Port of New
Orleans from being the engine which would drive the city in its capacity as a primary
container-shipping “intermodal node” of the “global commodity chain” (Gereffi 1994;
Rodrigue 2006). At issue is a descending order of economies of scale: megaregional,
regional, and last mile. The economy of the city of would be enhanced by port-based
cultivation of its status as a primary node in the freight transportation flow of the Gulf
South megaregion. The port is hampered in fully realizing its status as a “gateway
thruport… where the containers are shuffled to their…respective [transportation modes]
bound to specific markets” (Rodrigue 2006:7, 15). The proposed developments adjacent
to the entrance and exit of the Clarence Henry Truckway are unworkable in the current
context.
Research Problem
The Port of New Orleans cannot sustain its current last mile freight congestion at
the entrance to the Clarence Henry Truckway. The narrative of the primacy of a tourist
economy for the city has advanced to the point where major expansions of the NOCC
and the development of the Trade District threaten to choke off the Port’s already
problematic access. It is important to comprehend how the Port came to be in this
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situation, to find ways both to ameliorate it and to prevent it from happening in the
future. As people are the cause of this congestion, and their culturally-derived actions
are driven by the narratives they tell about the Port, and about freight in general,
understanding the role of these narratives in bringing the Port to this situation, and
potentially exacerbating it in the future, is critical. The thesis of this research is that
narrative, rather than being simply one element among many, is a primary factor in the
development of freight transportation infrastructure.
Research Questions
How did narrative contribute to last mile freight congestion at the Port of New Orleans?
1. What were the dynamics which facilitated freight opposition?
2. What did freight transportation infrastructure mean for the different
stakeholders through time?
3. How did the narratives of the residents successfully compete with those of the
Port?
a. What were the dynamics of power in this story?
4. How did changing national policies affect questions 1-3?
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Chapter 2. Review of the Literature
The canonical urban studies literature has been highly influential on the recent
turn in urban planning to the Complete Streets / New Urbanism movement, which seeks
to repurpose city streets to minimize, and where possible eliminate, automobile traffic in
favor of pedestrian uses, bicycling, and increased access to public transit. This
literature, however does not significantly consider freight transportation. There is,
however, literature within urban studies on the impact of elite domination on the creation
of urban space, which can also be extrapolated to both Completer Streets / New
Urbanism and the findings of this ethnohistory. While anthropology has recently
undertaken a turn to consideration of infrastructures, it has a limited focus on the
narrative symbolic processes involved in the facilitation of freight transportation.
Urban Studies and Freight
The primary textbook for the introductory urban studies course at UNO,
“Introduction to Cities,” does not contain the word “freight” in the index (Chen 2013).
The transportation topics covered in this pages this index refers to under the term
“transportation” are: commuter gridlock, “road rage,” racial discrimination in the
implementation of light rail, automobiles as suburban transportation, the historical
relationship of journey-to-work transportation technology and urban form, the evolution
of mass transit, the transportation implications of Los Angeles as a “postmodern
metropolis” lacking a city center, the importance of metropolitan transportation planning
to control urban sprawl, the establishment of the interstate highway system, the
relationship between transportation infrastructure and natural disasters, and
transportation and sustainability (Chen 2013:156). None of these topics is discussed in
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its freight implications. The only passage in the book which can be construed as freight
related is “For example, sites along rivers typically lend themselves to the emergence of
towns and villages because rivers furnish the means for transporting goods that can be
bought and sold, thus sustaining the livelihoods of people” (Chen 2013:104).
When automotive transportation infrastructure is discussed in the literature, it is
usually in the context of the negative impact of the federal highway system on the inner
city, in the tradition of Jane Jacobs and Lewis Mumford (Jacobs 1961; Mumford 1961).
Jacobs was an early 1960s activist who advocated for socially functional walkable
community-oriented neighborhood spaces versus the interstate highway-based urban
renewal plans of Robert Moses, New York City’s nationally influential director of the
Department of Parks, as well as of the Triborough Bridge commission (Jacobs 1961).
Moses’ car-friendly philosophy and highway building initiatives influenced interstate
highway-based urban renewal projects throughout the country (Caro 1974). Jacobs led
a successful campaign against the Moses-developed agenda of putting a highway
through Greenwich Village and the West Village neighborhoods of New York City (Caro
1974).
Lewis Mumford wrote that the physical urban environment is derived from sociocultural / socio-historical processes. He discusses the rise of elites, that is, city, state,
and federal planners who deleteriously exercised the power of urban form for the
wealthy over most people. His primary example is the automobile-centric planning
regime (Mumford 1961). It is partly from the writings of Mumford that the “highways are
bad in general, and cars are bad in particular” trope within urban studies and planning is
derived.
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Examples of recent highway-oppositional urban studies literature include discussions of
the cost burden to states of highway planning (Taylor 1995), the historical lack of
significant influence by urban planners over the development of highways running
through cities (Taylor 2000), histories of successful community opposition to federal
“highwaymen” (Mohl 2014:870), the urban cost of theorizing freeways solely in terms of
car usage, as well as the general prioritization of cars over pedestrians; and the
desirability of reorienting traffic patterns around pedestrian usages (Brown 2005, 2006;
Brown, Morris, and AICP 2009; Patton 2007), and the implications of the federal
highway system as a sometime “civil rights violation” because of its inequitable effects
on poor people and minorities (Karas 2015:9). There is, however, a limited focus on the
desirability of maintaining the usefulness of the highway system (Yingfeng, Hard, and
Bochner 2013). This focus is not reflected in the most recent tendency in the field of
urban studies.
Complete Streets / New Urbanism
The newest trend in urban studies, is the Complete Streets Movement, is an offshoot of
the broader New Urbanism. New Urbanism has little consideration of land use
resources for freight transportation or parking. In their discussion of how New Urbanism,
originally conceived as a way for owners of open spaces to humanistically develop their
land, can be applied to inner city spaces, often notorious for their status as sites of
urban renewal-interstate highway victimization, Laplante and McCann do not use the
word “freight” even once (Laplante and McCann 2008). Complete Streets is an offshoot
of the New Urbanism, and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. “Complete
Streets, Context Sensitive Solutions, New Urbanism, and Smart Growth are but a few of
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the terms that reflect and accompany initiatives to develop people-centric, communityfocused public spaces that accommodate walking, bicycling, and transit in addition to
motor vehicle use” (Mustafa and Birdsall 2014). In Complete Streets’ self-imaging, cars
are peripheral and there is no room for freight. See Figures 3 and 4.
In another piece entitled “Complete Streets: We Can Get There from Here,” the
authors mention freight one time in the phrase “…many roads continue to be built as if
private motor vehicles and freight are the only users” (Laplante and McCann 2008:24).
In the volume Complete Streets: Best Policy and Implementation Practices, Mcann and
Rynne mention freight as an afterthought in their case studies. For example, when
discussing how Seattle has chosen to include freight in its planning that incorporates
aspects of Complete Streets, they state “Pedestrian and bicycle advocates are still not
happy … but the city felt such language was necessary to gain the support of the freight
community” (McCann and Rynne 2010:27).
In their proposed models of resolutions for cities to adopt the Complete Streets planning
policies, we read “NOW, THEREFORE, LET IT BE RESOLVED that [Municipality /
Adopting body] hereby recognizes the importance of creating complete streets that
enable safe travel by all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, public transportation
riders and drivers, motor-vehicle drivers, [insert other significant local users if desired,
e.g., drivers of agricultural vehicles, emergency vehicles, freight, etc.]…” with freight
portrayed as an option or afterthought rather than as a necessity of urban life (McCann
and Rynne 2010:119 emphases in original). This antipathy to freight is a function of the
movement’s origins.
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Figure 3. Complete Streets’ Self-Imaging.

Source: McCann and Rynne 2010
Figure 4. The Complete Streets / New Urbanism Paradigm at the
NOCC.

Source: MCCNO.com
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Canonical Urban Studies Literature
However, it is not only Jacobs and Mumford who are foundational to Complete
Streets / New Urbanism. The movement is rooted in the Marxian turn in geography
which came about partly because of the French student / worker uprisings of 1968. The
Urban Revolution was originally published in 1970 by Henri Lefebvre and translated into
English in 2003 (Lefebvre 2003). In it Henri Lefebvre writes of how capitalism has
commodified urban space, both as a “… source [of] surplus value [and a] means of
production …]” (Merrifield 2005:694). Lefebvre is referring here to how the production
and appropriation of urban space by private enterprise for “real estate speculation,” and
the commodification of urban spaces, has supplanted industrialization as the primary
means of profit generation (Lefebvre 2003:211, 212, 159 in Merrifield 2005:695).
Complete Streets / New Urbanism seeks to turn control of this space over to the
residents via zoning and codification.
Per Complete Streets / New Urbanism, “[Lefebvre’s] ‘cybernanthropic urbanist’
[technocrat on steroids] maintains that streets are ‘traffic machines’ where the ‘objectking’ or ‘object-pilot’ circulates, where vehicles imbued with surplus value shift
commodities and labor-power” (Merrifield 2005:699). Complete Streets / New Urbanism
seeks to bring life back to the street, putting the “object-king” of freight in its place and
elevating pedestrian community per Jacobs.
In the Production of Space, 1991, Lefebvre posits that space is not a geographic
given, but the result of interacting social forces, political classes, and competing
economic interests, and per Jacobs he prioritizes the human social or “use value” of
space over its economic or “exchange value” (Lefebvre 1991; Molotch 1993:887; see
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Marx “Capital” in Tucker 1978 for a discussion of use value and exchange value). Of
Lefebvre, Molotch writes that "A sort of master distinction is between those who produce
a space for domination [what Lefebvre calls "abstract space"] versus those who produce
space as an appropriation to serve human need ["absolute space"]” (Molotch 1993:889).
This is the essence of the freight assessment of Complete Street/New Urbanism, which
views freight transportation as spaces of “domination” over and above "human need."
Lefebvre writes “Pressure from below must therefore also confront the state in its
role as organizer of space, as the power that controls urbanization, the construction of
buildings and spatial planning in general. (The state's) ... ability to intervene in space
can and must be turned back against it, by grass-roots opposition, in the form of
counter-plans and counter-projects designed to thwart strategies, plans and
programmes imposed from above" (Lefebvre 1991:383 in Molotch 1991: 892). As
Lefebvre puts it, "'On the horizon, then, at the furthest edge of the possible, it is a matter
of producing the space of the human species - the collective (generic) work of the
species - on the model of what used to be called "art."... [The production of] a planetwide space as the social foundation of a transformed everyday life ... such is the dawn
now beginning to break on the far horizon.'" (Lefebvre 1991:422 in Molotch 1993:894).
The authors and practitioners of Complete Streets / New Urbanism see themselves as
charged with the implementation of Lefebvre's program. This program is based upon
three aspects of the production of space.
Swyngedouw writes of Lefebvre thinking in terms of space as “…the perceived,
the conceived, and the lived”- (Swyngedouw 1992:318). Perceived space is what
people experience as they participate in their normal activities; conceived space is how

28

space is “discursively” represented (notably by “planners,” among others); and lived
space is communicated through stories (narratives); "it is the space of symbols and
images, which the imagination continuously seeks to change and appropriate (the turf of
gangs, for example)” (Swyngedouw 1992:318). Lefebvre was foundational to the
thinking behind Complete Streets / New Urbanism, but others were also influential.
In 1970, Manuel Castells wrote The Urban Question, which was translated into English
in 1977 (Castells 1977). The 1970 Castells held to a Marxist-oriented conflict view of the
production of urban space, seeing it as an inherently political process of "conflict"
between competing social interests (Pickvance 1978:175). Under the influence of
Castells then, the Complete Streets / New Urbanism movement narratively brings the
interests of residents and freight transportation into inherent and assumed conflict. That
is, where freight is concerned, Complete Streets / New Urbanism reflects Castells by
seeing the production of space as the outcome of the conflicting narratives of residents'
consumption of space and those of freight usages of space for economic production.
However, Castells’ views on how to effect change morphed over time, and it is his shift
from seeking revolution to looking for planning and leftist “municipal control,” as the
means of transformation benefitting urban residents, which resonates with the strategy
of Complete Streets / New Urbanism (Pickvance 1978:175). The orthodox Marxist turn
in urban studies continued, however, during the early 1970s.
In 1973, David Harvey wrote Social Justice and the City. Influenced by Castells,
it is a "...classical Marxist..." analysis (Sjoberg 1975:279). Per Marx, Harvey
distinguishes between the use value and exchange value of urban space (Harvey
1973). Complete Streets / New Urbanism is billed as a use value of space overcoming
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what is seen as the dominance of an exchange value, namely freight, although this
language per se (use value/exchange value) is not used in Complete Streets / New
Urbanism. Harvey sees capitalism’s “…inability to deal with inequality and injustice” as
one of its aspects that “created the modern city” (Morrill 1974:476). This perception of
inequality is what generates anti-freight narratives. Complete Streets / New Urbanism
seeks to zone and codify equality and justice into being. The pressures of capitalist
urbanization, according to Morrill’s reading of Harvey, lead “… to the energy crisis, to
environmental degradation and excessive suburbanization,” all phenomena which
Complete Streets / New Urbanism purports to address (Morrill 1974:476).
However, in this work Harvey did not account for the then-burgeoning transition
from an industrial to a service economy in advanced capitalist societies (Sjoberg
1975:279). Part of what is happening with the Complete Streets / New Urbanism
planning paradigm is that it is one of the ways in which global cities, that is, centers of
the finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) sector are making their inner cores,
downtown areas, and dilapidated neighborhoods (some of which are considered
culturally significant “hip” areas) attractive to the gentrifying entrepreneurs and
employees of this sector, as well as to members of Richard Florida’s “Creative Class”
(Brash 2011; Florida 2004; Sassen 2012; Zukin 1995, 2010). In these instances,
Complete Streets / New Urbanism is turned on its head, that is, it is not in fact a force
for the democratization of urban space, but rather a tool of class warfare via the
facilitation of gentrification. The emerging international dominance the FIRE sector led
to a nuancing of the Marxian turn in urban studies.
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Edward Soja published Postmodern Geographies in 1989. In this work, Soja
combines Marxist and Postmodern analyses to construct a new “ontology of being” in
which “… space is accorded the same … priority as time and being” (Dear 1990:650;
Resch 1992). This perspective is inspirational for Complete Streets / New Urbanism
(Soja’s dismissal of the movement notwithstanding) because its vision seeks to
democratize "...the spatial order of human existence [which] arises from the (social)
production of space, the construction of human geographies that both reflect and
configure being in the world" (Soja 1989:25 in Dear 1990:650).
In 2010, Susan Feinstein published The Just City. For Feinstein, efforts to create
justice in cities should focus on the three domains of “equity, diversity, and democracy”
(Tonkiss 2011:584). By equity, Fainstein means
… a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy
that does not favor those who are already better off at the beginning … Diversity …
encompasses reference to the physical environment as well as social relations, and
refers to policy ambitions that go beyond encouraging acceptance of others to include
the social composition of places … Democracy [is the] ideal that everyone’s opinion
should be respectfully heard and that no particular group should be privileged in an
interchange … (Fainstein 2010:36, 67, 29).
Advocates of the Complete Streets / New Urbanism paradigm would see
themselves as promoters of equity in their emphasis on facilitating access to public
transit, of diversity in the promotion of multiuse public spaces, and of democracy in that
they see themselves as promoting the voices of those who traditionally are not heard in
the urban planning process (cyclists, pedestrians, and public transit users).
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Soja’s Seeking Spatial Justice was also published in 2010. Against the backdrop
of the Los Angeles Bus Riders Union’s successful fight to expand public transit access
to the poor and working people, not just the wealthy (in the form of a proposed light rail
system), Soja posits “… the spatial dimension of social justice … ‘seeing the search for
social justice as a struggle over geography’” (Barsky 2011:281, Soja 2010:13 in Barsky
2011:281; Soja 2010).
The influence of Soja on Complete Streets / New Urbanism is evident in Keil’s
statement that Seeking Spatial Justice “… should be on the shelf of every critical
urbanist and in the hands of a new generation of students in geography, urban studies,
planning and cognate fields” (Keil 2011:1086). However, according to Soja, "‘the
spatiality of (in)justice can be both intensely oppressive and potentially liberating’" (Soja
2010:37 i Keil 2011:1086). Both experiences have been reported by residents in
response to the Complete Streets / New Urbanism movement. At times, although
operating under the aegis of social justice as indexed by its emphasis on reforming
public transit, the movement is catering to gentrifiers and yuppies because of its
emphasis on bicycling and walkable spaces.
This critique of the relationship between the Complete Streets / New Urbanism
paradigm, notable urban studies literature, and freight closes out with Zukin’s discussion
of the relationship between consumptive practices and authenticity, Naked City (Zukin
2010). According to Zukin, place-based consumption of local goods and services, which
attempts to index a city’s authenticity, that is, its “… social diversity and sense of history
…” can threaten this very quality by facilitating gentrification, the marketing of that city to
wealthy elites, and the resultant disruption of generational neighborhoods (Brown-
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Saracino 2010:863). The repurposing and marketing of the Brooklyn wharves at Red
Hook for sports and tourism usages are analogous to the repurposing of the Mississippi
Riverfront for tourism and conventions over freight transportation. "Marketing" is another
name for attempts to establish the dominance of a given narrative. If the Right to the
City for "authentic" residents and services is the focus of Naked City, then it can be said
that Complete Streets / New Urbanism seeks to facilitate "authenticity" in urban
neighborhoods through the promotion of cycling, but especially of walking, per Jacobs.
It should be noted that in none of the canonical works of urban studies discussed
above does the word “freight” appear. The term is mentioned as an afterthought in the
recent literature from the Complete Streets / New Urbanism movement itself. However,
in the canonical literature, freight is lumped in (unnamed) with negative connotations of
automotive transport in general, relegated to the realm of exchange value and set over
in opposition to the social use value of space. For ports such as the Port of New
Orleans wrestling with last mile congestion issues, it is necessary to find a successful
way to narratively market freight transportation as intrinsic to the creation of all use
value of urban space.
Elites within Urban Studies Literature
There is a literature within urban studies on the effects of elite domination on the
social production of space. Rocco studied the history of the “discovery,” or more
properly the creation, of Brazil (Rocco 1997:121). He concluded that the entire nation—
space on a grand scale—is the product of a colonial capitalist venture, and as such was
unable to generate its own economic validity in the hinterland. The result of this was that
Portuguese elites accessed Brazil solely for easy profiteering (ibid).
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Glaeser argued from social capital theory that communal networks were greater
predictors of well-being than income (Glaeser 2000). This conclusion was reached by
accessing data from the General Social Survey (GSS). These results were extrapolated
to show that strong social interactions are also necessary for “… the success of
governments and societies at large” (ibid: 101). This demonstrates the potential for
social capital to dominate over the economic capital of elites. Andra Condor wrote a
comparative study of neoliberal governance in the cities of Jakarta and Buenos Aires.
She used the lens of water supply and land use to investigate how elite power is
manifested in these two global cities, specifically as it relates to “… the dynamics of the
shaped environments …” created by these cities’ westernization (Condor 2015:5). She
concludes that the power of local culture can eclipse the pressures of globalization
(Condor 2015:12).
Uppal’s lens is the 2010 Commonwealth Games hosted in New Delhi. He
compares this experience with other “Hallmark events,” such as Olympic games, to
conclude that many times these actions on the part of governments are oversold,
particularly to impoverished populations (Uppal 2006:7) . They often turn out to “… be
anti-poor, badly planned and ecologically unsound” (ibid). Similarly, Salvati and Zitti
explored the relationship between competition for the 2004 Olympic Games and
unregulated urban sprawl in Athens, Greece (Salvati and Zitti 2017:110). They critiqued
this model of elite-driven economic development as it unfolds “… in poorly planned and
long-deregulated urban contexts …” (ibid). They concluded that this economic mode is
inherently flawed, and that greater economic importance should be placed upon cities
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which are both nodes of communication, and of connection between industry and
agriculture.
Obeng-Odoom contests the concept of the “resource curse” which is prevalent in
the social sciences (Obeng-Odoom 2012). That is, there is an orthodoxy which posits
that state abundance derived from extractive resources ultimately leads to elite
autocratic rule and social breakdown (Obeng-Odoom 2012; Watts 2004). ObengOdoom uses the case of Sekondi-Takoradi, an oil city in West Africa, to oppose this
concept. He performs an “institutional-analytical” history of the city, by which he means
the use of historical datasets to interrogate “… broader social explanations embedded in
which are the roles of political economic institutions and phenomena …” (ObengOdoom 2012:122). His argument is that the city’s history of maritime and rail access
show that rather than suffering any social depredations due to the effects of an oil
economy, it rather is returning to a grandeur it once held during the 1920s (ObengOdoom 2012:121).
Anthropology and Infrastructure
Freight transportation infrastructure is relevant for anthropological study because,
“Ideology does not just exist in linguistic form; it also appears in material structures”
(Humphrey 2005:39). The term “material” must be distinguished clearly from the term
“materiality,” which appears frequently in the anthropological literature on infrastructure.
Materiality can refer to the impacts of physical qualities on human perception. Oil as a
natural resource is a frequently cited example (Rogers 2015). Rogers illuminates how
socio-politics is reflected in physical oil infrastructures. This oil focus exists perhaps
because “…the ‘geist’ of oil has been central to the history and mythos of the modern
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world” (Bowden 1985; Watts 2004:51; Wildavsky, Tenenbaum, and Albin 1981).
Wildavsky et. al. use debates about oil and gas scarcity to argue that a policy focus on
the availability of oil & gas is misplaced. Their perspective is that policy dictates the
relevance of data. This is analogous to the construct in this research of the role of
narrative in the facilitation of freight infrastructure, as I will show that community
narratives, rather than economic exigencies, have driven Port-related freight
transportation in New Orleans since 1969.
Bowden argues that the validity of oil resource estimates is socially constructed
through connection to the oil industry's "political economy" (Bowden 1985). He bases
this on the empirical estimates of M. King Hubbert regarding peak oil, the changing
validity of which was a function of the oil scarcity / surplus narratives of the oil industry.
Watts discusses how the “authoritarian governmentality” of oil is generative of the
volatility and violence of Nigerian oil politics (Watts 2004). He argues that the violence
associated with "petro-capitalism" is derived from the governmentality, and resulting
"spaces of rule," which petro-capitalism generates, and in which it exists. Violence is not
derived from the oil itself. In his interrogation of the corrupt and violently shifting
Nigerian oil-related “governable spaces,” he explicates how these governable spaces
build upon “pre-oil dynamics” (Watts 2004:75). I seek to do the same for Port-related
freight transportation infrastructure solutions in New Orleans, that is, to find the prefreight-proposal dynamics which generated the oppositional narratives. I focus on the
defeated freight options because the Port of New Orleans is at a critical juncture in its
attempt to expand logistically through the lower Mississippi River basin, linking its
container operations through Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard parishes (St. Bernard
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Television 2018). Understanding the history of these failed projects relative to the
influence of the community narratives can yield policy prescriptions to promote the
success of the Port’s future agenda of logistical expansion (Port of New Orleans
2018b).
In contrast to much of the urban studies literature on the production of space,
from the early 1970s, purely Marxist interpretations of oil production are relatively rare,
as when Khalaf states “...that it is the broader impersonal socioeconomic conditions that
in the final analysis produce certain images in a given society at a given time. These
conditions also determine, but may not necessarily dominate, the forms and other
cultural peculiarities these images may take” (Khalaf 1992:84). In Khalaf’s analysis of
the Kuwaiti state, the state is not only political but also "controls the means of
production" (ibid). This discussion of control segues into conflict theory.
Conflict theory discussions revolve around tensions between the state apparatus
and the population, over who will benefit from the financial gain of oil extraction (Reyna
and Behrends 2008; Watts 2012). At the time of their writing, (Reyna and Behrends
2008) argued that because peak oil predictions were being fulfilled, we were seeing
increases in US military action to dominate oil, and that overall there was a rise in the
military struggle of nations to dominate the vanishing resource. This general conflict
perspective reflects my discussion of how the elites of New Orleans lost control of the
freight transportation narrative. The term “elites” refers to members of the upper echelon
of the business class from whom membership on the board of directors of the Port,
known as the Dock Board, has traditionally been drawn, as well as those members of
the political class (and general business community), who have traditionally been
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committed to seeing different freight transportation options for the Port come to
realization. The Dock Board is the board of directors of the Port of New Orleans. Its
members are appointed by the governor of Louisiana.
In 2012 Watts returned to the political economy of the Niger delta, and included
the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, when discussing how "...empire,
dispossession, race, and the insecurities of neoliberal life" are made manifest by these
two “oil assemblages” (Watts 2012:440). By “oil assemblages” he refers to "...the
processes by which a wider world obtains the energy that drives its materials and
technical life." For him "…oil capital and oil markets, not [oil] itself are the drivers of…the
political economy of…the oil assemblage" (Watts 2012:440, 439). This is like the role of
narrative in this research, that is, narrative’s contribution to last mile Port congestion is
that it facilitates limitations on congestion mitigation strategies. In addition to conflict
theory, anthropology discusses oil production from the perspective of semiotics- the
science of how people construct reality using signs.
Behrends and Schareika argue, based on their observations of the “social
transformations” wrought by the discovery and production of oil, that anthropologists
studying oil need to look at both the sign systems produced by the actors and how
these systems are deployed in practice, not one or the other. (Behrends and Schareika
2010). “Significations” (semiotics) and meanings are attributed to the process of oil
extraction in Africa. In this analysis, oil generates socially agreed-upon meanings, but it
is the social processes around oil’s extraction which animates and validates those
meanings (Behrends and Schareika 2010:83). I take Behrends and Schareika’s
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semiotic perspective on the social processes around the facilitation of freight
transportation infrastructure (Behrends and Schareika 2010).
The material qualities of a resource can serve as cultural signifiers, as when a
post-Soviet petrochemical company attempted to utilize the qualities of oil and natural
gas in a campaign of attempted cultural reproduction in the regions directly impacted by
resource extraction (Rogers 2012). Rogers discusses oil and gas corporations attempts
to use these properties, and their associated infrastructures, to socially engineer
approval of the corporations activities in the Perm region of Russia. The “depth of oil
[and] connectivity of gas pipelines...are used to evoke cultural heritage and social
connectivity, via corporate-sponsored festivals” (Rogers 2012:284).
In this research, I clarify how New Orleans’ freight infrastructure’s physical
aspects were comprehended in different categories of meaning by different
stakeholders through time. The historical analysis of the ways in which the materialities
of freight transportation weighed upon the affected citizens of New Orleans, in the
generation of the anti-freight narrative, comes closer to Rogers’ 2015 use of the term.
These materialities—noise, pollution, structural damage from vibrations, and the danger
of accidents—had been with the residents who lived along the historic arterials ever
since motorized freight began. However, when the shipping container began to
revolutionize the freight transportation industry in such a way as to become a
foundational component of globalism, the size, weight, and frequency of the freight
trucks along these arterials began to increase, and Rogers’ “materialities” became more
intrusive (Levinson 2008). The materialities of a resource can undercut its economic
functions based upon how these materialities are perceived by different actors. Zalik
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argued, based upon Shell Oil's participation in the oil futures market, that "…speculative
trading…" based on socially-derived perceptions of oil scarcity, or lack thereof,
determines oil prices, not the actual geological volume of the resource (Zalik 2010). This
aligns with the perspective of this research, that it is the socially-derived, narratively
communicated perceptions of Port-related freight transportation on the part of the wider
community, rather than an understanding of the economic and personal need for this
freight, which facilitate the existence of this freight transportation infrastructure (George
2013; Zalik 2010:553). These narrative perceptions can include the dimension of racial
conflict over who benefits from the freight resource.
Vitalis says that it is necessary to see "American oil firms…[investing in]…racism
and white supremacy [in order to understand the critical tradition of political economy for
the region]" (Vitalis 2002:186). He focuses on relations between the United States and
Saudi Arabia and the influence of the history of Saudi state and market formation on oil
politics and emerging markets in the 21st century. By charting the chronology of
developments influencing U.S.-Saudi relations from the 20th century through 2002,
Vitalis shows their influence on the ideas, institutions and social movements related to
political economy. Similar identity discourses are components of narrative in other
anthropological research as well.
One case describes narrative impacting corporate action by oil companies, again
in the Niger Delta (Adunbi 2013). Adunbi argues that narrative facilitates pushback
against oil corporations and the state, based upon Ilaje tribal myths of oil resource
ownership in Nigeria through ritual identification with the Yoruba tribe (Adunbi 2013).
Firat focuses on energy infrastructure projects in Turkey designed to promote “regional
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integration” at the political and economic—and, overarching cultural—levels (Firat
2016). For Firat, "Material infrastructures are important ‘political stories’ that
anthropologists need to attend to because they embody ‘particular intentions … in
physical form’” (Winner 1980:125 in Firat 2016:90). These infrastructures embodied by
political stories are “materialized dynamics of power and economic inequality” (Firat
2016:81).
Sawyer discusses how access of a resource by a population gives the extracting
corporation the social space to push a narrative of more extraction (Sawyer 2010).
Ferguson relates how regionalism is determinative of the style of corporate-investmentdriven capitalist governmentality (Ferguson 2005). Ferguson also takes a modified view
of political economy. In addressing militarily fortified enclaves of production and capital
benefit in the oil-producing regions of Africa, Ferguson holds that global capitalism does
not impose a normalizing grid over societies per Scott in Seeing Like a State (Scott
1998). Instead, capital inhabits differential points of corporate wealth in these regions
with little or no beneficial economic effects on the general population. The management
of people’s perceptions—or lack thereof—of these benefits is key.
Weszkalnys describes the “…management of expectations” in a government’s
social navigation of the anticipated understandings, responses, and desires, positive or
negative, of a population confronted with the unrealized possibility of oil revenue
(Weszkalnys 2008:474). She argues that the oil-related professional class is managing
people's expectations, and physical oil infrastructures, in anticipation of the "oil curse"
which has destabilized the African oil-producing countries (Weszkalnys 2008:480). This
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shows how economic expectations, analogous to the role of narrative in this research,
can facilitate access of the resource.
It is in the literature on built, physical infrastructures, however, rather than on
extractive resources, that anthropological research on freight transportation finds its
theoretical niche. Two types of infrastructure, roads and the concrete-built environment,
are illustrative of this. Ethnographic discussions of the social processes surrounding
road construction, deployment, and the impacts roads have on political and social
structures, understood through adaptations of classic ethnographic practice, are primary
to the anthropology of infrastructure (Dalakoglou 2010). In Dalakogulu 2010, the
narratives surrounding the construction of a road in post-socialist Albania “…are
creative and poetical schemes through which people perceive and make sense of the
complex global economy and of daily life in the age of the fast and broad mobility,
migration, and transnationalism within which highway construction projects are
embedded” (Dalakoglou 2010:144). Dalakoglou writes from a neo-Marxist perspective.
Dalakoglou’s Marxism is not so much concerned with demonstrating the historical
evolution of society to an ultimate communism, but still grapples with capitalist forms of
domination (Dalakoglou 2010; Oxford English dictionary 2018). Dalakoglou holds that
the emics (the categories of meaning of the informants) revealed at the ethnographic
scale of research, including narratives, reveal nuances of enculturation and nonalienation that the macro-economic scale conceals. Therefore, roads are fertile ground
for ethnographic methods (Dalakoglou 2010:133). While not an ethnography, but rather
more of a historical analysis, this research holds the same “fertile” capacity for an
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anthropology of Port-related freight transportation. This historical analysis is wellgrounded in anthropology (Sahlins 1981; Wolf 1982).
Other examples of “road ethnographies” include Roseman’s discussion of how
those living in areas directly impacted by road construction pushed back against the
official development narrative (Roseman 1996). This is valuable for a comparative
discussion of citizen resistance to freight transportation arterials. For Roseman, history
is a symbolic construction. She argues, based on the history of road-building in Galicia
in 1967, that historical identities are socially constructed to facilitate coping with
perceived oppression. This is like Masquelier’s perspective, which demonstrates how
road construction in Niger connotes understandings of reality as a function of space,
“…linking the road…To the region’s history of civil engineering, emergent capitalism,
and religious transformation…the road is a hybrid space that condenses past histories
at the same time that it concretizes the perils and possibilities of modern life for rural
Mawri (Masquelier 2002:829; Roseman 1996). Masquelier shows how the spatial
perceptions of a post-colonial road in Niger are becoming perceptions of modernity. She
argues that this road space “embodies trace narratives of colonial oppression”
(Masquelier 2002:830).
Of special value are Harvey’s 2010 and Knox and Harvey’s 2011 ethnographies
of concrete-based construction in Peru as they touch upon the social relations
engendered around the impacts, of the physical properties upon the senses and the
surrounding environment, of concrete roads. Harvey holds that the success of concrete
infrastructure is a function of the sociopolitical relations which surround it, rather than
focusing on its engineering properties. When Harvey writes that “The image of power
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that concrete affords is thus a compromised one, as the stability and predictability of this
substance is secure only insofar as it is surrounded by and embedded in specific
relationships of care,” she is proposing an analysis that is applicable to freight
transportation (Harvey 2010:28; Knox and Harvey 2011). Kahn writes of the
development of a motorway in Pakistan which was supposed to connote a sense of
modernity to the citizens. “Given the poor state Pakistan was in, developmentally
speaking, the Motorway was out of step with its environs. In other words, the
Motorway’s modernity far outstripped that of Pakistan’s” (Khan 2006:88). She could be
speaking of the state of New Orleans Port freight infrastructure relative to container
freight transportation demand at the time of the arterial shutdowns. That is,
containerization had already come to dominate global shipping by the mid-1980s when
the arterials were shut down. Freight transportation modernization was outpacing the
freight transportation infrastructure of the Port. Containerization was to the Port as the
Motorway was to Pakistan. Khan discusses a modified governmentality, which functions
by “attraction and repulsion rather than discipline and resistance” (Foucault 1977; Khan
2006:75). She uses the failed attempt to evoke a sensory experience of modernity by
building an ultimately underutilized "modern" highway in Pakistan to argue that there is
a relationship between the affective experience of infrastructure and conceptions of the
future.
More recent anthropological explorations of infrastructures refer to them as
“ontological experiments” (Jensen and Morita 2017). Ontology refers to the study of
essential being or first causes; it has been denoted in the past as “metaphysics” (Oxford
English Dictionary 2018d). In these discussions, infrastructures are first causes which
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“…give shape to culture, society, and politics” (Jensen and Morita 2017:615). In this
research on infrastructure, I go in the opposite direction. That is, if narrative is a
component of “culture, society, and politics,” then according to the work of these recent
scholars, infrastructure gives rise to narrative. I argue the opposite: that narrative
facilitates infrastructure, or, in most of the cases examined, discourages it. If narrative
can discourage or facilitate the “being” of infrastructure, then one would say that
narrative is “ontologically prior” to the existence of infrastructure. That is, I will show how
the oppositional narratives, or the seeds of them, were in place before any
consideration was given to the geography, geological characteristics, engineering
specifics, etc. of the freight infrastructures.
These ontological experiments are represented in a variety of ways. Brenda
Chalfin sees infrastructures as “… [providing] the basis of urban public life and the
foundation for the commonwealth,” as represented in a case study she did of how a
large public restroom facility in Ghana became the nexus of the lifeway and cultural
sustenance of its patrons (Chalfin 2017:648). Penelope Harvey’s recent contribution to
the anthropological literature of infrastructure contains elements which are closer to my
perspective on the relationship between narrative and infrastructure (Harvey 2017). In
her discussion of efforts by the Peruvian government to intervene in the lives of locals in
the Cusco region by modernizing waste treatment facilities, she touches upon many
elements which dovetail with my discussion of the tension between narratives of
economic development and those of environmentalism, as these are “…re-negotiated in
spaces of distributed sovereignty and decentralized environmental governance” (Harvey
2017:672). However, per Chalfin, she also views changes in infrastructure as leading to
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a multiplicity of its lived meanings for those who experienced its presence; that is, for
Harvey, changes in infrastructure are ontologically prior to local categories of meaning
(Harvey 2017:673).
In his 2017 “Pipe Dreams: Sewage Infrastructure and Activity Trails in Phnom
Penh”, Casper Bruun Jensen uses the efforts of a Japanese Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO) to rebuild dilapidated sewerage infrastructure as his ontological
lens (Jensen 2017). Yet where he writes that “Infrastructures…consist of metal and
machines as much as by meanings and discourse,” I show that without a congruent
dominant narrative, an infrastructure’s existence is tenuous. (Jensen 2017:629). Contra
Jensen, I argue that the narratives which facilitate infrastructures are indeed “…there to
begin with…in fixed form” (Jensen 2017:629). He calls attention to the ways in which
Lea and Pholeros have “…a steady focus on the concrete arrangements that make up
infrastructures or, crucially, do not make them up” (Jensen 2017:630; Lea and Pholeros
2010).
Jensen contrasts his discussion of “activity trails,” that is, accretions of political,
social, and technological action which give rise to politics, society, and technology, with
a “phenomenological [approach]” (Jensen 2017:631). Specifically, he opposes “human
embodiment and sense-making capacities” as infrastructural organizers, whereas I do
the opposite (Jensen 2017:631). Narratives are fundamental to how people “make
sense” of their lives and surroundings, and these understandings are what facilitate
infrastructures. These narratives can function as Jensen’s “pipe dreams” in the sense of
being vehicles of rumor; it does not matter whether an infrastructurally oppositional
narrative is empirically true in the scientific sense (Jensen 2017:632). I will show how
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narratives facilitate or discourage infrastructure. Jensen, however, writes “…pipe
dreams can thus be seen as emanations of infrastructural arrangements” (Jensen
2017:633 emphasis original).
In “Infrastructural Hope: Anticipating 'Independent Roads' and Territorial Integrity
in Southern Kyrgyzstan,” Madeleine Reeves writes of how road construction along an
unstable border determines the affect of the residents (Reeves 2017). She discusses
how language is deployed to “… enable a new road to come into being …” and
specifically mentions “ … the mobilising of elected representatives, the appeal to
languages of abandonment and territorial loss … ” which are both key to how narrative
has historically worked in the realm of freight transportation infrastructure in New
Orleans (Reeves 2017:711).
In discussing such mobilization, I follow much of the same analytical thought of
Stephen Gregory’s Black Corona, in the sense that resident-based Port freight
opposition communicated similar themes to his research community’s opposition to
proposed infrastructure improvements at LaGuardia Airport (Gregory 1998). Gregory
sought “… to restore both history and politics to discussions of contemporary black
urban life through an analysis of [black] community activism …(Gregory 1998:18, 19). I
expand on this objective to include histories of both white and black community activism
(St. Bernard Parish and the city of New Orleans).
Other notable anthropological literature on infrastructure, which is relevant for
freight, includes Laura Bear’s Navigating Austerity, and Andrew Newman’s Landscape
of Discontent. Bear writes about the international financialization of state debt
associated with the workings of the Hooghly River in India and its major ports (Bear
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2015). The lifeways of those who work the river are uncovered through ethnography.
Bear writes of the negative impacts of globalization and associated austerity capitalism
upon the workers and how these impacts are narratively communicated. In Bear’s work,
the river workers relegate the disempowered among them to a lower status by utilizing
accusatory tropes (figures of speech) of non-productivity. These tropes are
communicated along lines of “… [gender, religion, and cultural-history] …” (Majumder
2016:649). These are used against those who are experiencing the anti-labor
consequences of international finance, rather than tropes of labor solidarity to build
resistance to this austerity (ibid). Bear uses these observations to argue that
“Capitalism, in its current guise, does not regenerate; it ruins processes of life,
livelihood, and nature … ” (Majumder 2016:648).
In Landscape of Discontent, Newman discusses the socio-politics surrounding
the redevelopment of a Parisian freight transit hub into an accessible urban park,
cultural site, and subsidized apartments (Newman 2015). Using an ethnography of the
actors, including ethnic minority residents as well as city officials, Newman addresses
the question “Who are the intended beneficiaries of green spaces and sustainable
cities” (Terrio 2016:938)? He argues that the park is a zone of socially adopted
accessible space claimed by the residents (ibid:939). Nevertheless, conflicts over who
uses it have ensued, leading the surrounding middle-class residents to assume the
function of self-appointed park police (ibid:939). This is telling because the materialities
associated with the construction of the public space— “… demolitions, noise and air
pollution, and toxic dumping … ” —served to marginalize the minority residents, thus
making them the targets of this middle class vigilantism (ibid:938).

48

The Role of Narrative
A narrative is a story, defined as “An account of a series of events, facts, etc.,
given in order and with the establishing of connections between them; a narration, a
story, an account” (Oxford English Dictionary 2018c). In this sense, Narrative facilitates
infrastructure through its deployment to resist the “colonisation of the imagination” by
the "discursive formation" of economic development by facilitating Port freight (Sneath
2009:72). “Discourse” is defined as “The process or faculty of reasoning; reasoned
argument or thought; reason, rationality,” (Oxford English Dictionary 2018a). It is “… a
culture’s determined and determining structures of representation and practice…”
(Terdiman 1985:12). The “reasoned argument(s)” are how narratives are formed. Very
simply, narrative is the “what” and discourse is the “how” (University of Freiburg 2018).
In other words, the residential narratives, composed of “counter-discourses,” dominated
the narratives of the Port, the ACE, and the city, state, and federal governments
(Terdiman 1985:15). Terdiman asserts that the conflict between “sovereign” discourse
and counter-discourse is about “concrete conditions of power,” and counter-discourses
“…are never sovereign” (Terdiman 1985:18 emphasis original). In other words,
sovereign discourses produce hegemony—“dominant ideology which imposes or
reinforces (through conditioned consent) a certain social order”—purveyed by the
political class, to the designated “consumers” of this ideology, “…the general public…”
(Bourdieu and (John Brookshire) 1991:172 in Heritage 1993; Gramsci 1986; Heritage
1993:213; Oxford English Dictionary 2018b). Discourses and narratives are
communicated through tropes. A trope is “a significant or recurrent theme, esp. in a
literary or cultural context; a motif” (Oxford English Dictionary 2018e). An example of the

49

relationship between narrative, discourse, and trope is the tale of The Three Little
Bears. The Three Little Bears is the narrative, that is, the story; Goldilocks’ inspection of
the beds is a discourse, and “This one is too hard, this one is too soft, but this one is
just right” is a trope in the narrative.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodology and research design for this thesis. To
uncover the answer to the question “How did narrative contribute to last mile freight
congestion at the Port of New Orleans”? a variety of historical analysis used by
anthropologists known as “ethnohistory” was employed. Ethnohistory is essentially the
use of historical and ethnological methods and materials to gain knowledge of the
nature and causes of change in a culture defined by ethnological concepts and
categories […] practitioners have discovered the utility of maps, music, paintings,
photographs, folklore, oral tradition, ecology, site exploration, archaeological artifacts
(especially trade goods), museum collections, enduring customs, language, and place
names, as well as a rich variety of written sources. Despite their new-found wealth of
sources, ethnohistorians still rely primarily upon the written record, largely from the pens
of non-native [sources]…” (Axtell 1979:2, 4 emphasis original). The method of
ethnohistory was chosen because it served to document the contribution of narrative to
the social production of freight spaces as the result of interacting social forces, political
classes, and competing economic interests (Lefebvre 1991; Molotch 1993:887).The
“ethnological concepts and categories” documented were the understandings of those
who lived through these events, comprehended primarily through archival research in
the main local print news source in the New Orleans area, the Times-Picayune in its
various formats. The Times-Picayune has been the main source of print news in the
greater New Orleans are for over 100 years. Approximately 600 articles were accessed
from the Times-Picayune and other local print / online news sources. Secondary
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sources, including census tract data, the archives of the Tulane School of Architecture,
GNO Inc. (a regional economic development corporation), and the reporting of the Port
of New Orleans were accessed, as well as open-ended and semi-structured interviews
with key informants.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this research was to explore the documentary history of last mile
freight congestion at the Port of New Orleans, and the relationship of this history to the
ascendancy of the tourism narrative of economic development by the city. This
ethnohistory was compiled for dissertation research at the University of New Orleans
Department of Planning and Urban Studies. At this stage of the research, last mile
freight congestion will be generally defined as traffic obstructions due to competition for
road space between freight trucks, passenger vehicles, and pedestrians.
Scope of Research
This research established a documentary history of various blocked freight
transportation options for the Port, the history of technology-derived labor unrest at the
Port, and the ascendancy of the tourism-based economic strategy for the city, in the
context of the gentrification of the riverfront and the Warehouse District (the warehouse
district consists of gentrified downtown/Central Business District [CBD] Port-related
storage facilities and warehouses). It also documented the story of the acquisition of the
formerly city-owned New Orleans Public Belt Railroad (NOPB) by the Port of New
Orleans. Additionally, it documented the recent purchase of the former Avondale
Shipyard by “ … Virginia-based T. Parker Host and Illinois-based Hilco Redevelopment
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Partners … ” and the narrative of repurposing this industrial property into a logistics hub
and light manufacturing facility (Moore 2018).
The story of the freight oppositions was constructed to understand the history of
how the Port came to be in its current last mile situation. The history of labor unrest was
constructed to understand the impact of technology on the employment share of the
Port in the city. The story of tourism/gentrification was constructed to understand how
tourism came to be the dominant economic strategy of the city. The acquisition of the
NOPB by the Port of New Orleans was documented to understand how the Port can still
attain freight access simultaneously with the tourism narrative. The repurposing of
Avondale was constructed to show how narrative can work in favor of the Port, to open
the possibility of Port freight-based manufacturing.
Methods
This research primarily utilized computer keyword searches in the online
databases of the Times-Picayune. The databases accessed for the archival keyword
searches were the “America’s Historical Newspapers” database files of the TimesPicayune up to the year 1988, the last year of the newspaper available for this
database, and the “America’s News- Historical and Current” database for issues of the
paper dating after 1988. Google keyword searches yielded articles in Antigravity
magazine, New Orleans City Business, The Advocate, The Lens, and the Journal of
Commerce. The Times-Picayune was accessed because it is the longest-running print
newspaper in the New Orleans area, having been in existence in various incarnations
(such as The Times-Picayune States-Item) since 1837. It continues today in its online
version established after Hurricane Katrina in 2005, NOLA.COM. Antigravity Magazine
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and The Lens were accessed because these publications reported on issues of freight
infrastructure and gentrification from the viewpoint of the city’s residents. The Baton
Rouge and New Orleans editions of The Advocate were accessed as a supplement to
the reporting of the Times-Picayune, but the Advocate was not a significant source of
data because the focus of this research was on how the population of New Orleans
narratively encountered Port-based freight transportation, rather than that of Baton
Rouge. New Orleans city Business and the Journal of Commerce were accessed to
obtain the perspectives of the business community and the shipping industry on the
Port’s attempts to negotiate last mile access.
Secondary sources of data for this research included maps, census tract data,
documentation from the Tulane University School of Architecture, Greater New Orleans
Incorporated (GNO, Inc., a regional economic development corporation); the Port of
New Orleans’ 2018 Strategic Master Plan, documentation from the US Department of
Transportation (DOT), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), The United States
Maritime Administration (MARAD), the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, The US
Army Corps of Engineers (ACE), the website of A Community Voice, a Lower Ninth
Ward advocacy group; The Mitigator, the newsletter of the Community Based Mitigation
Committee | For the Industrial Canal Lock Replacement Project; The American Planning
Association, the American Transportation Research Institute, the website of the Uptown
Triangle Neighborhood Association, The Federal Register, The Council on
Environmental Quality, The Big River Coalition, a non-profit advocacy group for
dredging the lower Mississippi River to a continuous draft (the space for a ship’s hull to
pass) of 50 feet; the New Orleans television news stations WYES, WDSU, WWL TV
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and FOX 8 News; The Pew Research Center, The Transportation Research Board of
the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering and Mechanics (NASEM TRB); The
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, HealthCare.Gov, The Louisiana
Economic Development (LED) Site Selection Center, NBC News, The National
Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers (NCSHPO), The New Orleans
Convention Center (NOCC), The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad (NOPB), The Office
of the Governor (of Louisiana), the New Orleans Regional Planning Commission (RPC),
PBS, The University of New Orleans Transportation Institute (UNOTI), TCI Plastics, and
Union Facts, an advocacy organization designed for union members.
Maps, especially custom maps constructed with Google My Maps, were a crucial
component of this research for understanding the geography of the various freight
options and the development of current last mile constraints. Census tract data were
used to examine the demographic shifts in the neighborhoods of the uptown freight
arterials. The Tulane School of Architecture was accessed as a further source of
documentation for the story of the Riverfront Expressway project, as well as the history
of how the establishment of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), the
Department of Transportation (DOT), and the National Historic Preservation Act
affected the outcome of the Riverfront Expressway project. The Port’s 2018 Strategic
Master Plan was accessed for insight into the Port’s most recent evaluation of its last
mile issues and its acquisition of the NOPB, and an assessment of its need to cultivate
a new shipping container terminal. GNO Inc. was accessed as the source for
information about Avondale.
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For interviews, snowball sampling was used to obtain informants, when possible,
who were knowledgeable about the events under discussion. In snowball sampling, the
interviewer asks his or her limited pool of contacts which are knowledgeable about the
subject under investigation for referrals to other informants. “‘Snowball sampling is
sampling from a known network. [It is] used to identify participants when appropriate
candidates for a study are difficult to locate.’ … Snowball sampling relies on the
personal networks you tap into for referrals” (Hesse-Biber 2011:47). Snowball sampling
was chosen because the network of informants known prior to this research was limited
to three people. Interviews were used to verify the events reported in the archives and
secondary sources. The following persons were interviewed:
1. a PhD in planning and urban studies who was intimately acquainted
with one of the issues at the time of the controversy;
2. two former directors of the Port of New Orleans
3. a current high-ranking employee of the Port;
4. the public information officer of the New Orleans region of the Army
Corps of Engineers;
5. a representative of A Community Voice, a Lower Ninth Ward citizen
advocacy group;
6. a representative of the Uptown Triangle Neighborhood Association
(UTNA); and
7. a high-ranking member of the New Orleans Convention Center
(NOCC).
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The interviews with the two former Port directors, the representative of the
NOCC, and the PhD in planning were unstructured, or open-ended, interviews. Openended interviewing is the process of asking “Questions for which the respondent is
asked to provide his or her own answers. In-depth, qualitative interviewing relies almost
exclusively on open-ended questions” (Babbie 2013:255). This technique was used with
these informants in order to gain an outsider’s understanding of the events in question
(Sunderland 2007:225). The interviews for the high-ranking Port employee, the
representative of the ACE, the representative of the UTNA, and the representative of A
Community Voice were semi-structured. In semi-structured interviewing, questions for
facilitating discussion are drawn from the themes revealed by the open-ended
interviews (Spradley 1974). The semi-structured interviews were conducted to find more
detail about the issues discussed in the open-ended interviews. The following schedule
was used for the semi-structured interviews:
1. What is your understanding of (your stake; i.e. the Port, St. Bernard
parish, the ACE, the Lower Ninth Ward, Uptown, etc.)?
2. What does / did [the freight option] mean (for your stake)?
3. What is your understanding of economic development?
4. What is your understanding of quality of life?
5. What is your understanding of the environment?
6. How do you see the Port in the economy of New Orleans?
7. How do you see tourism in the economy of New Orleans?
8. Are there any (up-sides / down-sides) to [the freight option]? What are
they?
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This schedule was used to elicit the understandings of the participants from each
side of a freight option controversy, to get a balanced treatment of the stories under
investigation. The primary method of interviewing with this schedule was to digitally
record a telephone interview. Two scheduled interviews were conducted in person, and
two by telephone. One unstructured interview was conducted by telephone, and three
were conducted in person, for a total of eight interviews.
Narratives of Freight Opposition
This research focused on the stories of nine major freight-opposing narratives.
These were:
1. The French-Quarter-based cancellation of the Riverfront Expressway;
2. The removal of freight from Decatur Street;
3. The cancellation of freight traffic from Louisiana Avenue and
subsequent closure of all uptown freight arterials;
4. The defeat of the proposed Leake Avenue extension behind Audubon
Park;
5. The defeat of the proposed ship channel and lock in St. Bernard Parish
near Violet (“the Violet cut”);
6. The closure of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO)
7. The ongoing blockage of efforts by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)
to replace the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal (IHNC, or “industrial”
canal) lock;
8. The controversy surrounding the marshalling of New Orleans Public
Belt Railroad (NOPB) trains on Leake Avenue;
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9. The controversy surrounding the Port’s current proposed container
facility expansion on the Sinclair Tract, located in an area of St.
Bernard parish (county) known as Meraux. See Figure 5.
Figure 5. Location of the Nine Freight Options.

1). The Riverfront Expressway; 2). Freight routed down Decatur & South Peters
Street; 3). Freight on Louisiana Avenue & other uptown arterials; 4). The proposed
Leake Ave extension; 5). the proposed ship channel & lock in St. Bernard Parish; 6).
The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO); 7). The Inner Harbor Navigational Canal
(IHNC) lock; 8). The Leake Ave. marshalling yard for trains of the New Orleans Public
Belt Railroad (NOPB); 9). The proposed Port of New Orleans container facility at the
Sinclair Tract in Meraux, St. Bernard Parish.
Source: Base map Port of New Orleans, overlay Webb 2018.

This timeline is somewhat arbitrary, as many of these controversies occurred
simultaneously. For example, The Leake Avenue extension was debated at the same
time as the intensification of freight on Decatur Street and the ship lock and channel in
St. Bernard Parish. The ship lock and channel were being debated at the same time as
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the shutdown of Louisiana Avenue and other uptown arterials. Opposition to the IHNC
lock project has been constant from the 1960s until today. Opposition to the MRGO was
constant from the late 1960s until its full closure in 2013. See Figure 6.

Figure 6. Timeline of Freight Oppositions, 1960s-2010s.

Source: Author
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Data Searches for the Freight Oppositions
1. Riverfront Expressway:
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “Riverfront Expressway,” 753 hits;
“Riverfront Expressway, Port,” 343 hits; and “Riverfront Expressway, tourism,” 23 hits
for the years 1967-1969. This generated 124 useful articles from the Times-Picayune,
categorized by the years 1967, 1968, and 1969. These years were chosen because
1967 was the year the Expressway fight in the city began to intensify, and 1969 was the
year the project was defeated (Baumbach 1981).
Secondary sources– The Tulane School of Architecture, The DOT, the NCSHPO,
and the FHWA.
Interviews- A PhD in urban planning who was thoroughly aware of the
controversy at the time the Expressway proposal was defeated.
2. The removal of freight from Decatur Street:
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “Decatur Street, trucks, freight,” 313
hits for the years 1980-1984. This generated 23 useful articles from the TimesPicayune. These years were chosen because 1980 was when the push to remove Portbound freight trucking from Decatur Street began to gain the attention of the New
Orleans New Orleans City Council. 1984 was the year Port-bound freight trucking was
eliminated from the French Quarter.
3. The cancellation of freight traffic from Louisiana Avenue and the subsequent closure
of all uptown freight arterials:
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “Louisiana Avenue, trucks, Port,
freight trucking”; 115 hits for the years 1982-1988. This generated 13 useful articles
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from the Times-Picayune. These years were chosen because 1982 was when the
option of shifting Port freight from the French Quarter to Louisiana Avenue began to be
discussed by the New Orleans New Orleans City Council. 1984 was the year freight
trucking was banned from Louisiana Avenue and the other uptown arterials. In 1988 the
director of the Port referenced the cessation of Louisiana Avenue and uptown freight in
an article noting the importance of the Port.
Secondary sources– A master’s thesis from the UNO department of Planning
and Urban Studies concerning the development of the Clarence Henry truckway, and
the minutes of a session of the Freight Roundtable conducted by the RPC concerning
last mile freight congestion at the Port. Census tract data from the years 1960, 1970,
1980, and 1990 were accessed to construct charts showing the decline in blue collar
and increase in the professional/managerial and FIRE sectors. This timespan was
chosen because in 1960 the uptown area between Magazine Street and Tchoupitoulas
Street (known as the Irish Channel) was predominantly blue-collar. By 1990, after
uptown freight had been taken off the arterials, the area was predominantly white collar.
Interviews– The director of the Port of New Orleans soon after the arterials were
shut down.
4. The Leake Avenue extension:
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “Leake Avenue, trucks”; 125 hits for
the years 1975-1985. This generated 15 useful articles from the Times-Picayune. These
years were chosen because this was the duration of the controversy over extending
Leake Avenue behind Audubon Park to Nashville Avenue to give the Port more trucking
access to its uptown wharves.
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Secondary sources– The minutes of a session of the Freight Roundtable
conducted by the RPC concerning last mile freight congestion at the Port.
5. The proposed ship channel and lock in St. Bernard Parish:
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “ship lock, St. Bernard, Violet,
Poydras, CENTROPORT (the Port’s 30-year strategic plan launched in 1969. Part of
this plan was to shift most Port activity from the uptown wharves to the region of the
industrial canal and the MRGO), Mississippi River Gulf Outlet”; 260 hits for the years
1969-1978. This yielded 29 useful articles from the Times-Picayune. These years were
chosen because 1969 was the year the project was proposed, and 1978 was the year
the project was scaled down to a new IHNC lock near the original one.
6. The closure of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO):
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches- “Hurricane Katrina, MRGO”; 59 hits,
which yielded four useful articles for the years 2005-2015 from the Times Picayune.
These years were chosen because Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005, and
2015 was the citywide ten-year retrospective on the storm.
Secondary sources– These same keywords were also applied in a general
Google search, which returned one article from MSNBC, one from PBS, one from the
Congressional Research Service, one from arcticbeacon.com, one from New Orleans
Magazine, one from Restore the Mississippi River Delta, one from levees.org, and one
from The Advocate for a total of 12 useful articles from both the Times-Picayune and
secondary sources.
Interviews- A former director of the Port.
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7. Blockage of efforts by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) to replace the IHNC lock:
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches- “Lower Ninth Ward, Industrial Canal,
Army Corps of Engineers”; 100 hits in The Times-Picayune for a total of 90 useful
articles from the years 1960 to 2018. The timespan 1960-2018 was chosen because
residents of the Lower Ninth Ward have been vocally opposing the expansion and / or
refurbishment of the IHNC lock during this timeframe.
Secondary sources- A Google search returned three useful articles from The
Advocate, two from the ACE, one from Antigravity Magazine, one from the Lower Ninth
Ward citizen’s website A Community Voice, and on from WWL TV’s website, a New
Orleans news broadcaster.
Interviews- a semi-structured interview with the public information office of the
New Orleans section of the ACE, and a semi-structured interview with a representative
of A Community Voice.
8. Opposition to NOPB trains parked on Leake Avenue:
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “Leake Avenue, Trains”; two hits in
the Times-Picayune for a total of two useful articles from the year 2016. This year was
chosen because it was the year when the conflict between the Uptown Triangle
Neighborhood Association (UTNA) and the NOPB became most widely known, due to
the reporting of the Times-Picayune.
Secondary sources– A Google search produced three hits for a total of three
useful articles from the UTNA website detailing its grievance with the city concerning the
trains, which were still owned by the city in 2016. The Greater New Orleans Data Center

64

produced one hit for a useful article concerning the history of the Black Pearl
neighborhood, which encompasses the Uptown Triangle Neighborhood
Interviews– an interview with a representative of the UTNA.
9. The controversy surrounding the Port’s current proposed container facility expansion
on the Sinclair Tract, located in an area of St. Bernard parish (county) known as
Meraux:
Secondary sources– A Google search for the keywords “Sinclair Tract, Meraux,
St. Bernard” generated 28,400 hits. 14 articles were chosen from this selection for the
years 2017-2018, because the Port became interested in building a new container
terminal facility at the site in 2017. These articles were chosen because they
represented a cross-section of industry and residential viewpoints. For industry, two
articles came from the Louisiana Economic Development Site Selection Center, one
came from the online edition of New Orleans City Business, one came from the Journal
of Commerce, two came from the American Shipper website, one was a YouTube video
of the Port’s presentation of the project to a closed session of the St. Bernard parish
New Orleans City Council, and one came from a press release by the Port of New
Orleans. For the residential viewpoint, three came from the New Orleans FOX affiliate
(WVUE Channel 8), one came from the website of the Meraux Foundation, one came
from the online edition of New Orleans City Business (containing a residents’ comments
section) and one came from the website of the St. Bernard Parish Post.
Interviews– A high-ranking member of the Port.
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Narrative of Labor History
The history of organized labor unrest at the Port was examined to document
changes in the Port’s employment share through time and illustrate the impact of
technological changes on the blue-collar, Port-employed middle class of the city. The
Times-Picayune archives were accessed to document the storylines of the strikes of
1962, 1968, 1977, and 1986. These same archives were then used to construct a timeseries graph of the number of International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) union
members involved in each strike. The website Union Facts was accessed to obtain
membership numbers in the New Orleans ILA local for the years 2002-2015. These
years were chosen to bring the membership graph as close to 2018 as possible.
Additionally, the history of a 2015 brief work stoppage by non-union truckers at the Port
was examined.
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “Port of New Orleans, ILA,
dockworkers, strike” generated 227 hits for the years 1962-1986. This generated a total
of 43 relevant articles. These three strikes were chosen because the strikes of 1962,
1968, and 1977 represent the national response of east coast and gulf coast
dockworker organized labor to changes in technology. 1986 was the last ILA strike at
the Port of New Orleans, and involved local labor issues. Times-Picayune archival
keyword searches for the 2015 work stoppage– “New Orleans, Port of New Orleans,
Truckers” generated 2 hits yielding two useful articles. A NOLA.com video recording of
the protesting truckers was accessed from YouTube.
Secondary sources– The online journal Southern Spaces of the Emory Center for
Digital Scholarship was accessed through Loyola University in New Orleans for
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information about the lifeway of Port dockworkers at the time of the four major strikes
mentioned above. Healthcare.Gov was accessed to give context for the fringe benefits
the ILA members were striking for. The Pew Research Center was accessed for a
working definition of a middle-class wage structure. For the 2015 work stoppage, a
video segment from the news of the local New Orleans television station WDSU was
accessed via YouTube. Additionally, The April 2016 Freight Roundtable of the RPC,
which addressed the concerns of these truckers, among other topics, was accessed.
Interviews– an open-ended interview with a former Port director who was
involved in the strike of 1986.
Narrative of Tourism
To examine the rise of tourism as the perceived economic basis of the city, over
and above the Port and the freight which comes with it, a brief economic history of the
Port’s decline of employment share relative to tourism was performed. Again, the main
source for this research was archival in the Times-Picayune, in the “America’s Historical
Newspapers” database files of the Times-Picayune up to the year 1988, the last year
available for the database, and the “America’s News- Historical and Current” database
for information dating after 1988. Beginning with the 1980s, this research focused on
the differing economic roles of tourism and the Port for the city of New Orleans through
time at ten-year intervals. The 1980s were chosen as the starting point for documenting
the rise of the tourism narrative because this was the period when tourism began to
gain in economic importance for the city over the Port. Thus, for the 1980s, 1990s,
2000s, and 2010s, archival keyword searches in the Times Picayune from the
America’s Newspapers database were performed for “tourism”, “port”, and “local
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economy” to find relevant articles. Articles were classified as relevant if they reported
directly on the relationship of tourism and the Port to the economy of the city.
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– 1980s- 101 hits. This generated 29
relevant articles; 1990s- 178 hits. This generated 23 relevant articles; 2000s- 32 hits.
This generated 11 relevant articles; 2010s- 10 hits. This generated 10 relevant articles.
Secondary sources– WYES, the New Orleans PBS affiliate, was accessed via
YouTube. This generated a video about the 1984 New Orleans world’s fair. The website
of the NOCC was accessed to obtain information about the NOCC’s tourism vision for
the geography of the last mile.
Narrative of Gentrification
The story of the gentrification of the Warehouse District and subsequent
repurposing of Port-related riverfront property for tourism was accessed through
archival research in the Times-Picayune databases. The keywords “Warehouse
District,” “Riverfront,” “development,” and “gentrification” were used for the years 1980s2000s. This timeframe was chosen because the 1980s was the beginning of an ongoing
redevelopment process in this area. The gentrification of the site of the former St.
Thomas public housing development and its surrounding neighborhood was accessed
through the keywords “St. Thomas,” “redevelopment,” and “gentrification.”
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– 1980s– “Warehouse District;
development” 100 hits generated 32 relevant articles; 1990s– When these were paired
with “gentrification,” 7 hits generated 5 relevant articles; 2000s– 4 hits generated 3
relevant articles. Also, in the 2000s, for the St. Thomas neighborhood gentrification, the
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keywords “St. Thomas,” “redevelopment,” and “gentrification” generated 7 hits which
produced 7 relevant articles.
Data for the Port Acquiring the NOPB
Times-Picayune archival keyword searches– “Port of New Orleans, New Orleans
Public Belt Railroad” generated 10 hits which produced three relevant articles from the
year 2017. This year was accessed because it was the year of the acquisition of the
NOPB by the Port.
Secondary Sources– the website of the NOPB, and the Port’s 2018 Master Plan.
Interviews– interview with a high-ranking Port employee.
Data for Repurposing of Former Avondale Shipyard
Secondary sources– the website of GNO Inc.
Method of Analysis
Constructing long view history.
This research focused on developing the overall story of opposition to freight
transportation as it relates to the Port of New Orleans. As this was primarily a historical
project, the purpose was to build a storyline through time rather than uncover thematic
frequency counts. The unit of analysis was the stories revealed by the reporting in the
articles. In constructing this long view, the methodology of the French Annales School
was used.
The French Annales School holds “ … that in the reductive treatment of the
record—documentary, material—an adequate account of the shape of what happened
can be found” (Galloway 2006:7). This method was chosen because the texts used to
compose the story were created by native New Orleans people. Therefore, concerns
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about whether outside non-native sources were accurately reporting events were not
relevant. The secondary sources and interviews were used to ascertain the accuracy of
the events reported in the archives.
Inductive reasoning was used to analyze the overall story. That is, the narratives
of each freight opposition in the archives were read to discover the tropes and
discourses which they contained. These tropes and discourses were then compared
across narratives for similarities and differences to get a sense of the overall pattern of
the anti-freight narrative. The same process was applied to the tourism narratives in the
archives.
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Chapter 4. Narrative of Freight Blockages
This chapter is the story of how various attempts by the Port of New Orleans to
improve its freight access were blocked by a succession of nine different narratives from
the year 1969 to the present day. These narratives concerned Decatur Street, the
Riverfront Expressway, Louisiana Avenue and other uptown arterials, a proposed 1970s
Leake Avenue extension for freight access to the Port behind Audubon Park, a
proposed ship lock and channel, , known as the Violet Cut, to connect the Mississippi
River to the MRGO between Violet and Poydras in St. Bernard parish; a project to
improve the IHNC lock, the MRGO, trains parked on Leake Avenue, and the Port’s
proposed new container terminal facility at the Sinclair Tract in Meraux, St. Bernard
Parish.
The Riverfront Expressway
Until about the mid-1980s, The Port was generally held in good regard by the
citizens of New Orleans, as for some time it was the primary employer. With the advent
of the freight trucking, the port developed an adversarial/problematic relationship with
the city because of arterials running through residential neighborhoods (Parsons 1997),
especially Decatur/South Peters Streets. The defeat of the proposed Riverfront
Expressway between the River and the French Quarter, which was designed with
freight relief for the French Quarter partially in mind, gave many residents of the city,
and historic preservationists in particular, a sense of empowerment, even though not all
residents of the French quarter were opposed to the expressway, seeing the potential
economic benefits (Baumbach 1981; Foresta 1983). However, barring some form of
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riverfront roadway, trucking in the French Quarter was to become increasingly
problematic.
As early as 1968 it was becoming apparent that the demographics of the French
Quarter were changing. A 1968 far-ranging French Quarter redevelopment plan
submitted by the Bureau of Governmental Research and the federal government with
the Washington DC planners Marcou & O'Leary noted that
“The population of the Quarter is changing. The former melting pot of the
Quarter is rapidly changing to a more homogeneous population. The
Quarter population is getting younger. More than 60 per cent of all
residents are now single; the population has higher occupational skills,
about 80 per cent are now white collar workers, compared with only 55 per
cent 15 years ago” (Atkinson 1968:26).
Interestingly, this report also said that the Port facilities along the Quarter needed to be
removed at some point. Containing a recommendation for a ground-level Expressway
as being less intrusive to the Quarter’s character, the report also outlined changes that
needed to be made to preserve the historic character of the French Quarter.
The closure of the uptown freight arterials in New Orleans, and the subsequent
shifting of freight trucking onto the Clarence Henry Truckway behind the Tchoupitoulas
floodwall, are rooted in the 1969 defeat of the Riverfront Expressway, which was
originally conceived in 1945 by Robert Moses to alleviate traffic on Decatur Street and
throughout the French Quarter (Weingroff 2017). See Figure 7.
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Figure 7. The Route of the Proposed Riverfront Expressway.

Source: Webb 2018.
A summary of the perspectives of the various stakeholders concerning the
Expressway is therefore necessary. Four iterations of the Expressway were proposed:
elevated, ground-level or “surface”, a combination of elevated and ground level, and
“depressed” (that is, a subsurface roadway).
The Port of New Orleans was very much in favor of the elevated Riverfront
Expressway, as its construction would be least disruptive to the operations of the
French Quarter wharves. However, the Dock Board ultimately came out in favor of the
New Orleans City Council-approved surface roadway, provided any cost mitigations
regarding disruptions to port activities during its construction would be factored into the
cost of the project, and not be the responsibility of the Dock Board. By 1969, the Dock
Board very much wanted an expedited construction process (Gillis and Atkinson 1969:1,
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3, 14). In fact, the Dock Board was so thoroughly behind the project that it opposed the
designation of the French Quarter as a historic district, out of concern for how this would
negatively impact the chances for the Expressway’s completion (Gillis 1967). On
December 21st 1965, US Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall had stated that the
French Quarter “… had national historic significance, ” but at that time the city did not
follow up with achieving official designation as a National Historic Landmark (Weingroff
2017). Udall’s action was highly “ … significant, because in 1966 two pieces of critical
legislation—the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Act—were passed, both with provisions to protect historic sites
from highway construction” (Tulane School of Architecture n.d.). The most notable
portion of the NHPA is section 106, which “Requires federal agencies to take into
account the effects of its [sic] actions on historic properties by identifying historic
properties, assessing adverse effects and resolving those adverse effects. The process
is initiated by the federal agency, and includes comment and input from stakeholders at
the local and State levels, as well as the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation”
(National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers n.d.). In addition, “Section
4(f) of the DOT Act stipulated that the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and
other … (DOT) agencies cannot approve the use of land from a significant publicly
owned public park, recreation area, wildlife or waterfowl refuge, or any significant
historic site unless the following conditions apply: There is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the use of land; [and] The action includes all possible planning to minimize
harm to the property resulting from use” (US Department of Transportation Federal
Highway Administration n.d.). The NOPB, a then city-owned railroad designed for freight
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transportation at the Port, also opposed the French Quarter’s historic designation when
expressing support for the surface roadway (Gillis 1967; Gillis and Atkinson 1969).
The relevant state agencies—which were at that time known as the Louisiana
Department of Highways, and the Bureau of Public Roads—were also in favor of a
surface Expressway (Gillis and Atkinson 1969). There was tension at the municipal level
however, as the surface Expressway was narrowly approved by a 4-3 vote of the New
Orleans New Orleans City Council (ibid). The New Orleans Chamber of Commerce also
came out strongly in favor of the project. The Chamber had always been in favor of
some form of Riverfront Expressway, repeatedly urging its expedited construction for
advancing a regional economic paradigm– Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jefferson parishes
as one contiguous economic unit powered by the Port of New Orleans (Gillis and
Atkinson 1969; Times Picayune 1968).
The business community as well as “…all the newspapers were very much in
favor of this, because it was promoted as, ‘this is going to help bring people downtown’”
to ameliorate the growing threat to downtown shopping from nascent suburban malls
(Urban Planning PhD 2017). The Times Picayune went so far as to refer to riverfront
expressways in general as “welcome buffers” that had the potential to be “… both an
answer to urban traffic congestion and an asset to the Riverfront and residential areas”
(Times-Picayune 1968b).
The historic preservationists, who defeated the Riverfront Expressway in 1969,
were highly opposed to it. For purposes of this research, they are divided into the
general categories of uptown and the French Quarter. For the uptown preservationists,
opposition to the Expressway centered on its facilitation of a span across the Mississippi
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River originating at the end of Napoleon Avenue, citing the “…bleak ugliness of I-10 on
Claiborne Avenue…” as a mark against any proposed approaches to the bridge
(Times-Picayune 1968a).
The resistance of the French quarter historic preservationists to any form of
Expressway was documented by Richard Baumbach and William Borah (Baumbach
1981). The business community, whose views were in opposition to the
preservationists, made references to them which included “…those few, those very few,
who would have no expressway at all” (Gillis 1968). The position of the business
community in relation to the French Quarter historic preservationists is summed by a
quote from Richard B. Montgomery Jr., then-president of the Chamber of Commerce of
the New Orleans Area:
‘It’s ridiculous that a few people can stop the development of a city. These
people would prevent the connection of ports along the Gulf Coast and do
a great harm to the city. It’s like the tail wagging the dog.’ On the local
level, Montgomery said that the New Orleans City Council can help by
taking a broad metropolitan view of the whole matter and ‘…quit looking at
individual sections of the city…We live in a competitive society in which
we must compete with cities like Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, and Miami for
industry and progress. This means giving motorists a way to get around
the city. Unless we all put our shoulders to the wheel in a concerted and
unified fight, we might as well say goodbye to progress for this area,
including the Port of New Orleans' (Times-Picayune 1967:9)
It is notable, however, that even some ordinary citizens referred to “a handful of
people” as the ones who disrupted plans for the Expressway (Times-Picayune 1969a).
It is also apparent that pro-Expressway French Quarter residents were not noted in the
narrative by Baumbach and Borah (Foresta 1983:459).
Understandings of the potential effect of the Riverfront Expressway on the
tourism industry as it related to the French quarter generally fell along the same fault
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lines, in the sense that newspapers and civic leaders saw the Expressway as promoting
tourism, while residents’ reactions were mixed on this aspect (Atkinson 1970; Nelson
1969; Times-Picayune 1969b, 1969a). Some of the residents compared the negative
tourism experiences of other cities regarding their waterfront expressways to what they
saw as the potential impact of one upon New Orleans. The example of San Francisco
was cited.
“San Francisco is warning us. A decade ago she built a bayfront expressway.
Now she wants to tear it down” (Nelson 1969:10).
On July 9th, 1969, US Secretary of Transportation John Volpe announced that
the Department of Transportation refused to fund the Expressway.
‘A careful review of the highway proposal and the positions of various interests
convinced me that the public benefits from the proposed highway would to be
enough to warrant damaging the treasured French Quarter’… Volpe’s decision,
which marked a turning point in the agency’s approach to heritage conservation,
was one of the first major tests of the Section 106 process. For the first time,
concerned citizens were able to stop a segment of the interstate highway system
on the basis of social and environmental concerns” (The Times-Picayune 1969;
Tulane School of Architecture n.d.).
The narrative outcome of the Riverfront Expressway defeat was very much in
alignment with the general spirit of the times during the years 1967-1969, in the sense
of being a narrative of ordinary people triumphing over the establishment. It set the
stage for future discourses which culminated in the modern duel between the freight
and tourism narratives. The first outcome of the defeat of the Expressway was a push to
move Port freight out of the French Quarter completely.
Decatur Street Narrative
This section is an overview of the Decatur Street freight narrative, which
culminated in the removal of heavy trucking from the French Quarter. The development
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of the Decatur Street/French Quarter anti-freight narrative was an element of the
original plans for the Riverfront Expressway. After the defeat of the proposed
expressway, this narrative grew in intensity. The idea of a riverfront surface roadway of
some form never really left the French Quarter discussion until after the riverward
expansion of Jax Brewery in concert with the 1984 world’s fair (Urban Planning PhD
2017). The closure of all the arterials, and the resultant shunting of all Port-related
freight traffic on to the Clarence Henry Truckway, is rooted in the defeat of the
Riverfront Expressway as well.
Barring the construction of some form of freight roadway along the riverfront,
Port-bound freight traffic which would have been routed upon it passed down Decatur
and South Peters streets, among other freight arterials in the city. See Figure 8.
Figure 8. Decatur and South Peters Street Route.

Source: Webb 2018.
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Residents in the greater New Orleans area were well aware of this dynamic, and
some of them referenced it as vindication of the plan for the expressway, whether
elevated or not– even at the risk of seeming to be “a traitor to the cause [of opposing
any expressway along the river]” (Jee 1983; Kelso 1980:41). At the time, a proposal for
a limited access roadway connecting Elysian fields and Canal Street along the river and
transforming Decatur/S. Peters St. into a pedestrian mall, was being advocated by thenStreets Director Blaise Carriere. The roadway was being opposed via misrepresentation
of how it was actually planned, as well as by deployment of the narrative of the
Riverfront Expressway discourse, by the original champions of the preservationists,
Richard Baumbach and William Borah (Gillis 1982). There was pushback against the
preservationist’s discourse where it concerned the surface roadway, both within the city
of New Orleans and in the surrounding areas (Brune 1982; Gillis 1982; Jee 1983). As
with the original Riverfront Expressway itself, the issue was not settled, and The TimesPicayune/The States-Item shows a back-and-forth of citizen opinions on the issue
(Foresta 1983; Brune 1982; Jee 1983; Morrison 1982).
The paper itself, however, was against the concept of freight arterials along the
river (it would eventually extend its opposition to include any freight arterials in New
Orleans), and used its position to consciously steer the narrative. This opposition is
revealed in some of the language used in editorials, reporting, and published opinion
pieces about the issue, such as “… the thundering 18-wheelers whose vibrations are
causing structural damage to historic buildings in the Quarter,” “The vibration literally
makes me seasick,” and “… smoke-belching, thundering large trucks rumbling through
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the historic and residential sections…” (Forsyth 1983:10; Mitchell 1980:17; Fitts
1981:8).
The discourses deployed to compose the No Freight on Decatur component of
the master narrative occurred simultaneously in multiple instances. The primary ones
were Quality of Life (Fitts 1981; Kelso 1980; Webre 1984), Historic Preservation (often
with the Pontalba apartments, crumbling from truck vibrations, as a focusing issue
(Mitchell 1980; Roehl 1981; Treadway 1983b) and the overall tourism profit potential of
the French Quarter (Carli 1986; Katz 1981). Other discourses revealed the growing
power of French Quarter residents and businesses to drive the narrative (Mitchell
1980), the role of the Vieux Carré Commission (VCC) (Brune 1982; Morrison 1982;
Treadway 1982, 1983a), the scare deployment of the riverfront expressway discourse
(Gillis 1982; Katz 1981; Morrison 1982), and concerns about the shifting of the freight
load onto Louisiana Avenue (Associated Press 1984; Dansker 1983; Donze 1984).
These were, in many instances, visited in the same article with an appearance of
support for the Port and its freight, combined with overall instances of opposition to
freight traffic (Associated Press 1984; Brune 1982; Forsyth 1983; Gillis 1982; Katz
1984c; Roehl 1981; Webre 1984), support for freight traffic—or at least an expressed
awareness of its necessity to the economy of the city (Gillis 1982; Katz 1984c)—offers
of compromise– that is, suggestions of various alternatives to accommodate the freight
traffic of the city to a modicum of satisfaction for all parties (Dansker 1983; Donze 1984;
Treadway 1982), and even support for revisiting the overall concept of some form of
“surface roadway” (Jee 1983; Kelso 1980).
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The story of rising anti-freight sentiment in the French Quarter shows how
narratives, communicated through tropes, can influence the location of freight
transportation. It also shows how these tropes can be rooted in the materialities of
freight– noise, vibration, etc. The discourse of the Port as the adversary of the citizens
is not deployed in this story. Rather, an increasingly insistent discussion of the potential
of tourist profit—in the context of freight traffic threatening this potential—is what is
seen. This is partly a function of how tourism’s rising profits were being noted, and
partly a function of changing demographics. Demographic changes were key to the
eventual removal of all freight from the uptown arterials.
Changing Uptown New Orleans Demographics
This section details shifts in the demography of the neighborhoods impacted by
the freight arterials. For this research, the most important of these shifts involves the
socioeconomics of the population under study. This section contains charts which
illustrate this shift. These charts were composed with data from the US censuses of
1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990.
Since the 1960s, along with an increase in freight trucking due to
containerization, demographic changes, particularly an increase in the share of
employment held by FIRE-sector workers on the one hand, and a decrease in bluecollar workers on the other, generated a culture which narratively communicated its
intolerance for the materialities of freight traffic on the historic uptown New Orleans see
arterials. See Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Historic Uptown Freight Trucking Arterials.

Source: Ash et al. 2016a
Since the area of uptown New Orleans covered by the historic arterials is vast,
the census tract demographics encompassing this portion of the city were aggregated
into a cognitive map designated “Uptown,” for the census tract data from 1960, 1970,
1980, and 1990. A cognitive map is a representation of a geographic area which has
meaning to, in this case, the researcher. This map of Uptown does not correspond to
the same term used by the RPC. This map also aggregates an area between Magazine
Street and Tchoupitoulas Street known colloquially as the Irish Channel. See Figure 10.
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Figure 10. “Uptown” New Orleans and the Irish Channel.
Legend: Border of “Uptown” in red (inclusive of Irish Channel); Border of Irish
Channel in green.

Source: Author
I ended at the 1990 census because by that time, all the uptown freight arterials
had been closed, and freight trucking was then being routed onto Tchoupitoulas Street
in preparation for the construction of the Clarence Henry truckway.
I examined the demographics of race, average median household income, and
the percentage of employed persons in both the professional/FIRE sectors and bluecollar workers. The percentage of blue-collar workers was arrived at by aggregating the
number of persons employed in the construction and manufacturing industries. The
census data indicated that the racial composition of both the whole uptown
neighborhood and the Irish channel underwent significant white flight from 1960 to
1990. See Figures 11 and _and 12.
83

Figure 11. Change in Racial Composition for Uptown.
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Figure 12. Change in Racial Composition for Irish Channel.
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The data also indicated that average median income fell in both geographic
regions from 1970 to the recession of 1980, and began to rebound in 1990, after the
arterials were closed. See Figures 13 and 14.
Figure 13. Change in Average Median Income Uptown.
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Figure 14. Change in Average Median Income Irish Channel.
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a

What is most salient for this research, however, is the indication of how bluecollar employment, which one could reasonably assume is an indicator of dockworker
employment at the Port as well, fell so dramatically over this time span, while the
professional/FIRE sector increased markedly. In uptown, the professional/FIRE sector
went from 4% in 1960 to 43% by 1990. In the Irish channel, it went from 2% to 38% as
the neighborhood gentrified. Note, however, that by 1990 blue-collar employment still
accounted for 20% of the Irish Channel workforce. See Figure 15 and 16.

Figure 15. Change in Employment Share Uptown.
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Figure 16. Change in Employment Share Irish Channel.
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Note that these percentages do not add up to 100, because I did not aggregate
in service industry workers, healthcare workers, or educational professionals. The
professional/FIRE sector was selected for focus because this sector is where income
rises more rapidly. Note as well that 1980 is the census year in which the
professional/FIRE sector overtook the blue-collar sector in both geographies; it is
especially apparent for uptown. This corresponds with the advent of the Reagan and
Thatcher administrations, which promoted a fundamentalist free market economic
liberalism on a global scale that privileged global financial and currency transactions
over labor. This economic system is sometimes referred to as Neoliberalism (Harvey
2007).
Without the advent of containerized shipping, however, this global economic
system could not function. It can be appropriate to refer to “globalism” as “containerism”;
see Levinson 2008 and George 2013. This boom in global finance is linked to greatly
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accelerated containerization, which would have put more trucks in the neighborhoods of
new FIRE professionals, stimulating a narrative-driven reaction against freight trucking.
This general sentiment sparked a citizen protest as freight shifted from Decatur Street to
Louisiana Avenue. The actual physical protest, however, was carried out not by
members of the FIRE sector, but rather by black residents of public housing along the
arterial. In addition to the anti-materialities narrative (concerns over property damage
from truck vibrations, noise, pollution, dust, and general safety), the black residents
deployed the trope of racial oppression on the part of the Port.
Louisiana Avenue and other Arterials Narrative
This section outlines the documentary history of the narrative which led to the
cessation of freight trucking to the Port through uptown neighborhoods. This freight
eventually shifted exclusively to the Clarence Henry Truckway. Concerns about a
shifting of the Port’s freight load primarily onto Louisiana Avenue were first addressed in
the Times Picayune in 1982, in an opinion piece where this is portrayed as a nonissue,
due to the impending construction of the second CCC a few years from then. The
author of this opinion piece portrays the Louisiana Avenue residents as being
propagandized by those who wished to keep the freight traffic on Decatur Street
(Morrison 1982). Additionally, Morrison goes on to voice what she depicts as the routine
lament of French Quarter residents that they are second-class citizens in the city, due to
their neighborhood’s status as a tourist destination. The Times Picayune advocated for
the protected status of the quarter as primary in all traffic considerations, describing the
French quarter as “… A mountain…[which]… People… perforce have to go around…
To get to other parts of the city...” (Forsyth 1983:10). When Councilman Mike Early first
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proposed a year-long trial ban of freight truck through-traffic in the French quarter, the
voices of the Louisiana Avenue residents still had the status of “…a minority opinion in
the task force report” (Treadway 1983a:13). Outside of the Council chambers, however,
the residents of this neighborhood were already expressing concern (Dansker 1983;
Soboloff 1983). See Figure 17.
Figure 17. Louisiana Avenue and other Arterials.

Source: Webb 2018.
As was the case with Decatur Street, the primary lens through which the discourse of
no-trucks-on-Louisiana-Avenue was framed was quality of life. In the New Orleans City
Council itself, the opinion was voiced that “The solution to saving the Decatur Street
area does not lie with the destruction of Louisiana Avenue” (Dansker 1983:13). The
issue went so far with the residents as to culminate in a lawsuit against the city
regarding the degradation of the neighborhood by the freight trucking traffic (Hodge
1984).
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It is crucial to note, however, that even during the deployment of these
discourses, the importance of the Port and the centrality of its freight trucking were
overtly acknowledged. They were realities which the residents felt it incumbent upon
themselves to grapple with in the midst of fighting for their quality of life against the
presence of increased freight trucking traffic. It is important to understand that at this
time, when the residents of the Louisiana Avenue neighborhood were publicly grappling
with the tension between the centrality of the Port to the economy of the city and their
own quality of life, the Port of New Orleans was at a crisis. The freight transportation
modality of the shipping container had come to press unavoidably upon the practices of
the Port, which traditionally had focused on bulk cargo, such as grain, petroleum
products, coal, and steel, transported on barges. It saw its only way to be able to
compete with the now container oriented and ready ports of Houston and Miami to be
the expansion of its own shipping container capacity at the Louisiana Avenue wharf
(Katz 1984c). This led plaintiffs in the anti-freight Louisiana Avenue lawsuit against the
city to speak of compromise regarding freight traffic in the city. The representative of the
affected district, Jim Singleton, publicly stated: “Nobody wants the truck traffic on his
street. [Nevertheless] it has got to get to the river in some way. The port is the lifeblood
of our city” (Hodge 1984; Singleton 1984).
Along with the rise of general uptown anti-freight sentiment, it was the success of
French Quarter residents in the case of Decatur Street which encouraged and inspired
the Louisiana Avenue residents to shut down freight traffic on their street as well
(Associated Press 1984; Hansen 1984; Soboloff 1983). In this process, the master
narrative was beginning to gel, epitomized by the statement “The truck traffic must be
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taken out of all residential neighborhoods and rerouted through commercial areas”
(Hodge 1984; Singleton 1984; Soboloff 1983:14). Also, notable at this time was the
deployment of the discourse that race factored into choice of Louisiana Avenue; this
despite the fact of the aforementioned fact of the last-ditch push on the part of the port
to use the geography of the Louisiana Avenue wharf to facilitate economically
meaningful competition with the ports of Houston and Miami, which would have
benefitted New Orleans’ Port-employed Black middle class, as dock work at the Port
was foundational to it. “… when we think about who is providing that labor, it very
quickly gets into the reality that it is traditionally the African-American community”
(Hodge 1984; Katz 1984c; Port director one 2017).
Leake Ave Narrative
This section details the story of a proposed extension of Leake Avenue from
River Road, behind Audubon Park, to Nashville Avenue for Port freight trucking to get
from Jefferson parish to the uptown container terminals. It is in the case of the Leake
Avenue extension that the anti-freight narrative begins to solidify. The Leake Avenue
extension was promoted to the citizens of New Orleans at least as early as 1975 to
relieve the Port-bound freight trucking which ran from Leake to Magazine to Henry Clay
and then to Tchoupitoulas. See Figure 18.
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Figure 18. Proposed Leake Avenue Extension.

Source: Times-Picayune 2/19/1975 sec.1:2

It is important to understand that initially representatives of the Audubon Zoo were in
favor of the proposal, to mitigate what was deemed an unacceptable level of freight
traffic through residential areas (Murphy 1975b). Nevertheless, only four months later,
when the issue of expanding the area of the zoo came to the fore, the Audubon
Zoological Society was unable to come to an agreement as to how the proposed
expansion of the zoo and the Leake Avenue extension would impact each other
(Murphy 1975a). It was still, however, upheld in the court of public opinion as at least a
potential public good, if for no other reason than to keep freight traffic off the proposed
Napoleon Avenue arterial (Forsyth 1975b).
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At the first public hearing on the issue on December 17, 1975, a variety of pros
and cons to the proposal were hotly debated (Atkinson 1975; Harsdorff 1975). There is
a reference to “rumbling trucks” on the proposed extension, although now many citizens
did support it (Atkinson 1975). More germane however, is that it was at this hearing that
the Audubon Zoological Society first expressed concern over the impact the extension
might have on the animal habitats in what was at the time a potentially expanded zoo
(Atkinson 1975).
Two days later, the centrality of the Port to the city’s economy—and the role of
freight trucking in its operations—were highlighted at a public meeting, along with one of
the “phantoms” raised.
Plans for a proposed extension of Leake Avenue through Audubon Park were
unwrapped last week, and the initial rhetoric raised a few phantoms … While the
Napoleon bridge concept is about as dead as a corpse can be, some form of the
Riverfront Expressway might still be a remote possibility” (Forsyth 1975a).
By early in the following year, the Audubon Park Commission was now serving
as a forum for uptown civic groups to reject any incarnation of the proposal, for reasons
of noise, traffic, quality of life, and concerns over the impact of the freight extension
upon the animals in the zoo. One uptown representative of the business community
spoke in favor of the extension on the condition that it run on the batture (the green
space) between the river and the levee, not between the levee and the park (Atkinson
1976). Four months later the Audubon Park Commission voted to defer taking an official
stand on the extension pending an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (Harsdorff
1976).
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Almost two and a half years later, the issue still was not resolved. During a public
hearing convened for other business, the uptown New Orleans City Council member,
Frank Friedler Jr., portrayed himself as the primary advocate of the extension, stating
that “he had the signatures of 2000 residents in favor of the new route,” which was
portrayed as an effective way to take significant amounts of freight traffic from other
uptown streets (Massa 1978:1). Notwithstanding the support of the City Planning
Commission and the Streets Department, the Uptown Civic Association opposed it
because “Uptown New Orleans as a residential area, with its narrow streets now
overloaded should not suffer further with unbearable traffic” (Massa 1978:14). Note the
linguistic power of discourse deployment in this instance. The extension was initially
proposed to mitigate freight trucking as it ran from Leake to Magazine to Henry Clay
and then to the wharves at the end of Tchoupitoulas Street (Murphy 1975b). Note as
well the usage of the term “social justice.”
Quality of life speaks against it. Economics speaks against it. Social
justice speaks against it (Massa 1978:14).
Of significance in this article is the explicitly stated support of the Audubon Park
Commission for the Leake extension, pending an EIS.
Only one month later however, the president of the Upper Audubon Association
deployed two discourses in her portrayal of the Association as the primary protector of
“Audubon Park and other green spaces” to advance the gathering anti-freight narrative
(Genella 1978). Casting the Association as the savior of public green space from not
only the Port and “trucking and shipping interests” in general, but also the zoo itself, the
first discourse was a revival of the fears and controversy surrounding the proposed
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Riverfront Expressway (ibid). The second discourse was that of generally increased
uptown freight trucking traffic (ibid).
The next time this portion of Leake Avenue is mentioned in the Times-Picayune
is seven years later. It occurs in the published minutes of a New Orleans City Council
meeting at which the stretch between Henry Clay and Audubon Park is reserved for
purposes of parking only (Harsdorff 1985). Present at this meeting was thenCouncilman Sidney Barthelemy, who later as mayor would “try to pry loose some state
road money to four-lane Tchoupitoulas Street to ease access to the city’s old wharves,
such as the Louisiana Avenue facility,” beginning the infrastructural process which
would move the freight traffic of the Port of New Orleans onto the Clarence Henry
Truckway behind the floodwall (Katz 1987; Parsons 1997). The discourse-driven desire
of uptown residents to see fewer arterials had been gathering steam all through the
1970s. The Napoleon Avenue freight corridor was originally proposed to take traffic off
Washington and Jackson.
“The [Leake Avenue] proposal is not new and was revived recently by New
Orleans City Councilman Frank Fiedler as an alternative to an attempt by [Director of
Streets Blaise] Carrierre to have Napoleon Avenue designated a truck route. The
Napoleon ploy was intended to remove trucks from Jackson and Washington Avenues,
which are deemed too narrow for truck traffic but have been truck routes for several
years” (Forsyth 1975a).
This was in keeping with the narrative of too much freight through uptown
(Atkinson 1975; Forsyth 1975b). Only once in the flow of reporting on the extension is
the centrality of the Port to the city, and the centrality of freight to the Port, ever
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acknowledged. “[The Leake Avenue extension] would provide needed truck access from
major highways to bustling wharves in the uptown area … The Port of New Orleans is
essential to the economy of this city, and truck access is essential to the port” (Forsyth,
1975b). This battle over Leake Avenue has echoes today in the recent controversy
concerning the use of the riverfront park area known as “The Fly” as a soccer field
(LaRose 2016a, 2016b; McClendon 2015, 2016c, 2016b, 2016e, 2016a, 2016d). This
controversy shows the political infeasibility of this engineering solution to the one way in
/ one way out access to the Port.
St. Bernard Lock Narrative
This section details the plans for a proposed ship channel and lock between
Violet and Poydras in St. Bernard parish known by residents as the Violet Cut. This
story bears a resemblance to the fight over the Riverfront Expressway. However, the
distinctly anti-New Orleans/anti-Port/anti-government-in-general tropes used by the
residents make this narrative unique to St. Bernard parish.
In 1969, the same year the Riverfront Expressway proposal was killed, plans were
announced for the Violet Cut. See Figure 19.
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Figure 19. The Violet Cut.

Source: Webb 2018.
The purpose was to connect the Mississippi river with the MRGO, to save time for ships
moving between the uptown wharves and the tidewater at the MRGO. This was a major
component of the Port’s 30-year CENTROPORT plan, which was based on a 1969
study by the Bechtel Corporation of San Francisco. The justification for the project was
to maintain the Port’s national dominance as the number two port in the nation by liner
tonnage. “The liner trade figures, compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
measure shipments, predominantly general cargo items, carried on vessels sailing
regular schedules to the same destinations, much like commercial airliners … A general
cargo ship is extremely adaptable and can be used to transport virtually every form of
dry non-bulk cargo, from railway lines to agricultural machinery” (Drew 1982b; Maritime
Industry Foundation 2013). The Port was ranked second in this category right after the
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Port of New York in 1969. The project was also to address uptown freight trucking
congestion, which was already seen as problematic (Mongelluzzo 1978). "This was
announced here by U.S. Rep. F. Edward Hebert after he conferred with Dock Board and
Army Corps of Engineers representatives," reported the Times-Picayune (Roane
1969:1, sec.1). The necessity of relocating 4,000-plus New Orleanians if the ship
channel and lock were placed next to the old IHNC lock informed the decision to place
the project in St. Bernard. A new lock next to the present IHNC lock would be much
more expensive, logistically difficult, and disruptive, said the Dock Board and the ACE. It
is important to note that at the outset of this proposal, the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury
was in favor of the lock and channel, similarly to the initial support of the Leake Ave
extension by the Audubon Institute, so long as there would be sufficient bridges to
traverse it. This was the discourse of industrial development vs the discourse of St.
Bernard as residential area. Note that it prioritized advantages to the Port over the
residents of St. Bernard. The Dock Board, the ACE, state and Orleans Parish
government, and the maritime industry were marketing the lock and ship channel as an
asset to St Bernard via the Port, deploying the trope "as goes the Port so go we all."
The next time this proposal appears in the Times-Picayune is in 1972, when
resentment was building up over repeated delays of a public hearing on the project,
which was sure to display the anger of St. Bernard residents concerning it. Rep. F.
Edward Hebert sought to delay the next public hearing due to the controversy (The
Times-Picayune 1972c). At issue was the division of St. Bernard parish by the lock and
canal without sufficient transportation infrastructure—highways, bridges, overpasses—
to traverse them. Hebert’s support of the project was conditional upon sufficient access
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across the division for the residents of the parish. He spoke of plural access routes. In
addition, he wanted assurances there would be no financial burden to St. Bernard in
their construction. This meant that Hebert was pushing for federal and state roads,
perhaps Port-constructed and maintained, to stitch the two sides of St. Bernard together
in the event the ship channel and lock were constructed. He wouldn't support the project
unless this condition was met.
Hebert did deploy the discourse of jobs/economic development: “Hebert said that
the project would create one of the biggest industrial booms the parish of St. Bernard
could ever obtain. Millions of dollars in payroll and unlimited jobs in new industry would
be the result, according to Hebert” (The Times-Picayune 1972c:sec.1, 4). He also
accessed the discourse of protection from outsiders– read, New Orleans, in the guise of
the Port: “He said he has an ‘Absolute commitment’…that there will be no outside
interference in the operation of the canal, which will be under the control of St. Bernard
authorities” (The Times-Picayune 1972c:sec.1, 4). In addition, the environmental
discourse was intensifying. Senator Nunez, chair of the Joint Legislative Committee on
the Environment, was also trying to delay the hearing. These two discourses, the selfdetermination of the residents of St. Bernard, and the project’s environmental impacts,
figured into a major development in the narrative flow of this story.
On July 20th, 1972, Dock Board President Harold Loumiet suddenly resigned. In
an article of August 3rd, 1972, he gave his reasons, citing the "...ship lock and canal
(as) '...a disaster from every standpoint - ecological, political, economic'” (The TimesPicayune 1972d:1, p. 20). He wanted the ship lock and canal to be built next to the
existing IHNC lock and noted that it should be of barge dimensions rather than
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engineered for larger ships, as the majority of the IHNC traffic was "shallow draft,"
meaning less than 30 feet deep (ibid). This was an alternative which came to be
rejected by the ACE and others primarily because of the soil types next to the IHNC, as
well as the necessary relocation of more people than if the project was developed In St.
Bernard.
Loumiet said that although there were vessels which wasted time going to both
the river and the MRGO, expansion of the facilities on the MRGO could ameliorate this
problem. He said containerized shipping would be at the France Road terminal via
MRGO, and LASH and SEABEEs2 would only operate on the Mississippi. He said he
was not told by other members of the Dock Board that he was incorrect per se, but
rather that he shouldn't make his opinion public so as not to "'...embarrass the Dock
Boards of the past and their friends by such an announcement'” (The Times-Picayune
1972d:1, p. 20).
It was ... suggested by some that we wait for the (ACE) to reach a
decision: then if the people of St. Bernard file suits against the lock, and
the project were to be tied up in the courts, then the board could look for
an alternative in such a way that no one would be embarrassed. In
broader terms, I was asked to further delay the proper development of the
inland waterway system of this country– a system that has suffered for
many years waiting for the Dock Board to move. This I would not do ... I
felt that I could best serve the community, the industry and the needs of
the port as a private citizen, so I ... resigned ... I intend to champion the
barge lock [at the IHNC location] proposal at every opportunity'" (The
Times-Picayune 1972d:1, p. 20).
Loumiet had formerly supported the original lock and ship channel project, but came to
say "'I cannot imagine the people in St. Bernard permitting this'" (ibid). This discourse on

Last stands for “Lighter Abroad Ship,” and it was a system whereby a ship carried a fleet of lightweight
barges for quicker transport and loading/unloading than towing the barges by tug. It was supplanted by
“SEABEE” or SEABARGE ships, which can stack larger barges in three tiers for transporting heavier
cargo in a greater number of barges (Leach 2007; Shuler 2008).
2

100

Loumiet's part was that of the arrogance of the Dock Board. It reflected a strong, rapidly
growing anti-Port sentiment in St. Bernard. The maritime community, meanwhile, was
marshalling ever-stronger support for the project.
On October 4, 1972, the Times-Picayune reported that the Merchant Marine had
formally endorsed the St. Bernard location (The Times-Picayune 1972a). At the event
where this endorsement took place, Associate Port Director H. G. Joffray represented
the Port. He cited the necessity of space as the justification for the lock and channel per
the port of Rotterdam, at that time the world's largest (ibid). He also cited the need for a
fast, easy route between the MRGO and the Mississippi River. This discourse on the
part of the Times-Picayune was that of professional legitimization of the project. At this
point the Times-Picayune still appeared to be supporting it. On October 26th of the same
year the Times-Picayune continued more strongly in this vein. It published a veritable
who’s who of the maritime industry as coming out in strong support. "[the] ... New
Orleans Steamship Association, Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association, American
Waterways Operators Inc. and the Ohio Valley Improvement Association" all backed the
project– note that The Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIW) is referred to in this article as
the Gulf Seaway (A. Roane 1972b). The GIW is an inland barge route that runs along
the Gulf Coast from Fort Myers Florida to Brownsville Texas.
The rationales given by the Dock Board were congestion at the outdated IHNC
lock, relocating most of Port to the MRGO and France Road Terminal, and feasibility
because of land use and low population density " ... between Violet and Poydras" (A.
Roane 1972b). Significantly, an additional reason given by the Dock Board was that " ...
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the old breakbulk-cargo riverfront wharves are poor for a heavy volume of containers
because of inadequate land and crowded city streets" (ibid).
The Dock Board had no real focus on developing Port facilities on the West Bank
or the St. Bernard riverfront at this time because rates were cheaper on the East Bank,
rail service was poorer on the West Bank, and "... [the West Bank had] inferior highway
connections compared with [the] France Road Terminal … ” (A. Roane 1972b). These
were the reasons given for going further into the MRGO tidewater area. The dimensions
of the proposed Violet lock, at 1200' long; 150' wide; and 50' deep, made it "...the
largest lock ever built by the Corps of Engineers" (ibid). However, the maritime
community was not in fact unanimous in its support of the project, despite the TimesPicayune’s attempts to discursively frame the situation as such.
On November 17th, 1972, it was reported that "William C. McNeal ... executive
vice-president of Oil Transport Co. Inc. and past board chairman of the American
Waterways Operators … " opposed construction of the channel/lock without a further
cost analysis.
I am convinced nobody will ever build a ditch in St. Bernard Parish ... this
will be in the courts for years. The people of St. Bernard are up in arms
over this" (The Times-Picayune 1972e).
He cited the predicted opposition of the politicians of St. Bernard, the Sierra Club, and
the Audubon Society. This was reminiscent of both the Riverfront Expressway and
Leake Ave conflicts. Note the use of the term “ditch” about a project that was supposed
to ensure the dominance of the Port of New Orleans. This is a discourse of contempt for
Orleans Parish.
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McNeal and Loumiet were both advocating for a new lock for barges only to be
built next to the current IHNC lock. The Dock Board said soil studies showed that site to
be geologically inadequate for this use. It is important to remember that everyone at that
time was still expecting CENTROPORT (what would come to be known as The
Millennium Port) to be built at the mouth of the river, so theoretically ships wouldn't have
to come upriver as much. McNeal saw no use for the MRGO in general and said that it
wasn't large enough for increasing ship sizes. "However, associate Port Director
Herbert R. Haar Jr ... said [its use] is increasing [and would grow from 768 ships in
1972] to 2900 by 1980" (The Times-Picayune 1972e).
It is at this point that we begin to see a severe, publicly declared pushback
against the project by the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury. Only five days after McNeal’s
statements about the “ditch,” the Police Jury attempted a further delay on a public
hearing about the ship channel and lock, which the ACE said it had been trying to
coordinate "since 1970" (McMillan 1972:1, p.1). The Jury accused the ACE of trying to
rig the hearing by having it located on Lakeshore Drive at 10 a.m., presumably a place
and time which would have been difficult for St. Bernard residents to make. The meeting
time and place was referred to as "capricious" (McMillan 1972:1, p.1). A Jury member
stated their intent for "recall proceedings" against F. Edward Hebert because of a
perceived lack of support on Hebert’s part for the parish's opposition (ibid). By this time,
all parish politicians opposed the project, and they had collected 14,000 signatures
against it.
The ACE defended itself by saying it had worked with the jury for years to
schedule the hearing, and that the site indicated that it was a "... national and statewide
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..." not just parish, issue (McMillan 1972:1, p.1). This is the deployment of the trope of
St. Bernard Parish obstructing the greater good, also known as “The tail wagging the
dog.” The ACE also promised to keep the hearing open until all who wished to arrive
had spoken. The Police Jury also called on Gov. Edwin Edwards to " ... fulfill his
campaign promise … " to St. Bernard that he would fight the project, noting that St.
Bernard voted for Edwards. Additionally, the Police Jury deployed the trope of "absolute
federal domination" as being the ACE’s true reason for the scheduling and time of the
hearing, which were set without the consultation of the Police Jury (McMillan 1972:1,
p.2). U.S. Senator J. Bennett Johnston was also singled out for recall proceedings, due
to the accusation that he had done nothing to aid the parish in this conflict (McMillan
1972:1, p.2).
On Wednesday November 29th, 1972 the long-delayed and controversial hearing
finally took place. Governor Edwin Edwards was reported as going back on his
campaign promise to oppose the project, due to evidence of inadequate soils, and
therefore greater expense (as well as greater community displacement) if the ship
channel & lock were built near the IHNC. St. Bernard residents at the meeting deployed
the trope of the Dock Board and ACE as the villains of the story. "For a time, about two
dozen carried signs deriding the project, Dock Board, and Army Corps of Engineers
around the hall, and loudly gave their disapproval" (Roane and Bourgoyne 1972:8). It
was also reported that New Orleans organized labor and the shipping industry were on
the same page regarding the project. The AFL-CIO and Seafarer's International Union
of North America, along with " ... several shipping companies and associations,
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including the New Orleans Steamship Association ... " all supported it at the meeting
(Roane and Bourgoyne 1972:9).
Scare quotes were used to describe concerns of the Orleans Audubon Society
and Louisiana Wildlife Federation: “A spokesman for the Orleans Audubon Society and
Louisiana Wildlife Federation said after studying data on the proposal collected by the
Dock Board and the [ACE], both environmental groups had ‘great doubts’ about the
channel project” (Roane and Bourgoyne 1972:8). In other words, at this point the TimesPicayune was still on the side of industry. The discourse of New Orleans profiting at the
expense of St. Bernard was deployed, along with fears of flooding from the MRGO
juxtaposed with Port-only benefits. One Police Juror "...charged that the parish has not
shared in the economic growth and prosperity of the Port of New Orleans and that the
planned channel will not bring about industrial expansion and economic growth in St.
Bernard, as proponents claim" (Roane and Bourgoyne 1972:8). Senator Nunez said that
guarantees of economic growth from "public works projects" across the country often
didn't pan out (ibid). He also contrasted President Nixon's environmentalism3 with the
ACE's "[encouragement of] wetlands exploitation," citing the destruction of cypress
swamps by the MRGO (ibid). This led into the trope of a double standard for Orleans
and St. Bernard parishes when it came to political influence, with New Orleans unfairly
outweighing St Bernard.
"Sheriff John F. Rowley of St. Bernard said 'a few hundred people in New
Orleans blocked construction of a riverfront expressway and selection of a new bridge
site. But in the metropolitan area, if St. Bernard people oppose it, then [the project is

3

President Nixon founded the Environmental Protection Agency.
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deemed to be] good for the entire area’" (Roane and Bourgoyne 1972:sec.1, 8). This
assessment overlooks how the entire business community, most city government, and
all state government had seen the Expressway as vital to the state of Louisiana. Again,
the trope was deployed of favoritism towards New Orleans at the expense of St.
Bernard Parish. A more focused discourse of government in general as the enemy was
deployed as well by Sheriff Rowley. He said the 10,000 jobs to be created would be
“only temporary,” and that after these were gone all that would be left would be “‘ …
bridgetenders … civilians on civil service’” (Roane and Bourgoyne 1972:sec.1, 9). In
opposition, as well as the discourses of economic development and maintenance of
dominance, the Port deployed a more technological discourse to shore up its position.
On December 6th, 1972, Port director Walter Reed spoke to a meeting of the
Society of American Military Engineers. His message was on the need for the ship
channel and lock at St. Bernard to provide a more stable tidewater for new kinds of
vessels (LASH and SEABEE) than was available on the Mississippi at the uptown
wharves. Briefly, the currents of the Mississippi River form rapidly-shifting sandbars
which make its draft unstable and difficult to navigate. The tidewater at the MRGO was
more stable, and therefore more suited to these kinds of barge-carrying vessels (The
Times-Picayune 1972b). The Times-Picayune shortly came out stronger than ever for
the project.
The story about the “hotly debated” project (a summary of the two-session
meeting in November 1972, where Rep. Hebert was “booed”) came out in the
December 17th, 1972 issue of the Times-Picayune. The story opens with
“The seat of a great and populous empire, the mighty mart of the
merchandise brought from more than a thousand rivers.” This statement
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was made by President Thomas Jefferson, a man of vision and vast
intellectual capacity. He said it of the Port of New Orleans in 1803 at the
time of the Louisiana Purchase. It has proven true, especially the second
part, with New Orleans the second port in the nation and involved in
competition with other ports during sweeping technological changes in
worldwide shipping" (A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 3).
The article goes on to summarize the main feature of the Port’s planned
redevelopment program: shifting the bulk of Port activity from the riverfront to the
France Road terminal and MRGO, utilizing the St. Bernard ship canal and lock. This
would free up the Port to rehab the riverfront wharves and get rid of many of them. It
would also address the outdated IHNC and lock as roadblocks to Port expansion,
generating the " ... something larger and more modern ... " needed to fulfill this vision
(A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 3). The Times-Picayune deployed the trope of the general
ignorance of St. Bernard Parish on at least two occasions in this article, once noting that
" ... it is the most bitterly opposed measure for the parish since the school
desegregation days of the early 1960s," as well as reporting the trope of resentment of
the Dock-Board-as-representative-of-New-Orleans (A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 3). The
Times-Picayune goes on to point out that the Dock Board is an agency of the state, not
the city. To be fair, St. Bernard Parish residents were also angry that at that time there
was no St. Bernard representation on the Dock Board. The paper also mentions the “ …
sweeping technological changes in worldwide shipping,” which is interesting because at
the planned dimensions of 1200' long by 150' wide by 50' deep, the ship lock and canal
would have been perfect for many modern post-Panamax container ships (A. Roane
1972a:sec.1, 3). The passenger vehicle crossing for this channel, however, was less
than hoped for at this stage of planning.
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" ... a fixed high level highway bridge [was] to be built ... " to enable the residents
of St. Bernard to navigate this feature and ameliorate the aspect of “the parish being cut
in half” (A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 3). Note, singular; " ... a ... bridge ... " Contrast this to
congressman Hebert's original conditions for the project of multiple " ... bridges,
highways, and overpasses" (The Times-Picayune 1972c). This is exactly like the federal
government ultimately opting for the surface roadway rather than the depressed
roadway for the Riverfront Expressway. When the Times-Picayune describes the
concerns of the residents about the bisection of their parish, it again uses scare quotes
(“cut in half”). The article also notes the residents’ concerns about flooding and
wetlands, but only in passing (A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 3). The residents deployed the
discourse of the damage received from Hurricane Betsy pre-levee protection. They
portrayed this damage as caused by the MRGO. The Times-Picayune did not agree
however, and went on to state that "The U.S. Maritime Administration, Mayor Moon
Landrieu, and...the Greater New Orleans AFL-CIO...All endorse a lock and canal," as
well as the Seafarer's International Union of North America (A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 3).
The major political endorsement, however, came from Governor Edwin Edwards.
Governor Edwards originally favored a new connecting canal alongside the
outdated IHNC, and promised St. Bernard as much, but then stated that " ... the sheer
weight of evidence against such a location ... has forced me, reluctantly, to conclude
that in good conscience I could not recommend it" (A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 3, 4).
Edwards gave six conditions to be met for the lock and ship channel to be built at Violet:
1). A 4-lane federally-funded highway bridge to be built over where the channel
connects the Mississippi River to the MRGO;
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2). Utilities must be relocated so that there is no disruption of the Parish;
3). The Construction of lock and ship channel must be deferred for the highway
bridge and utility relocations to be completed;
4). Levees bordering the ship channel must be of the same quality as the overall
hurricane protection levees, and they must be complete before the levee
improvements to the River and the MRGO;
5). An Environmental Impact Statement must be completed before any work is
done; and
6). The channel and its adjacent lands must be put under the control of St.
Bernard Parish.
He acknowledged this is a compromise that all parties would have some issues with,
but " ... looking at our problems [this is] ... realistically, the only solution available to us"
(A. Roane 1972a:sec.1, 4).
The article relates that the EIS completed for the St. Bernard Parish Police Jury
by the ACE says there will be " ... certain positive and adverse environmental effects
that occur as a result of modification." Note the ACE deploying the trope of compromise,
paralleling Gov. Edwards. The article goes on to report that at the hearing, the Soros
engineering firm, in confirmation of the Bechtel firm's Port growth assessment in 1969,
said
... [this assumes] that adequate connecting waterways will be provided
between the Mississippi river, the Inner Harbor [canal], and the Gulf...all
three of the waterways - the MRGO, the...new lock and channel, and the
Southwest Passi (deepening) - should ultimately be provided with the
same capability if the Port of New Orleans is to freely develop as predicted
[i.e., remain competitive as the number two port in the nation] (A. Roane
1972a:sec.1, 4).
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From ship lock to IHNC Lock replacement controversy.
Two years later, the Times-Picayune reported that the US House Appropriations
Committee had approved funding for both a channel connecting the MRGO to the
Michoud Canal4, and a study as to where to put the proposed ship lock connecting the
MRGO and the Mississippi river– either at the IHNC, or at Violet in St. Bernard. This
debate is the seed of the current longstanding opposition by residents of the Lower
Ninth Ward to replace the old IHNC lock near St. Claude Ave. See Figure 20, 21.
Figure 20. IHNC lock location relative to the MRGO.
Legend: Red rectangle is location of IHNC lock

Source: http://images-mediawki-sites.thefullwiki.org/02/1/4/5/71535463257896517.gif

4

The Southwest Pass is located downriver from the Port of New Orleans and is notoriously difficult to
navigate.
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Figure 21. IHNC Lock Detail.

Source: http://media.nola.com/environment/photo/existing-industrial-canal-lock-andtransportation-routesjpg-09b044a091246cb2.jpg
On September 30th, 1975, the Times-Picayune published a report on the
inadequacy of the IHNC lock. Col. Early J. Rush, the district engineer for the ACE at
New Orleans spoke at a New Orleans meeting of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterways
Conference. He predicted that the problem would worsen from then-current 24-hour
wait times. He also said the St. Bernard ship lock near Violet would displace fewer
people and cost the state less. Expanding the current IHNC would disrupt 600 people.
"'It is primarily the flood control features, such as levees and floodwalls, that accompany
any lock construction, not the lock itself, which cause the greatest real estate and
environmental impact'" (The Times-Picayune 1975:sec.1, 2). He did acknowledge that
the Violet ship lock proposal had the potential to cause great controversy. Col. Rush
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was deploying the tropes of cost efficiency and sensitivity to the New Orleans
population. The metacommunication (overarching unspoken message) was that the
people of St. Bernard didn’t know what they were talking about. However, a St. Bernard
Parish letter to the editor in response to this article urged construction of the new ship
lock close to the IHNC instead as soon as possible. The author castigated the Dock
Board for wasting so much time on trying to get the ship lock constructed in St. Bernard.
He referenced the concurrent lost money because of increased wait times at the IHNC
lock while this was going on. He also wrote of Leander Perez's5 “‘...[fear] that the link in
St. Bernard would cut the parish in two parts and [Perez's recommendation] that the
new lock be constructed in the Industrial Canal site'" (MacAulay 1975:1, p. 12). He
maintained the lock at the IHNC was the option that would be cheaper and less
disruptive. This was the discourse that the people of St. Bernard are the ones who really
know what's going on, and the trope of the Dock Board, and by extension New Orleans,
as the villain.
On February 20th, 1976, the Times-Picayune reported on the St. Bernard Parish
Police Jury declaring its intent to block the ship channel. The Police Jury was, however
undecided on a strategy. It wanted to pursue legal action. The Violet location was
formally approved by the Lower Mississippi Valley Division of the ACE. The Police Jury
emphasized that it still needed to be finalized in Washington, and so it vowed to
continue the fight against the Violet location. "Maj. Gen. Francis P. Koisch, division
engineer of the Lower Mississippi valley Division of the [ACE] ... said the Violet location

Leander “Judge” Perez was an ardent segregationist and the most powerful political boss in St. Bernard
and Plaquemines Parishes from 1919 until his death in 1969, the year the recommendation for the ship
channel and lock was made public.
5
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... 'is cost effective [at $200 million] ... and will cause a minimum of social disruption
and, while it will cause some environmental damage, on balance it is the most
acceptable location for the project' (Hutcheson 1976:1, p. 4). St. Bernard officials said
the whole concept of a Port tidewater operation in St. Bernard, including the GIW, was
"outdated" (Hutcheson 1976:1, p. 4). For the ACE, this was the trope of minimal
disruption with maximum benefit. The St. Bernard discourse was an interesting move:
The federal government had not fully signed off on the project yet; therefore, the feds
were now the protector of St. Bernard, as opposed to the oppressor. The ACE was
portrayed by the Police Jury as the real villain of this story, a trope which would come to
be the central theme of the saga of the ill-fated IHNC lock replacement in the Lower
Ninth Ward. The core discourse of the federal government as enemy of the people of
St. Bernard was, however, always present during the standoff over the lock and ship
channel. A prime example of this is the full-page ad for William T. Bergeron’s candidacy
for the first Congressional district in 1976 (The Times-Picayune 1976:sec.1, 21). The
controversy was growing exponentially.
On March 29th, 1977, there was a public meeting about the project in the New
Orleans Superdome6. The size of the venue is notable as an indication of how much
debate the issue was causing at the time. However, no real new discursive
developments appeared from this meeting, at which it was revealed that President
Carter was ordering the project to be studied further before committing it to the 1978
budget. The same parties marshalled the same tropes for and against the project.
Interestingly, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service came out against the project, opposing

6

It is now called the Mercedes-Benz Superdome.
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the ACE, federal agency vs federal agency (Mongelluzzo 1977c). Again, there was a
reiteration by proponents about the necessity of locating the Port’s primary operations at
the MRGO tidewater if the Port were to remain dominant and competitive. Also,
proponents were still able to point out that the Port was the primary regional employer.
The issue was, however, about to reach its dénouement.
On April 15th, 1977, President Carter rejected funding for the St. Bernard site, but
said "...he would approve funding for modifications to the...[existing IHNC lock]" for it to
connect the MRGO and Mississippi River (Weiss 1977b:sec.1, 1). "During [an ACE]
hearing on the project last month, Gov. Edwin Edwards and New Orleans port officials
warned that unless the new lock in St. Bernard goes ahead as scheduled, there would
be dire consequences for the state and the nation" (Weiss 1977b:sec.1, 26). Notably,
the Times-Picayune used the phrase "The lock and its channel would cut St. Bernard
Parish in half...," this time without the qualifier of scare quotes (Weiss 1977b:sec.1, 26).
It seemed at this point as if the Times-Picayune, in choosing to linguistically legitimize
this trope, was attempting to align itself with the people of St. Bernard.
The very next reporting day, the Times-Picayune revealed that "Rep. Lindy
Boggs ... said that opponents of a proposed new ship lock and channel in St. Bernard
Parish will have to convince congress the project is not justified" (Weiss 1977a:sec.1,
1). The Times-Picayune again stated "New Orleans port officials have called the
proposed St. Bernard lock essential to long-range development of the city's port, but St.
Bernard officials have vigorously fought the project, which would cut the parish in half
(Weiss 1977a:sec.1, 1). Nevertheless, Rep. Lindy "... Boggs said, 'the attitude of the
[congressional] committee is that all of the [waterway] projects on the President's list
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were justified previously’" (Weiss 1977a:sec.1, 5). Boggs’ trope was that this was a
federal, not a local, issue. This did not fare any better with the sentiments of the
residents of New Orleans than it had with St. Bernard.
In the state of the Port, 1978, optimism was indicated for the required new ship
lock to be built at the old IHNC lock. By this time the site at the IHNC—
"...encompassing..." the old lock–was being portrayed as minimally disruptive, but the
new lock itself was still portrayed as vital to the continued status of the Port as number
two in the nation: "Mayor-elect Ernest Morial said late in the year area neighborhood
organizations indicated they may accept minimal displacement so a new lock can be
built" (Mongelluzzo 1978:sec 7, 12). This is the discourse of the Port's needs depending
upon the will of the residents.
Nevertheless, the Port continued with the trope of urgency. On February 3 rd,
1978, it was reported that "... [the] Louisiana Congressional delegation ..." was pushing
the ACE for the new lock. According to the ACE, the new proposed location, opposite
the Galvez St. Wharf posed little environmental harm. This lock would be "... one of the
largest in the world" (Poe 1978:2, p. 20). "It was brought out at the hearing, attended by
Mayor-elect Ernest Morial of New Orleans, Edward S. Reed, executive port director,
[and] Col. Herbert Haar of the Port [sic], that the new Industrial Canal lock [was]
regarded as the second most urgent and important project on the Mississippi river after
the Alton, Ill. proposed new lock which has crippled the upper river system [sic]."
The ship lock and canal at St. Bernard were key to the Port’s plan to retain its
dominance as the number two port in the nation, and to relieve traffic congestion at the
uptown wharves. However, no amount of economic development discourse on the part
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of the Port, federal, state, and local government; or the maritime community, could
overcome the power of the residential trope: that the project would “cut the parish in
half.” Why this was held to be such a key concern is unknown, except possibly because
there would be only one access point over the ship cut. The real power for the St.
Bernard residents, however, came from the anti-federal and, especially, the anti-New
Orleans discourses. These have always been endemic to St. Bernard Parish, and
continue to this day. We are no longer seeing concerns that the parish will be bisected,
but the Port is still represented by the residents of St. Bernard Parish as being the
epitome of New Orleans, even though it has been under Louisiana state control since
the late 1800s.
MRGO Narrative
If the anti-freight master narrative can be parsed as “No Freight Is Good Freight /
Tourism-Gentrification Trumps Port”, then Hurricane Katrina provided the soil in which
new discourses that contributed to this narrative flourished. On the freight side, the
impact of the storm involves the fate of the MRGO. The MRGO was constructed in the
1950s to provide a shortcut from the Gulf of Mexico to the IHNC, which was completed
in 1925. See Figure 22.
The MRGO’s closure is tied up with the destruction of St. Bernard Parish and the
Lower Ninth Ward due to storm flooding. An examination of the historical record shows
that, as was the case with the freight land arterials in the city of New Orleans, the
abandonment of the MRGO as a viable freight access for the Port of New Orleans was
the result of the deployment of a sequence of discourses, in this case flood-oriented,
concerning these areas.
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Figure 22. The MRGO.

Source: Webb 2018.
The initial trope of Lower Ninth Ward / St. Bernard flooding during Hurricane
Katrina was that of a deliberate bombing of the pertinent levee. The proponents ranged
from mainstream to fringe (Myers 2005; Pollard 2006; Syzmanski 2006). In the
historically black Lower Ninth Ward, this discourse was not strictly a function of a
documented culture of conspiracy in the Black community (Turner 1993). The residents
of both the Lower Ninth Ward and historically majority-white St. Bernard Parish both
hearkened to the publicly documented bombing of levees in the Flood of 1927, as well
as the widespread rumor of the same occurring during Hurricane Betsy in 1963 (Persica
2012; Reckdahl 2015).
The memory of [the intentional bombing of levees during the Flood of 1927] is
seared in the memories of the [people of St. Bernard parish].
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Almost every survivor from Hurricane Betsy in ‘65 will passionately tell you the
government blew up the levees to save parts of New Orleans. My grandfather
will tell you he heard the explosion that sent his family to his attic to axe his way
out. I’ve heard people say the same about Katrina. I have not found any
evidence of these claims, but it does make one wonder, especially in regards to
Betsy (Dier 2014).
The secondary discourse of Ninth Ward/St. Bernard flooding was that of a barge
breaking loose and piercing the levee. This would have placed the onus for the flooding
partially upon the economic activities of Port. Ultimately, however, this discourse was
publicly rejected in the media as a viable explanation for this portion of the flooding
(Krupa 2011; McQuaid 2005).
The final discourse of the flooding in these regions, which ultimately gained
traction and spelled the end of the freight transportation utility of the MRGO, was that
the outlet was a major contributor to the flooding of Hurricane Katrina. Notwithstanding
the fact that by 2006 the economic contribution of the outlet from freight transportation
had declined, in combination with the restriction of all port freight trucking access to the
Clarence Henry Truckway this severely impacted the freight aspect of the port’s
business (Carter and Stern 2006:Summary). The trope of the anti-MRGO push was the
phrase “hurricane highway.” (Moore 2015). Nevertheless, a report by the Congressional
Research Service concluded that MRGO “…did not serve as a hurricane highway for
storm surge from the Gulf during Hurricane Katrina” (Carter and Stern 2006:6 emphasis
original). There was an acknowledgement of some contribution of the outlet’s “funnel
effect” to the flooding, but it was not determined to be the major cause (Carter and Stern
2006:7).
The true agenda for the closure of the MRGO was not one of hurricane
protection or redress to these flooded areas, but rather environmentalist concern for
118

mitigation of the erosion of the wetlands due to the unforeseen widening of the channel.
This discourse developed early in the history of the MRGO, and damage to the
surrounding wetlands is empirically substantiated (Carter and Stern 2006). The
discursive groundwork of MRGO as a hurricane highway, however, was laid early on in
descriptions of the hydrodynamics of the flooding. The public television program NOVA
brought the MRGO into the narrative—but not by name—seemingly to counteract the
rumors of a deliberate explosion of the levee. “7. Around 7:45 a.m., the levees along the
eastern side of the Industrial Canal's southern arm breach explosively” (Penry-Davey
and Chinn 2005). Shifting the discourse away from the levee breakage caused by a
man-made explosion to one derived entirely by water pressure brought the MRGO into
play, even unintentionally, as an element to be considered in the discursive processes
which constructed narratives of the flooding.
The environmentalist agenda impacting the MRGO discourse is an example of a
“policy window”, that is, a “…fleeting opportunity for advocates of proposals to push
their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems” (Sabatier and Weible
2014:34). The dénouement was that after the MRGO was closed in 2009, the Port of
New Orleans had no access—no arterials, no MRGO—other than the Tchoupitoulas
corridor with the cul-de-sac of the Clarence Henry Truckway as the solution to take all
freight trucking off of the New Orleans arterials, the result of the historical interplay of
these various land and water-based neighborhood discourses (Parsons 1997).
IHNC Lock Narrative
This section details the documentary history of the development of opposition by
the residents of the Lower Ninth Ward to replacement of the outdated IHNC lock by the
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ACE. The lock was created as an integral part of the IHNC in 1923. Its original
dimensions were 31.5 feet deep by 75 feet wide by 640 feet long. The ACE was given
the authority to build a new lock in the 1956 legislation creating the MRGO "'when the
economy justifies," i.e., when the lock could no longer handle the volume of traffic,
primarily barges, by 1963 (Krebs 1963:1). In addition to creating a passage from the
Mississippi River to the yet-to-be-completed MRGO (completed in 1968), the IHNC lock
was the primary means for ships and barges to get from the Mississippi River to the
GIW. A fully functional triumvirate of the IHNC, the MRGO and the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway (GIW) would have guaranteed the Port’s place as number one in the nation,
probably by any measure, be that dollars, tonnage, or TEUs. However, the continued
blockage of the IHNC lock replacement, particularly as a deep draft, led the Port to
move container facilities from the IHNC region to the uptown wharves, exacerbating last
mile freight congestion. This blockage was due to the deployment of several community
tropes and discourses over time.
1960s.
The primary tropes deployed in the 1960s by proponents of the lock project were
progress, commerce, economic development, and national economy. This was the
province of the Times-Picayune. On September 29, 1963, the Times-Picayune
published an article detailing how the inadequacy of the IHNC lock was hampering
waterborne commerce. The article showed the lock depth to be a significant problem
over 50 years prior to today. The paper deployed the tropes of MRGO-increased Port
commerce as the "irresistible force" meeting the "immovable object" of the shallow lock
(Krebs 1963:1). In addition, the article reported on the process for creating the new lock.
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... there will have to be a hearing; a review by the board of engineers [ACE];
congressional committee hearings; authorization of the work by Congress, and;
... appropriations ranging from $50 million to $70 million or more [over $400
million to $500 million in 2017]- depending on who is going to pay for a tunnel
under or a high level total ship clearance bridge over the canal leading from the
lock to the turning basin of the present ship channel four miles to the north"
(Krebs 1963:16).

The article also deploys the progress discourse for the new lock in the form of probable
support by a "...[reactivated] ship channel committee [supported by] the whole business
community ... the Mississippi Valley Association, the Rivers and Harbors Congress, the
Mississippi Valley Flood Control association and similar powerful bodies ... " (Krebs
1963:16). However, the policy foundation for a whole new set of oppositional discourses
would soon be laid.
In 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was created by President
Nixon. Under 40 CFR §§ 1500-1508 are included the elements
“Assessment of the social, economic, and environmental impacts of a proposed
action or project; Analysis of a range of reasonable alternatives to the proposed
project, based on the applicants defined purpose and need for the project;
Consideration of appropriate impact mitigation: avoidance, minimization and
compensation; … Public involvement including opportunities to participate and
comment; [and] Documentation and disclosure (Federal Highway Administration
n.d.).
In 40 CFR section 1501.8 section b on time limits for participating federal
agencies in the NEPA process to make decisions on proposed actions, the factors to be
considered include:
(i) Potential for environmental harm; (ii) Size of the proposed action; (iii) state of
the art of analytic techniques; (iv) Degree of public need for the proposed action,
including the consequences of delay; (v) Number of persons and agencies
affected; (vi) Degree to which relevant information is known and if not known the
time required for obtaining it; (vii) Degree to which the action is controversial …”
(Council on Environmental Quality 2005:7). The provisions of this act would
factor heavily into the battle over the IHNC lock.
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1970s.
On February 5, 1979, the Coalition to Save the Ninth Ward (The Coalition), a
group of community activist organizations, announced its formation at the Association of
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) headquarters. The Coalition had a
1000-signature petition opposing any construction regarding the IHNC lock, barring
community participation in the planning process. At its first rally on February 14, 1979,
The Coalition insisted that the ACE deal with Lower Ninth Ward residents as a collective
through The Coalition, rather than trying to negotiate with individuals (The TimesPicayune 1979b). The Coalition deployed the property values trope, citing the fact that
rumors of residential displacement were already leading people to start selling their
homes to real estate speculators (The Times-Picayune 1979a). The ACE, however,
stated that no relocation of homes or businesses was planned, and that it was looking
into the feasibility of constructing the new lock on the water and floating it into place,
rather than disrupting the residents (The Times-Picayune 1979a).
1980s.
In the 1980s, the ACE was studying once again the possibility of siting a new
lock near Violet in St. Bernard Parish, as an option out of three possibilities. The other
two potential sites were in Orleans Parish– expanding the existing lock, or building a
new lock and channel slightly south of the old one (Powers 1987). This study was
revived by the Federal Water Resources Act of 1986, directing the ACE to revisit
potential solutions for relieving the bottleneck at the IHNC lock (Martin 1987:1). The
residents of St. Bernard parish were upset by this development, as the parish was the
first choice of the ACE. "'We're going to put every obstacle that we can in front of them
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...The people don't want it' St. Bernard Police Jury President Luis Munster said" (Martin
1987:1). Munster again deployed the trope of the parish being cut in half, and in
response to the Port-deployed trope of economic development for St. Bernard, Munster
said, "'If it's an asset, they wouldn't be looking to give it to St. Bernard Parish ... New
Orleans would want to keep it,'" deploying the trope of New Orleans exploiting St.
Bernard, as well as repeating the conflation of the Port with the city (Martin 1987:2).
However, at one point the trope of economic development led to a guarded willingness
to consider the lock in St. Bernard by some of the Police Jury. ACE representative
Bruce Sossaman said the new lock would economically boost whichever parish it was
located in. The St. Bernard site would be less disruptive to people and industry than the
New Orleans site, but the environmental impact would be greater in St. Bernard
(Thomas 1988e). At the St. Bernard Police Jury meeting the week of June 19th, 1988,
Munster tried to speak for the entire St. Bernard Police Jury, some of whom were now
reconsidering their unanimous resolution for St. Bernard to be dropped from
consideration as a ship channel site. Munster was trying to get the ACE to forgive parish
levee funding bonds if it proceeded with the lock and ship channel "Instead of coming
out here with their hat in their hands, they better come with their checkbook" (Thomas
1988b:B-3). Other jurors were more swayed at this point by the potential for a $750
million investment in St. Bernard, over $1.5 billion in 2017. This was the trope of the
federal government financially assisting St. Bernard Parish, either way. The ACE said
the site would be chosen for the best cost-benefit ratio, stating that the Orleans
locations would "...cause the extensive displacement of industry and at least 200
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residents" (Thomas 1988b:B-3). Note that this contradicts the statement made by the
ACE to the Coalition to Save the Ninth Ward in 1979.
In a report on a June 30th, 1988 meeting between the ACE and the St. Bernard
Parish Police Jury, the Police Jury, in protesting against the Violet Cut deployed the
trope of the ACE as untrustworthy "liars" who "...should 'get the hell out of St. Bernard'"
(Thomas 1988d:B-3). The Police Jury blamed the MRGO for flooding during Hurricane
Betsy and expressed anger that no industrial development had occurred for the parish
from the Outlet. In addition, the parish was promised industrial development in its
southeastern portion due to the hurricane protection levees; yet the federal government
instead had taken these wetlands out of circulation because of their environmental
protection status under NEPA (Thomas 1988d:B-3). There was no more traction, at
least with the Police Jury, for the trope of economic development.
In an editorial of July 3rd1988 the Times-Picayune used the trope of St. Bernard as
reactionary. It gave an overview of St. Bernard's MRGO-derived vendetta against the
ACE (the ACE denied there was any proof that the MRGO led to flooding during
Hurricane Betsy). The piece describes Police Juror Louis Munster lambasting the
protected wetlands as "'...a beautiful swamp. I never figured out what marine wildlife we
were supposed to be protecting.'" (Thomas 1988a:6C). The Times-Picayune stated that
it was not endorsing the St. Bernard site, but that the parish could be missing out on
significant economic development by rejecting the ACE's findings, if those showed St.
Bernard to be the best location for the new lock. The piece does give Munster credit for
pushing for two bridges over the ship channel. It also points out that St. Bernard couldn’t
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afford its levee bond debt and should be open to the possible financial windfall of the
lock.
On July 11th, 1988 U.S. Rep. Billy Tauzin, D-La., met with the Police Jurors to
support them against "the Cut," but convinced them to drop their demand to be erased
from the ACE feasibility study. While acknowledging the trope of ACE as liar to the
parish over the years, Tauzin still managed to deploy the of potential of economic
development: "He...asked jurors if they would support the Violet Cut channel if the corps
promised everything they wanted - including high-level bridges, assurances of economic
development, coverage of all costs and permission to develop currently untouchable
wetlands" (Thomas 1988c:B-3).Another interesting trope deployed by the parish during
the 1980s was that of the ACE favoring the urban over the rural: "Many parish officials
fear that the Violet cut will come out on top in the corps' study because revamping the
Industrial Canal would entail the relocation of heavy industry while building a canal and
lock system south of the channel would call for the relocation of 200 families in the 9th
Ward. The area in Violet, however, is generally undeveloped" (Thomas 1989b:B-3).
Later that same year, Sherwood Gagliano, hired by the police jury to interpret the ACE's
findings, referred to "the Cut" as "'...a serpent that won't die...it keeps coming back"
(Thomas 1989c:B-3, 4). Finally, the ACE ended the decade with the trope of complexity,
possibly to let the controversy cool down before publishing a recommendation. At this
point, the option of expanding the existing IHNC lock was off the table, as the time it
would take was deemed to be too disruptive to the shipping industry. The plans now
called for a refurbishment of the existing lock. The results of the study were put off until
the spring of 1990, "...to put all the pieces together" (Thomas 1989a:B-3).
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1990s.
The 1990s opens with the Times-Picayune and the residents of the Lower Ninth
Ward deploying the "classic New Orleans neighborhood" trope. "A check from the
government can't re-create a close community or replace years of familiarity, the crow of
a rogue rooster on a city street at dawn, a cool breeze sweeping off the Mississippi
River in August… city, but a little bit country" (Cooper 1990:B-1, 2). The ACE’s plans
had shifted, as it was again studying widening the entire IHNC. This would displace
approximately 625 people from the Lower Ninth Ward (Cooper 1990:B-1). The ACE was
planning to reimburse them for their property, which is standard federal procedure. A
few of the residents were in favor of the expansion, from a desire to leave the
neighborhood, seeing the buyout as facilitating this. “‘Bring ‘em on,’ day-care operator
Elaine Jackson said. ‘My business is lousy. I’d love to relocate.’ But Jackson’s view is a
minority one” (Cooper 1990:B-2).
The Lower Ninth Ward had historically been worried about the ACE from the time
of the first debates about the Violet Cut. The neighborhood had attempted to protected
itself with historic preservation statutes.
Some people got scared, enough to charter a neighborhood association
and successfully lobby for a historic district designation. But the discussion
seemed to peter out, and people didn’t think about it so much anymore.
The neighborhood association turned to other things (Cooper 1990:B-2).
The Times-Picayune was in support of the expanded IHNC and new lock at this point,
supporting the maritime commerce trope of the Port. Ron Brinson, then the director of
the Port, explained.
... a deep-draft lock would give the many ships that carry a mix of
containers and break-bulk general cargo more flexibility. They could call at
Riverfront wharves for general cargo and then have access to the Port's
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main container yard on the industrial Canal … [the Port will] fight for [its
share of the cost] because the lock is vital to its long-term future …’”
(Hughlett 1990c:A-10).
On the same page, the Times-Picayune introduced the trope of "social
dislocation” (Thomas 1990:A-1). Because the controversy was no longer about the
environment—so the reporter believed—as wetland mitigation had been the reason for
taking the project out of St. Bernard, the new focus was on how the project would affect
the quality of life of the residents of the Lower Ninth Ward. “The corps New Orleans
district engineer, Col. Richard V. Gorski said the Ninth Ward plan is a product of the
Corps’ newly found environmental conscience” (Thomas 1990:A-10).
In response to this, at a June 4th, 1990 residents’ meeting with the ACE, local
officials used the trope of New Orleans going to war with the ACE. US Sen. Jay Bennett
Johnston D–Louisiana, US Representative Lindy Boggs, D–Louisiana, State Sen. John
Johnson, D–New Orleans, state representative Sherman Copelin Junior, D–New
Orleans, New Orleans City Councilman Johnny Jackson Junior and The New Orleans
City Planning Commission director John Wilson had all been invited (The TimesPicayune 1990a:B-5). Copelin, Johnson, and Jackson opposed the IHNC expansion
project. Copelin stoked residential anger, and Jackson said the "...project would
proceed 'over my dead body'" (Donze 1990b:B-5). These officials held the issue over
Senator Johnston, as he was up for re-election that year (neither he nor Boggs came to
the meeting). Jackson said, "City Hall officials are researching legislation to ensure that
local officials have a say in any decision to proceed with the work," and told the meeting
that the ACE is downplaying the impact of the three new bridges which would cross the
expanded IHNC (Donze 1990b:B-5). A residents’ committee was formed specifically to
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fight the project. Copelin directed them to start contacting their congressional officials
immediately. At this point, the Times-Picayune promoted the historic preservation
discourse, a potential conflict between the ACE and the National Historic Preservation
Act. An article dated April 12, 1990, mentions that this was part of how the Riverfront
Expressway was defeated: "While the act does not guarantee that historic areas will be
untouched, the process sometimes delays projects indefinitely" (Donze 1990c:B-4).
After a meeting on April 14th of that year ended in a brawl (between two
community activists, one of whom was opposed to letting any officials speak at all), and
Sherman Copelin unsuccessfully tried to kill the lock project by vastly expanding the
reach of New Orleans’ historic preservation statutes—his proposed measure would
have given the city of New Orleans the authority to decide if a federal action was too
disruptive to historic sites—the neighborhood outrage over the proposed canal
expansion and new lock became so heated that by late spring 1990, the ACE decided
to revisit the idea of simply expanding the existing lock (Anderson 1990; Donze 1990a;
Hughlett 1990a). To do so would require the lock to be shut down for as long as 18
months, and representatives of the barge industry said that this would be crippling.
...John Duke, VP of the southern region of the American Waterways
Operators Inc., [said] 'if you close it for a year, you might as well close it
forever… Cargo will find another waterway or another means of
transportation… And once it is gone it will not come back…'" (Hughlett
1990a:A-8).
A representative of the ACE "...said closing the lock could 'probably end up putting
some people out of business. That is the bad side of the coin'" (Hughlett 1990a:A-8).
The ACE also pointed out that this would be much more expensive, by an unknown
margin, then either building the lock and ship channel in St. Bernard or expanding the
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IHNC and building a new lock. In addition, to study this revisited option "... Would add at
least a year to the planning process" (Hughlett 1990a:A-8). The ACE was hoping for
funding to be available in time to start the project in 1996, finishing it by 2004.
On September 27th, 1990, the Times-Picayune announced that the ACE was
accessing the grassroots trope, by creating a "task force," composed of nearby
residents.
"... The barge industry, politicians, environmentalists, preservationists and
others... [Ron Brinson said] 'Basically... Let's take this back to square
one…’ [Joe Dicharry, the lock project manager, said] 'We're trying to
implement a new concept for us– the open planning process. I do not think
the local people would have allowed it any other way'" (Hughlett 1990d:B8).
The task force was to study six different plans for expanding the lock. The ACE
was to provide it with the financial realities, neighborhood effects, and plans to
compensate residents for each option. The Port was to "… do a study on the economic
and social benefits of a new lock" (Hughlett 1990d:B-8). If the task force completely
rejected the idea of any expansion or replacement of the IHNC, the Dock Board agreed
to comply with that decision, and the ACE was open, but not bound, to doing likewise
(ibid).
The task force was also to plan for community development along with whichever
lock option it chose. Additionally, the Dock Board planned "...to hire a 'community
advocate'…to work with the task force” (Hughlett 1990d). This person was to serve as
an ombudsman to the residents from the task force. The Port had committed itself at
this point to the grassroots trope. However, the Port was still responsible for paying the
difference, about $60 million, to make the lock deep draft (deep meaning 36 feet at that
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time) as opposed to the shallower depth of 22 feet, which would make it a barge-only
lock. The ACE also emphasized the grassroots trope.
11 of the 15 members [of the task force] will come from the community.
Four will be ninth Ward politicians including State Sen. John Johnson, four
will represent the surrounding neighborhoods and three will represent area
businesses. Neighborhood interests, not the corps will choose those 11
task force members said Richard Gorski, head of the corps’ New Orleans
district. The other four members will represent lock users: the American
Waterways Operators, the Gulf Coast Intracoastal Waterway Association,
the New Orleans Steamship Association, and the Port of New Orleans …
[this was the arrangement proposed even though] … The barge industry
has the biggest need for a new lock" (Hughlett 1991:C–8).
On September 4, 1994, the Times-Picayune published an editorial in support of
the Port's continuing usage of the grassroots trope. The Port and the ACE opened an
office in the Lower Ninth Ward to be an information clearinghouse about plans to
modernize the lock. The office was to also be the place for residential expressions of
concern, which the Port and ACE were still soliciting. By this point, according to the
Times-Picayune, the task force had
... produced a plan acceptable to many... it's a valuable community service
that goes beyond pure public relations. Port officials and the Corps of
Engineers are not only constructing a good model for how to resolve
conflict between people and progress, but a better model for how to
reduce the chances that there will ever be conflict in the first place" (The
Times-Picayune 1994:B-6).
On January 10, 1995, in response to details given about lock project mitigation
plans by the Port and the ACE, Lower Ninth Ward residents pushed back. Note the use
of class warfare tropes. When told that the lock project " ... would result in millions of
dollars for neighborhood improvements ... [one resident told the crowd] 'You are being
asked to pay for a superhighway for the rich and the super rich [sic] to get richer ...
drawing rousing applause" (Warner 1995:B1). Another said that instead of spending the
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money on the lock and the mitigation projects, "...federal officials should go ahead and
spend [it] to ease poor living conditions in the 9th Ward. 'Take some of that money and
help get the families back together...’" (Warner 1995:B1). The Port and ACE told the
residents "The [Federal mitigation] money could be used to improve parks and streets,
give residents job training, upgrade aging houses and to improve police and firefighting
services in the area..." and that residents would be the first to be offered the
construction jobs which the lock project would generate (Warner 1995:B1). The ACE
also spoke of floating in significant portions of the lock to lessen the project’s impact.
None of the mitigation offers were acceptable to the community leaders, who cited
traffic congestion related to the necessary closing of bridges during the project, and its
12-year duration. State Sen. Johnson and state Representative Copelin, along with New
Orleans City Councilwoman Ellen Hazeur-Distance, told the lock planners they should
just face the fact that the residents absolutely rejected the project regardless of
mitigation offers, and that community organizers were already working with the city to
improve the neighborhood on their own (ibid).
The Port and the ACE could not communicate the short and long-term
neighborhood economic benefits of constructing a passable barge lock on the IHNC, or
its impact on national maritime commerce, global trade, and what these things would
mean for the lower Ninth Ward. Hazeur-Distance said "'I'm trying to understand, what is
the benefit to the community. We don't own the ships that are going to be using that
lock.'" (Warner 1995:B1).
On October 10th of that year, the Times-Picayune reported on the ACE’s new
plan to build a new lock off site and float it into place, thereby forgoing any demolition of
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homes. Councilwoman Hazeur-Distance used the change is bad trope. "People can
endure the daily pain of the current [traffic situation] because they've grown used to it.
But any suggestion of change agitates the old sore and brings tempers to a boil" (Miller
1995:1C). However, not everyone was opposed. Mrs. George Ethel Warren of the board
of the Lower Ninth Ward Neighborhood Council favored in the new proposal because of
job creation and her belief that the transportation problems could be minimized (ibid).
The discursive battle went back and forth. "Marc Cooper, a longtime leader of the
Bywater Neighborhood Association said 'It certainly is in the interest of the Dock Board
to improve the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal as well as the interest of the shipping
industry, but we have not figured out how it will help us. No one has convinced us this
project is good for us ..." (Miller 1995:1C). Ron Brinson, the director of the Port at that
time, emphasized that times had changed, such that projects like this were no longer
forced upon communities.
[Brinson] believes that well-intended but insensitive planners with both the
Corps of Engineers and the Port of New Orleans helped stoke the fires of
anger. [He said] “It helps to understand that between the time when a new
lock was first proposed in 1956 and the 1980s, important cultural changes
were taking place in America ... in the 1950s, planners had lots of power
and the neighborhoods had very little stroke. But by the 1980s,
neighborhoods had both moral authority and the support of the courts and
elected officials. In the 1990s, we understand very well that unless the
neighborhoods agree, there isn't going to be a new lock or new bridges or
any other changes ... it's hard today to believe that one of the Corp's
original plans called for removing 200 homes not because they are in the
way of a new lock but just to create a staging area for construction crews
and materials. It was a plan reflective of the attitudes of the times … The
current corps plan, which doesn't touch any existing homes and floats in a
new, prefabricated lock, is a comparative model of sensitivity and careful
thought about respecting historic neighborhoods but, in our era, when the
neighborhood says 'no,' nothing happens (Miller 1995:1C).
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Still, Brinson was optimistic that the ACE’s new proposal would be acceptable to most
of the residents, partly because he believed that the project could be completed in five
years. The residents believed it would take at least 10 years. The article points out that
this outdated lock accommodated, at that time, over 20,000 barges annually.
In the September 6, 1997 issue of the Times-Picayune is a report on possible
political traction in Washington for congressional approval of the lock project. There was
uncertainty as to how Congress would handle the community mitigation money.
Holy Cross Neighborhood Association President John Koeferl said the
neighborhood will continue to fight the plan, despite its limited resources for lobbying.
'I'm not surprised [at the corps' review approval] because they were the judge and jury
on this one,’ he said. 'I think the Corps of Engineers sits in a privileged fortress, up high
on the levee Uptown. . . They're willing to dig out the land from underneath thousands
of families in a historic, less affluent, largely African-American community. Does this
seem right?'" (Warner and Hall 1997:B-1).
The article goes on to point out that Gen. Jude Patin, retired from the ACE, who
would be the project coordinator, was an African-American New Orleans native, as well
as being a friend of US Representative William Jefferson, also African-American.
Jefferson was guardedly supportive of the project.
The class warfare discourse intensified in the beginning of 1998. The January
23rd issue of the Times-Picayune includes a report on a New Orleans City Council
resolution to block the lock project, pending residents meeting with the Louisiana
congressional delegation. Resident John Koeferl compared the project to the Riverfront
Expressway. Most notably, however, "Ray King, a former president of the Holy Cross
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Neighborhood Association, said fears about the project forced him to sell his home
recently for $8 a square foot, a fraction of the price he paid for it. 'Nobody, but nobody
wants to live there or move there,' he said. He said the Corps of Engineers is 'guilty of
(economic) rape (sic)’” (Donze 1998a:B1).
On July 4, 1998, State Representative Sherman Copelin led a jazz funeral for the
ACE. "They carried a coffin symbolizing the $531 million project's death and signs that
read 'Bury the Corps'…The critics tossed Corps project reports into the coffin, with
Copelin calling them 'volumes of misrepresentation.'" (Warner 1998c:B-1). The
Earthjustice legal defense fund called attention to the toxic waste which would be
dredged up in the process of widening the lock. US Rep. William Jefferson, however,
used the trope of progress. "'If you depend on the public agreeing on it, you'll never
build a highway or a road or anything else' ... " (Warner 1998c:B-1). Nevertheless, State
Sen. Jon Johnson said "'The leverage is with the people ... This is a democracy. You
got 25,000-30,000 people in that community that can't be ignored.'" (Warner 1998c:B-1).
At a residents’ meeting on July 8, 1998, Representative William Jefferson
expressed support for revisiting the moribund proposal to put the new ship channel and
lock near Violet or Meraux in St. Bernard, despite his previously expressed concerns
about the impact the project would have on St. Bernard wetlands. He was backing up a
proposal made at the meeting by state Sen. Lynn Dean, R-Caernarvon. Jefferson and
Dean said the project might be saleable in St. Bernard with the addition of a high-rise
bridge and pointed out increased flood protection from the levees which would be built
along the ship channel (Warner 1998a:B-1). The ACE said the idea had been off the
table for some time, and that the decision of whether to locate the project in St. Bernard
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was now up to Congress, not the ACE. Some Lower Ninth Ward residents said that
choosing to expand the canal in their neighborhood, populated mostly by black people,
constituted "environmental racism," since the ACE had rejected the idea of putting the
project in mostly white St. Bernard (Warner 1998a:B-1). This was the first appearance
of the environmental racism trope, using the specific term, which appeared concerning
the IHNC in the Times-Picayune during this research.
On October 1, 1998, Congress approved the IHNC lock project. A report detailed
legislative maneuvering by representatives Bob Livingston and Billy Tauzin to move the
IHNC project past the planning phase and into the beginning of construction. They
moved the project past a legislative ban on new waterway projects by declaring that as
it was part of the MRGO, rit didn’t count as a new project (Coleman and Walsh 1998:A1). Residents were furious about this, deploying anti-business tropes. "Dean Reynolds,
a Faubourg Marigny resident who has joined a coalition against the project, said the
appropriations wording represented political manipulation by business interests and
their allies in Congress" (Coleman and Walsh 1998:A-1). In response to congressional
approval of the project, the Times-Picayune began to favor residents over the project. It
referred to opposition to the project as " … a no-holds-barred neighborhood fight …, " a
" … crusade …, " and something the residents must " … derail … " (Warner 1998b:A1).
The article notes that "A few residents of neighborhoods lining the canal appear to
support the project, but they aren't organized" (Warner 1998b:A1). In the same article,
Ron Brinson pointed out, in response to the residents raising safety concerns because
the barges in the IHNC were carrying hazardous chemicals that an 2000expanded lock
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would be safer, because the barges would not have to wait as long next to the
neighborhood with their toxic loads.
On October 15, 1998, the New Orleans City Council passed a resolution
demanding that President Clinton veto the IHNC lock project. The residents accessed
the quality of life discourse regarding disruptions from the construction. New Orleans
City Councilwoman Hazeur-Distance used the anti-business community discourse,
since its representatives lobbied in DC for the project, but never came to any of the
neighborhood meetings. Sherman Copelin deployed the trope of the ineffectuality of the
ACE, referring to its plans for mitigation as " ... 'a joke' that would provide the
neighborhood with little more than 2 million a year. 'What can you do with that kind of
money’”? (Donze 1998b:B1). The residents formally deployed the trope of
environmental racism On May 4, 1999, when the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association
filed an official complaint with the Environmental Protection Agency. The complaint
stated that the ACE deliberately designed the IHNC lock project in such a way that it
would be guaranteed to be built near a politically powerless low income black
neighborhood, as opposed to a site which would impact " ... higher-income white
communities in St. Bernard." Up until then, the ACE had never had an environmental
justice complaint filed against it (Schleifstein 1999b:B4).
In 1994, President Clinton had issued Executive Order 12898, “Federal Actions
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations.”
It reads, in part
… each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of
its mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
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effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and
low-income populations …” (Clinton 1994).
In response to this, the ACE outlined the way the project was designed by
the ACE to minimize neighborhood disruption:
•

changing location of the lock so that homes would not be destroyed;

•

adding green space as mitigation;

•

a temporary bridge at St. Claude to minimize traffic disruptions;

•

designing the lock in such a way that the new Claiborne Avenue bridge will be
open less frequently than with the current lock;

•

the new lock being built off-site and floated into place for a reduced shutdown
time for Claiborne Avenue;

•

new technology to vibrate piles into place which meant noise reduction,
instead of pile driving them (Schleifstein 1999a:8B).

To charges of environmental racism, the ACE responded that the lock and canal were in
place before most of the people, and that the St. Bernard location was eliminated for
environmental reasons, not racial ones. The ACE also pointed out that if the project
were in St. Bernard, Holy Cross would miss out on economic development (ibid). At this
point "A contractor [had] been hired to develop a job training program aimed at teaching
community residents the skills necessary for them to be hired by companies building the
lock" (ibid).
The Times-Picayune’s response to all of this was to publish an editorial
defending the ACE’s decision to site the new lock where it was planning. In response to
the claims of environmental racism, the paper wrote "Or just maybe, the corps ultimately
settled on the 9th Ward because that's where the old lock is and because it is ludicrous
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to build a new canal through an environmentally sensitive area [the St. Bernard
marshes] when an existing canal can be rebuilt" (The Times-Picayune 1999b:B6). The
editorial goes on to point out that the residents are far from powerless, as they have
blocked the project for years and succeeded in pressuring the ACE to substantially
redesign it. The paper also used tropes of progress.
It isn't ever going to be painless. As the suburbanites who live near the
construction site on Interstates 10 and 610 have learned, every large
public-works project creates disruptions in surrounding neighborhoods.
That doesn't mean, though, that the project is unnecessary or that a better
site exists (The Times-Picayune 1999b:B6).
The decade closed out with ACORN. On August 14, 1999, the Lower Ninth Ward
chapter of ACORN led a “Death of the 9th Ward” tour of all the aspects of the
neighborhood which the group said would be impacted by the project.
“The canal expansion project will devastate our community”' 9th Ward ACORN
member Octavia Turner said. "Our community cannot afford this project with all the
terrible problems it will cause. The Port of New Orleans can build a new shipping port
somewhere else" (The Times-Picayune 1999a:B2).
2000s.
On April 26, 2000, US District Judge Stanford Duvall threw out ACORN's lawsuit
against the ACE, claiming ACORN's accusations were "'...based on unsubstantiated
beliefs that the process was biased.'" (The Times-Picayune 2000:B1) In its reporting,
the Times-Picayune was careful to use quotes around the phrase "environmental
racism." The article also goes on to point out that a very large sum of money was
allocated for mitigation of any damage caused by the project. In an opinion piece
published shortly after the story on the dismissal of the lawsuit, Octavia Turner of the
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Lower Ninth Ward chapter of ACORN pointed out that the Times-Picayune had
neglected to state the other half of the suit, namely that the US Department of
Transportation and the ACE had not fulfilled their obligations under historic preservation
statutes. The letter goes on to specifically access the quality of life discourse. “ …[the
project will] … needlessly disrupt our quality of life for the next 12 years, causing terrible
problems with construction noise, damaged homes, business closings, bridge closings,
unsafe conditions for schoolchildren who must dodge construction trucks, increased
traffic through residential neighborhoods and so much more … ” (Turner 2000:B 04).
Note that these are the same materialities which were referenced by residents of the
uptown arterials neighborhood, as well as those of the French Quarter.
On June 21, 2000, the Times Picayune reported that lawsuits had been filed in
federal court by "...certain organizations and individuals..." in the neighborhood (Warner
2000d:B 03). The lawsuits accused the Community-Based Mitigation Committee (The
Committee), the majority-resident panel established through the efforts of the Port and
the ACE, of violating the federal open meetings law as the plaintiffs were being barred
from its meetings. The Committee responded that the plaintiffs were too disruptive for it
to fulfill its mission. The paper, in sympathy with The Committee, goes on to list several
of The Committee’s recommended steps for the ACE to take when spending the
mitigation dollars, including:
•

Create a program to give entry-level construction skills to unemployed
residents of the neighborhood;
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•

Upgrade police and other emergency services in the Lower Ninth Ward, east
of the Industrial Canal, an area often left vulnerable because of the raising of
bridges;

•

Improve safety lighting along floodwalls and levee walkways;

•

Provide low-interest loans for local businesses and expand the availability of
business interruption insurance;

•

Set up after-school tutoring and truancy programs for local students” (Warner
2000d:B 03).

This was reported to be only a partial list of suggestions proffered by The Committee.
On October 19, 2000, The Committee held a forum to discuss the mitigation
plans it had formulated with the ACE. This was not an open working meeting, but a
public forum at which The Committee communicated work that had been done to that
date. ACORN again criticized The Committee, since the forum was not a working group
between The Committee and residents. "A three-year plan calls for spending the money
on job training, emergency services, home improvement loans, recreation programs,
vacant lot cleanup and construction of a new middle school" (Warner 2000c:METRO
04).
State Sen. Johnson objected to the middle school proposal, saying that it was the
responsibility of the Orleans Parish School Board to provide one. He, along with several
other residents, said the middle school money should be spent instead on repairing any
streets and homes that would be damaged by the construction. Others wanted money
set aside for drainage and general street repair.
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Construction and hotel union representatives were concerned that the early parts
of the project would not be union-staffed. One hotel union representative said, "The
expansion project not only destroys the 9th Ward but will offer no protection to the
workers" (Warner 2000c:METRO 04). The ACE said that the work would include union
members, but not exclusively, and that the ACE would not be involved in
subcontractors' decisions in this matter (ibid).
In the November 16, 2000 issue of the Times-Picayune, an opinion piece by
Michael E. Stout, Project Manager, ACE was published. It was a response to
accusations by ACORN representatives that the ACE was avoiding its responsibility to
repair any construction related residential damage.
No damages to homes are expected. However, if damages are caused by
construction activities, the owner will be reimbursed for any required
repairs ... This is a benefit to the community since it allows mitigation
funds to be allocated to other pressing needs ... [For disseminating
information about the project, in addition to the Internet] ... news releases
and advertisements in the Times-Picayune ... [past and future issues] of
The Mitigator [the neighborhood newsletter published by the ACE
regarding the status of project mitigation] ... a [neighborhood] community
information office ... and a walker-talker program that brings project
information directly to the people in the neighborhood ...
In response to another ACORN assertion, the community does have true
representation on the Community-Based Mitigation Committee. These 24
people were chosen by block-neighborhood organizations or through a
public process of self-nomination … (Stout 2000:METRO 06).

One of these organizations, either ACORN or the ACE, was not telling the truth. Stout
pointed out in his letter that " ... as with any corps project, legitimate claims of property
damage will be paid out of construction contingency funds." Therefore having the ACE
do the lock work would have been a financial benefit to the Lower Ninth Ward residents.
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On December 15, 2000, the paper reported that in response to The Committee
opening its working sessions to the public, ACORN produced 600 signatures in support
of its demand that the entire Committee resign (Warner 2000b:METRO 01,
2000a:METRO 02). ACORN’s justification for this demand was the claim that The
Committee had not backed residential repairs from any construction effects– a process
which was already codified in the activities of the ACE. This development served to
strengthen The Committee's determination.
On February 15, 2001, the ACE announced that it would go ahead and study the
possibility of tunnels for Claiborne and St. Claude, with skepticism. This study was not
well received by residents: "'It seems to be a ruse to ratchet the project further on by
pretending they are dealing with the issues,’ said John Koeferl, president of the Holy
Cross Neighborhood Association" (Turni 2001a:National 01). This was the trope of the
ACE as dishonest. St. Bernard Parish Council Chairman Cosse of said the ACE’s entire
traffic plans for the project were incorrect, because they were based on a new Florida
Avenue bridge which was not guaranteed (Turni 2001a:National 01). Government and
citizens representative groups from St. Bernard and Orleans got together on March 8,
2001 to solidify their stance towards the ACE by demanding
... three things: a more thorough review of the project's impact on marine
and vehicular traffic; a high-rise bridge or tunnel at St. Claude or Claiborne
built by the corps in addition to the bridge to be built by the state at Florida
Avenue; and ongoing communication between St. Bernard and Orleans
officials and community groups" (Turni 2001b:METRO 02).
In an opinion piece published on September 10, 2001, Pam Dashiell, President
of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, deployed the discourses of
environmentalism and class warfare, and the trope of the ACE as incompetent. Pointing
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to studies by the Lake Ponchartrain Basin Foundation showing that the sediments in the
IHNC Galvez Street wharf are highly toxic, she wrote:
The Holy Cross/Lower Ninth Ward community and environmental groups have
known since 1997 that the Army Corps of Engineers' analysis of sediments in the
Industrial Canal was inadequate … When will we stop sacrificing our most vulnerable
communities for the economic benefit of a very few [the corps, the Port of New Orleans,
landowners and businesspeople who stand to benefit, and the more cynical local
politicians]? - (Dashiell 2001:METRO 04).
In 2003, Dashiell added the hurricane trope. On June 14th of that year, she wrote
in the Times-Picayune that inadequate funding for other ACE projects devoted to
hurricanes showed that the IHNC lock project was a waste of resources, which could
better be spent shoring up the city's storm protections: “The people of Louisiana face a
clear choice here -- either we make saving lives and property a priority or we continue to
risk our lives and communities to fund projects that benefit very few … Lives and levees
must take priority over an unnecessary lock” (Dashiell 2003:METRO 06).
On February 2, 2003, it was reported that since its approval, the IHNC lock
expansion project had never received adequate congressional funding. The barge traffic
had not lived up to expectations either. The anti-lock residents of the Lower Ninth Ward
saw these developments as evidence that, even though they may have been
legislatively defeated, they would ultimately prevail. Gary Lagrange, then-CEO of the
Port, accessed the progress discourse.
... Congress should do nothing… [if anything,] the decrease in cargo is
evidence that the new lock is needed. Barge captains have to drop anchor
and wait in line to get through the existing lock, adding so much to the cost
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of shipping over water that some companies are opting to ship over land
... " (George 2003:METRO 01).
On June 19th of that year, the Times-Picayune reported on how the ACE would
augment police protection in the lock neighborhoods by $250,000 annually. "Jackie
Purrington, a Corps project manager for the lock replacement, said, 'This agreement is
a direct result of priority being placed on police protection by the Community Based
Mitigation Committee, which makes recommendations to the Corps on helping
neighborhoods impacted by the lock construction project.'" (Benoit 2003:DOWNTOWN
PICAYUNE 01). Nevertheless, the antilock residents received a significant boost in their
access of the environmental discourse.
On November 6, 2003 it was reported in the Times-Picayune that legal disputes
over toxic sediments in the IHNC led US District Court Judge Eldon Fallon to rule that
environmental groups could use new canal core test samples, which showed high
toxicity, as a basis to sue the ACE to cease working on the project pending proper
environmental mitigation. Judge Fallon said that the plaintiffs were only trying to get the
ACE to comply with environmental statutes. Representatives of the neighborhood
groups, however, intended to use this new development to stop the project. The ACE
maintained that the toxic cores should not be considered, as they were not from the
project area. The plaintiffs accused the ACE of not following EPA regulations
(Schleifstein 2003:NATIONAL 01). Specifically, The Tulane Law Clinic, on behalf of the
Lower Ninth Ward plaintiffs, was suing the ACE over the toxicity of sediments to be
dredged, stating that the ACE was contradicting its own procedures by mixing the
material in the sample cores, which the Clinic said would give false negatives when
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testing for environmental toxins. The ACE countered that its measure was effective
(ibid).
2005: Hurricane Katrina.
Hurricane Katrina reduced the draft of the lock, which would cost shipping from
one to $1.5 million annually. Many cargoes were already being rerouted to other, less
convenient and costlier parts of the Port complex, and New Orleans Cold Storage, with
a warehouse near the lock, was in danger of folding altogether barring the necessary
dredging. On September 16, 2006, it was reported in the Times-Picayune that at the
behest of the shipping industry, the ACE had agreed to the more expensive option of
disposing of toxic dredged sediments in the IHNC lock in a landfill specifically set aside
for the purpose. This development met with approval from environmentalists
(Schleifstein 2006:METRO 01).However, On April 4, 2007, it was reported that an
alliance of environmentalists, tax reformers, and neighborhood activists was petitioning
Congress to divert money for the IHNC lock project to " ... 'more important priorities,'
such as hurricane protection and coastal restoration" (Alpert 2007:NATIONAL 03). The
lock project was on hold pending a mandated new EIS. No money had been allocated in
the federal budget for the lock in 2007, but the Port was pushing Congress to allocate
money later the same year. With the closure of the MRGO looming, the lock would be
the only way for the Port to access the GIW. Citing hurricane protection concerns, lock
opponents called the project " ... an incredible waste of money ... " (Alpert
2007:NATIONAL 03). Similarly, except for Mary Landrieu, Louisiana's congresspeople
were starting to hesitate in funding the project. The anti-Port trope was heavily deployed
by resident representatives.
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Pam Dashiell, president of the Holy Cross Neighborhood Association, said the
Port of New Orleans has lost all credibility. 'They championed MR-GO and all the
purported economic benefits, but it ended up wiping out a good part of the city and
wreaked economic devastation on a whole section of the city and then (the Port) raised
objections to closing it,' Dashiell said, alluding to studies that indicate MR-GO
contributed to storm surge that devastated St. Bernard Parish, the Lower Ninth Ward
and eastern New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina- (Alpert 2007:NATIONAL 03).
The lock project itself would soon be blamed for the flooding which occurred in
the Lower Ninth Ward. On August 29, 2007 it was reported that the ACE had changed
its assessment of the causes of industrial canal related flooding during Hurricane
Katrina. According to the ACE, four hours before the canal overtopped the levees on
both sides, a floodwall failed close to Florida Avenue (Schleifstein 2007:METRO 01).
This contradicted the conclusions of scientists sponsored by the National Science
Foundation and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, who
said that weak materials underneath all the 9th Ward floodwalls caused them to fail. In
addition, " ... Robert Bea, an engineering professor at the University of California at
Berkeley and member of the NSF-sponsored team, said he also has evidence that deep
holes were dug in the canal along the wall as part of clearing work in advance of
construction of a widened Industrial Canal Lock," holes that were then filled with
permeable material (Schleifstein 2007:METRO 01). Although Bea's theory would come
to be disputed (in fact, he would be the only one to hold this specific claim) his theory
was set in the minds of those residents of the Lower Ninth Ward in opposition to any
sort of expansion or replacement of the IHNC lock.

146

On October 16, 2008, it was reported that the price of the lock project was now
estimated at $1.3 billion, up from the previous estimate of $770 million. This was still to
be a deep draft lock of 36 feet. The new EIS acknowledged that the project would have
less benefit than past estimates, due to the closure of the MRGO, and the population
decrease in the surrounding neighborhoods after Katrina, which would decrease local
lock related commerce, as well as the fact that the state had decided against a new
Florida Avenue Bridge (Schleifstein 2008:NATIONAL 01). Nevertheless, according to
the ACEs calculations, the project did have a positive cost-benefit ratio. For the ACE,
this was due to interest rate calculations set by the White House Office of Management
and Budget. However, according to "[John Koerfel who led the Coalition against
Widening the Industrial Canal],” the ACE was being dishonest, “… tweaking the little
picture, but missing the big one...'" (Schleifstein 2008:NATIONAL 01). There was still a
$35 million mitigation fund set aside for the Lower Ninth Ward. The EIS acknowledged a
temporary reduction in property tax revenue due to the disturbance of local businesses,
but stated that projected economic development from the project would make up for this
(Schleifstein 2008:NATIONAL 01). Post-Hurricane Katrina and with the closure of the
MRGO, the local scenario for the project was not nearly as good, although the Port still
insisted the project was necessary to get larger ships and barges from the Mississippi
River to the GIW, as well as facilitating barge traffic on the GIW itself.
On November 12th, 2008, the ACE once again held a community meeting to try
to explain the latest iteration of its plans for the lock. "Pam Dashiell … said the new lock
would usher in 'gangs of barges and deep draft ships to a community that is struggling
... Are you trying to kill us again'”? (DeGregorio 2008:NATIONAL 01). A representative
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of "... the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic ... decried the new lock as a boon to the
shipping industry at the expense of residents." The amount of money set aside for
community mitigation projects was now up to $43 million (ibid). The Port again tried to
promote the lock with the economic development discourse, but the residents in
attendance at the meeting were unconvinced (ibid).
On July 31, 2009, it was announced that the ACE had once again commenced
work on the project, although full funding was still not provided by Congress. The Port
was investing over $16 million to ensure that the lock was deep draft. The ACE's only
interest was for barges along the GIW. For the Port, however, "'The new lock will allow
[us] to utilize infrastructure, such as docks, berths and other existing infrastructure along
the inner Harbor navigational Canal for deep-draft commerce;'" as the closure of the
MRGO had led to the departure of "many longtime Port tenants ... " (Schleifstein and
DeGregorio 2009:MONEY 12). The coalition of neighborhood groups and the Louisiana
Environmental Action Network, however, promised another lawsuit against the project
based on environmental concerns.
2010s.
On February 5, 2010, it was reported by the Times-Picayune that there was still
no money for the lock project in President Obama's proposed budget for 2011. The ACE
downplayed this, saying it was normal. Senators Mary Landrieu and David Vitter
deployed the progress and economic development discourses in support of funding for
the lock project, which they would seek later in 2010.The coalition of residents and
environmentalists who opposed the project said that hurricane protection and restoring
the coast should be prioritized instead. One resident said that the most urgent need was
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to facilitate the return of people to the neighborhood (Alpert 2010:NATIONAL A 03).
Additionally, on June 10, 2010, opponents of the project again sued the ACE in federal
court to force it to construct a shallower lock. The Holy Cross Neighborhood
Association, Gulf Restoration Network, Louisiana Environmental Action Network,
Citizens against Widening the Industrial Canal, and the Sierra Club, all represented by
the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, said the National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA) mandated the ACE to build a smaller lock of 900 feet long x 110 feet wide x 22
feet deep. The ACE planned for 1200 feet long x 110 feet wide x 36 feet deep
(Schleifstein 2010b:NATIONAL A 02). This shallower alternative, of course, would not fit
the needs of the Port. The anti-lock residents, however, had a much more serious
challenge ahead for the ACE. They would utilize the flooding trope, maintaining that the
IHNC lock project was responsible for the destruction of the Lower Ninth Ward, St.
Bernard, and New Orleans East during Hurricane Katrina.
On September 14, 2010, the US Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
contractor working for ACE could in fact be sued by flooded residents of these
neighborhoods for digging up two deeply buried obstacles to the lock project, next to a
floodwall that failed between Florida and Claiborne avenues (Schleifstein
2010a:METRO B 01). The plaintiffs charged that the depth of the excavations allowed
water from the IHNC to seep underneath the floodwall, and ultimately burst the levee.
This strengthened the discourse of the lock project as the cause for flooding in these
areas.
On September 12, 2012, it was reported by the Times-Picayune that a smaller
group of residents was suing the ACE itself over the alleged negligence in the
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subcontractor's preliminary work on the lock project. The plaintiffs said that inadequate
work on removing pilings by the floodwalls caused them to fail, in which case the
contractor and the ACE would be liable for the flooding damages (KUNZELMAN
2012:News). The ACE said the floodwall failures were caused by water surging over
them. If this were the case, the ACE would be shielded from lawsuits, due to its
immunity for damages related to flood control projects. This immunity was built into the
Flood Control Act of 1928, but would not cover flooding related to the IHNC lock project
(Schleifstein 2013:A 01). In other words, the plaintiffs said that it was the lock project,
not flood control, which caused the flooding. The ACE said the opposite.
Judge Duval ultimately sided with the testimony of a witness for the defense (the
ACE), that the activity around the IHNC lock was not close enough to the floodwall to
cause the damages that Dr. Bea had earlier described (Schleifstein 2013:A 01).
However, Judge Duval excoriated the ACE and expressed disappointment that he had
to grant immunity to it.
Often, when the king can do no wrong, his subjects suffer the
consequences. Such is the case here ... This story -- 50 years in the
making -- is heart-wrenching ... Millions of dollars were squandered in
building a levee system with respect to these outfall canals, which was
known to be inadequate by the corps' own calculations'" (Schleifstein
2013:A 01).
Here, then, is the solid footing in the minds of the residents for the most recent iteration
of the "ACE as villain" trope.
On July 6, 2015, it was reported in The Advocate that the ACE was undertaking
another court ordered EIS about the IHNC lock project. The ACE was looking at
alternative placements for the new lock, as well as updating the old one (Budreau
2015). The article also reported that the ACE's lock project construction efforts were
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allegedly part of what caused area flooding. One community activist for Citizens against
Widening the Industrial Canal not only wanted the new lock in a different location, but
also "... said the old industrial Canal lock is an important piece of history that needs to
be maintained and not replaced. He [also] accused the corps of repeatedly favoring
maritime interests over those of residents” (Budreau 2015). Residents opposed to the
IHNC lock project were now utilizing the historic preservation discourse about the lock
itself.
By the year 2017, the overall position of the residents had not changed. The ACE
was accessing the accommodation trope and the residents were using the trope of
“We've-heard-this all-before.” On January 6, 2017, the ACE published its new plan for a
reduced, shallow draft lock (900 feet long, 110 feet wide, and 22 feet deep). Residents
were opposed, with John Koerfel calling it
… warmed up bits of old reports ... We expect the economic study will
have a lot of color graphs of benefits and almost no downside ... The
downside is when the floodwall collapses, the community floods, and
wetlands disappear. Since we can't sue them, why should they include
that in the cost analysis'” (Schleifstein 2017).
The Port was no longer interested in contributing financing for a deep draft lock. Gary
LaGrange had rescinded the Port’s participation back in 2012 when the ACE
recommended against a deep draft lock, and it became apparent that the Port would
have to contribute much more money to make the lock deep draft. Additionally, the Port
had already moved much of its IHNC container activity back onto the uptown river.
Money set aside for the community mitigation aspect of the project had increased
to $56 million. However, the ACE stated that the figure would consider previously used
mitigation dollars and the fact that a smaller lock would have less community impact
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(Schleifstein 2017). On February 6, 2017, The Advocate reported that Louisiana State
Sen. JP Morell opposed the reduced lock project: "The Corps has visited and revisited
this bad idea for years… [The IHNC] has seen a tremendous drop in activity. This plan
was a bad idea when there were actual shipyards using it, and it's an even worse idea
now." Morell also cited the unpredictability of President Donald Trump in terms of
whether the lock project would actually be funded, even though Trump is on record as
pushing for infrastructure expansion on the inland waterway system (Williams 2017a).
The ACE rebutted that it was the inadequacy of the lock that had led to the
decrease in its usage. A suite of projects, including opening an additional bridge next to
the one at Florida Avenue, replacing the IHNC lock, and replacing the St. Claude
bridge, were reported by The Advocate as being opposed by residents on February 15,
2017. Aside from support for spending the IHNC lock money on replacing the worn-out
St. Claude bridge (which would be a much less expensive project), " ... Vanessa
Geuringer of A Community Voice [said] 'It's just demoralizing, dehumanizing,
despicable, every word that you could think of ... '" (Williams 2017b). The ACE repeated
the discourse of economic development-derived jobs coming from a new lock.
According to the Public Information Officer for the ACE New Orleans Division,
… the challenge with that is … almost anywhere you can think of, there’s
no detour alternative to the lock. The only detour that we have is a 17-day
detour up to the Tennessee-Tomigbee River. And when you’re looking at
a critical piece of infrastructure on the third busiest waterway in the
country, when this lock goes down for a day, we’re talking millions of
dollars in impact. And a lot of times, you look at that, and it’s millions of
dollars in impact to the navigation industry, but really, that filters down to
millions of dollars in impact to the City of New Orleans because the
economy in this area is driven by the river and the intercoastal waterway.
So, impacts on that filter throughout the area. And what you’re looking at
is [how the Corps is] authorized just to look into how to make it better, how
to improve the situation … and look at [ways] for getting a lock that is
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appropriate for the modern navigation standard but in a way that is the
least impactful to the city area (Public Information Officer, USACE 2018).
Finally, in an Article in the July 2017 issue of Antigravity Magazine
… “After everything that’s happened, why should we trust you”? ... while
plenty of other parties may have contributed to the magnitude of the
disaster, the Army Corps of Engineers is widely-believed to be responsible
for design flaws which led to the breaching of the levees … [as]
community activist Vanessa Gueringer puts it, “the Corps is at the top of
the list for destroying us, for making us fight so hard for the community we
love. There are families who lost their lives, families who are in the
Diaspora and will never come back. The Corps has continuously caused
misery in this community ... We have not received any benefits from all the
times that they have done damage to our community. Not a park, not a
community center, not a school, nothing. We had to pull ourselves up. So
for them to come back to us and disregard all the things they have not
been held accountable for is just outrageous. [The lock] would be a death
sentence for us (Devon 2017).
There were no supporters of the lock project at the meeting. The article goes on to point
out the general negative impact of dredging as a technology and puts the blame on " ...
Faustian bargains made in the 19th and 20th centuries by industrial capitalists ... " Once
again, the ACE could not communicate the local economic benefits to the meeting
participants. One activist stated that
The only benefit is to the maritime industry. There is no economic
benefit—for every dollar they spend on this project, they say they’ll get
four back, but that’s for the U.S. over 50 years, not for the local
community. Who is being endangered, and for whose benefit (Devon
2017)?
The IHNC lock project was defeated by a multiplicity of discourses and tropes
which included hyperbolic language, such as describing the ACE as a “killer” and
“economic rapist.” The most damaging of these discourses, and the one that is foremost
in the minds of the Lower Ninth Ward residents today, is that the lock project specifically
was responsible for the Katrina-derived flooding of the Lower Ninth Ward, St. Bernard
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Parish, and New Orleans East. This discourse was solidified in the minds of the
residents by the testimony of Dr. Robert Bea, even though his conclusions did not stand
up in federal court. The 1928 Flood Control Project-derived immunity of the ACE from
prosecution in those matters for which it was culpable, i.e., under-engineering the levee
system in general, has shut the project out of consideration in the minds of the
residents. The defeat of this project, in tandem with the closure of the MRGO, and the
decision of the ACE to forego a deep-draft version of the lock, led the Port of New
Orleans to relocate many of its maritime tenants from the IHNC back to the uptown
wharves, which greatly exacerbated last mile freight congestion.
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad (NOPB) Narrative
This section gives an overview of the story of controversy over the NOPB’s
practice of using a portion of rail behind a Leake Avenue neighborhood to park its
railcars, as well as coupling and decoupling them. See Figure 23.
The narratives related thus far contributed to a lack of freight transportation
options for the Port. The following story shows the power of narrative to modify existing
freight transportation.
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Figure 23. The Uptown Triangle Neighborhood

Source: Google My Maps.
The Uptown Triangle Neighborhood Association (UTNA) has in recent years
been working to have these Port-related freight cars banned from this region. This
threat is unlikely to succeed, as the NOPB has been operating there as a city agency
since 1908, when its service began from the river terminus of Mandeville Street in the
Marigny neighborhood to that of Monticello Avenue northwest of the Uptown Triangle
Neighborhood, also known as The Black Pearl. See Figure 24.
Nevertheless, the UTNA was successful, via the consistent application of its
chosen narrative, in bringing about changes to how the NOPB operates on Leake
Avenue behind the neighborhood.
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Figure 24. Original Route NOPB.

Source: Greater New Orleans Data Center 2002, New Orleans Public Belt Railroad
2016, Google My Maps.
The Black Pearl neighborhood was settled as part of the New Orleans suburb of
Carrollton circa 1835, and the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad connecting New
Orleans with this suburb was in existence at that time (Greater New Orleans Data
Center 2002). As recently as 2002, one resident was quoted as saying “It's really quiet.
Except for the boats and trains, which I really love hearing” (Greater New Orleans Data
Center 2002). However, by 2016, NOPB operations behind this neighborhood were
caught up in narrative controversy.
In April of 2016, the UTNA sent a report to several agencies of the city, including
the Mayor’s offices of public permitting, public safety, NOPB, and counterterrorism,
outlining their concerns with perceived hazards of NOPB trains parked on the tracks
behind Leake Avenue. These concerns were focused on the potential for the toxic
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chemical-carrying rail cars to be targets of terrorist bombing, accidental explosion,
leaking, or even just hijacking by delinquents, as the cars are left parked unattended for
periods of time. The Mayor’s office responded on May 27, 2016, with the Not in Our
Jurisdiction trope. The message said, in part, that rail transport, safety, and zoning
issues are federally regulated, and not within the purview of the city. The city also
pointed out that it has $25 million of insurance for the NOPB, and that the slow speed
with which the NOPB travels greatly restricts the possibility of a serious accident.
The city also pointed out that the NOPB does in fact attempt to curtail the number
of trains parked along Leake Avenue and has met several times with the UTNA to try to
work on limiting Leake Avenue rail traffic, in the context of its sometime. In addition, the
city said that New Orleans is not in real danger of a terrorist attack. The response
concludes with a reassurance that the NOPBR operates in full regulatory compliance
regarding the transport of hazardous materials (Mellem 2016:2).
In July 2016, Dr. Sheldon Hersh MD issued a point by point rebuttal to the
assurances provided by the city. Specifically, he asserted that:
•

the NOPBR's insurance policy was not monetarily sufficient when compared
to the damages caused by other rail disasters;

•

the railcars should be deployed from "the secured railroad yard at Nashville
Avenue ... " instead of from Leake Avenue behind the neighborhood;

•

the UTNA fears that the NOPBR will not live up to its stated commitment to
limiting train activity on Leake Avenue;

•

the UTNA has no concrete evidence that rail activity on Leake Avenue is
unavoidable at times;
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•

the UTNA does not know to whom the NOPBR must answer;

•

the UTNA is demanding from the NOPBR a research report on applicable
federal regulations and statutes which could govern rail operations on Leake
Avenue;

•

the UTNA is unclear on how the state of Louisiana regulates the NOPBR;

•

the NOPBR Railroad commission members do not have contact information
readily available, and that the UTNA wants to participate in the meetings of
this commission;

•

the UTNA is unclear on the relationship between the mayor and the NOPBR,
as the mayor presides over the commission;

•

the UTNA believes that the citizens, as "corporation shareholders," should
decide how the NOPB is run;

•

the UTNA is afraid of the NOPBR declaring bankruptcy in the event of a
disaster and leaving the neighborhood liable from the fallout of such, and the
residents of the city responsible for the costs associated with the disaster;

•

the mayor's office has failed to engage the citizens regarding the problem.

The letter concludes thus: "A 'Don't worry, be happy' philosophy is not sufficient when it
is our neighborhood sitting across the street from these unattended railroad cars
containing toxic, hazardous, and explosive chemicals" (Hersh 2016:3).
In August of that year, the UTNA Railroad Committee released a report on the
rail cars. The executive summary states that
The New Orleans Public Belt Railroad (NOPB) has been parking, storing,
and marshaling railroad cars containing hazardous, explosive, and
poisonous materials along Leake Avenue in Uptown New Orleans for
many years; these railroad cars sit at the foot of the Mississippi River
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levee, 60 feet from our homes … Nationally, there have been many
accidents, derailments, and explosions of trains carrying petroleum and
hazardous chemicals; these explosions have killed people and destroyed
towns. The damage to New Orleans from these potential “Weapons of
Mass Destruction” could be catastrophic. This report outlines potential
dangers these parked railroad cars present to our neighborhood and our
City. These include … potential levee damage … neighborhood
evacuation difficulties … coupling and uncoupling railroad cars, zoning
violations, and others. (Barnes et al. 2016:3).
On September 5th, 2016, the Times-Picayune at NOLA.com published an article
outlining the demands of the UTNA, ongoing since 2014, regarding the NOPB. Most
notably, the article related the group's designation of the railcars as " ... potential
weapons of mass destruction ... " citing graffiti on the cars as evidence that they were
vulnerable to tampering by terrorists when unattended. The NOPB said it was in full
compliance with all federal safety regulations. Dr. Hersh stated that he had not received
any response from the Department of Transportation (DOT) Surface Transportation
Board in response to his concerns.
This became a dispute between the UTNA and the Port. On September 9th and
14th, 2017 the Times-Picayune announced that the city and the Port had reached an
agreement whereby the city would give the NOPB to the Port in exchange for the land
occupied by the Esplanade and Governor Nicholls street wharves. The Port would gain
a means of easing uptown wharf last mile trucking congestion by moving more freight
by rail to the France Road terminal, and the city would gain land for the completion of an
uninterrupted linear riverfront park from the Bywater neighborhood all the way to the
NOCC (Sayre 2017a, 2017b).
Nevertheless, on July 20th of that year, Dr. Hersh sent an email to Lester D.
Rawls of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Hazardous Materials Safety
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Inspector. The message was a complaint about unattended tanker NOPB cars carrying
hazardous materials parked on Leake Ave. The letter states that the cars have been
there for six days while FRA regulations prohibit hazardous material (hazmat) cars from
parking in residential areas for more than two days.
F.R.A. rules are in place to protect the public from these poisonous
materials. NOPB should not use our neighborhood as a parking lot for
their hazardous materials. Please instruct NOPB to abide by federal safety
rules (Hersh 2017).
The narrative of the NOPB cars on Leake Avenue as toxic threat to the Black
Pearl neighborhood will likely not gain traction due to the longevity of this freight
resource for the Port. Because it is integral to the Port, and firmly established, it is
resistant to the force of narrative. The Port will fight for this resource with all of its
political, economic, and social capital, because without the NOPB the Port cannot
survive in the modern world of containerization (Bourdieu and (John Brookshire) 1991;
Levinson 2008). In fact, the Port has recently expanded its social capital by working
further with the UTNA to ameliorate the impact of the trains, although the narrative
depends on who is speaking. The Port sees itself as being a good neighbor, but
according to a member of the UTNA
[Webb]: And I think you told me at the beginning of this interview that
since the port has taken over ownership of the public belt, that now, the
trains are no longer marshalling in the yard, and they’re not banging next
to the neighborhood, and they’re not blowing their horns anymore. Why do
you think that is? “[We] were at the point of working with the state
legislature to get written into law controls for the railroad, and I think that
[the Port] realized that. And I think they thought that they needed to
change their behavior …” (UTNA Member 2018).
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In actuality, the NOPB functions to keep Port-bound rail freight out of
neighborhoods, as shown in Figure 25. The yellow triangle is the Uptown Triangle
Neighborhood.
Figure 25. The NOPB in Relation to the City and the UTNA.

Source: https://www.portnola.com/business/real-estate/available-properties.
Today: The Sinclair Tract
This section discusses the Port’s recent proposal to expand its container
operations by building a new intermodal container terminal at the Sinclair Tract at
Meraux in St. Bernard parish, downriver from the uptown container terminals. See
Figure 26.
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Figure 26. The Sinclair Tract.

Source: Base map Google Maps.
The Port requires expansion of its container handling capacity if it is to fulfill its
potential as a key node in the largest regional port complex in the world, stretching from
the Port of Baton Rouge to the Port of South Louisiana. “In addition to the optimization
of existing facilities, there is a clear market-based need for additional container terminal
development to accommodate the projected cargo demand and ship sizes. Port NOLA
must look beyond its current footprint to meet these future needs in order to remain
globally competitive and retain jobs and supply chain-dependent businesses … [the
Port must expand] … container operations in a locale capable of handling growing
vessel sizes and add a major logistics component that complements the Napoleon
Avenue Container Terminal” (Port of New Orleans 2018b:87, 89).
This would be a much needed expansion in St. Bernard Parish, and is part of the
Port’s effort to benefit Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard parishes as a contiguous
economic unit, as well as to facilitate maximum economic impact on the state by all
Lower Mississippi port complexes (Port of New Orleans 2018d). In addition to being a
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container facility, the Port anticipates ancillary freight-based value-added operations,
“…such as transloading, warehousing, distribution, and light manufacturing…” (Port of
New Orleans 2018d).
The Port plans for stakeholder input and mitigation: “Beginning immediately, the
port will be assessing the site, current and potential rail and traffic issues and
related community impacts to identify mitigations that ‘ensure a positive project overall,’
[Michelle Ganon, vice president of public affairs at the Port] said” (Traweek 2018). “To
help prepare local residents for a new generation of transportation and logistics careers,
the Port plans to partner with the school district and Nunez Community College to
provide job training” (St. Bernard Parish Post 2018).
However, community opposition to the project has begun. This is basically a
reprise of the parish’s vehement reaction to the Violet Cut. In the comments section to
this story in the January 17, 2018 issue of New Orleans City Business, the following
single comment was posted from “Seriously Concerned”:
Thank you for doing this story. The residents there are totally unaware that
this is being pursued. Every resident i [sic] have spoken to is against this
and the St. Bernard Council is telling us it is private property and they can
do what they want with it. Regardless, there needs to be permits applied
for, it should be required to have a buffer zone. (so many feet from the
residents) [sic]. Noise ordinances should be in place. etc. But the council
is saying they don’t need to. How is this possible? How can we fight this?
Residents should be aware of this (Traweek 2018).
In addition, a milder caution was raised by St. Bernard Parish President Guy McInnis,
who said after viewing a presentation on the project.
What do we want for our children and grandchildren? That’s going to be a
big decision for us….We need to keep an open mind and go through this
process…I do know that the Meraux Foundation’s [the owner of the
Sinclair tract] commitment is to the quality of life in St. Bernard (St.
Bernard Parish Post 2018).
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Nevertheless, at a meeting held on February 21st, 2018, the residents of
St. Bernard expressed a great deal of acrimony to the Port regarding this
project. Quality of life complaints were raised, including concerns about
construction dust and debris, and facility maintenance noise once the
container terminal was completed. Residents also said that the St.
Bernard labor force doesn't have the education to take advantage of the
jobs the container terminal would bring. Brandy Christian, the current CEO
of the Port, deployed the Economic Development discourse, saying "...
this region was founded for shipping ...," and Michelle Ganon, Vice
President of Public Affairs for the Port, discussed technologies that can
mitigate some of the effects of the facility, such as laser-guided shipping
containers that deploy more quietly (Fox 8 News, New Orleans La. 2018).
Residents deployed the parochialism discourse, referring to their “… small
Mayberry quiet town.”7
The story of the repetitive defeat of freight transportation options proposed by the
Port is the story of how a succession of narrative “turf battles” led to the current last
mile freight congestion at the Clarence Henry Truckway (Swyngedouw 1992:318). By
the mid-1980s, the fights over the Expressway, Leake Avenue, the Violet Cut in St.
Bernard, and the IHNC lock had created a perfect storm which combined with the oil
and gas bust to create a narrative of tourism-dependency on the part of the city. It is this
tourism-dependency, a narrative which doesn’t acknowledge the role of the Port’s
nearby Julia Street cruise terminal in cultivating this very tourism, which has led to the
proposed NOCC/Trade District developments so close to the Port being considered.
However, all of this notwithstanding, the role of technology-driven labor changes at the
Port due to the advent of containerization has greatly contributed to the ascendancy of
the tourism narrative. In fact, organized labor realized too late that its existence
depended upon robust flows of freight through the Port.

7

Mayberry is the fictional North Carolina setting of the Andy Griffith Show, which was a comic portrayal of
law enforcement in a mythological idyllic small southern town.
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Chapter 5. Labor History
This chapter outlines the history of strikes by dockworkers at the Port of New
Orleans in the years 1962, 1968, 1977, and 1986. The strikes of 1962 – 1977 were
general issue strikes, in which “… the international longshoreman’s association calls
strikes throughout their jurisdiction, which would be the East Coast, the Gulf Coast and
most of the Great Lakes” (Port director one 2017). The strike of 1986 was a local issue
strike, in which “… the local unions [have] some grievance that leads them to shut down
work …” (ibid). The key players in this history are the International Longshoremen’s
Association Union locals 1419 and 1418 (ILA; black and white unions respectively) in
the strikes of 1962 – 1977; ILA local 3000 in the strike of 1986, which local was created
by the court-ordered merger of the black and white ILA locals in 1979 (Perales 1986);
the Teamsters Union; the New Orleans Steamship Association (NOSA); the New York
Shipping Association (NYSA); the Port of New Orleans; Teddy Gleason, the president of
the ILA during the strikes of 1960 – 1977; Cliven Cormier, the president of ILA local
3000 during the strike of 1986; and Ron Brinson, the director of the Port of New Orleans
during the strike of 1986. When monetary amounts were adjusted for inflation, the tools
used were Inflation Calculator – US CPI Inflation and Dollar Value from 1913 to 2015 or
Inflation Calculator - Saving.org (CPI Inflation Calculator 2017; Saving.org 2017).
In the general issue strikes of 1962 – 1977, in which the Port of New Orleans
was part of national International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) strikes from Maine
to Texas, freight was used as a weapon to extract concessions from management.
Freight flows themselves were not seen as the essence of employment, but rather as a
means of leverage for negotiation about compensation. As early as 1972, however,
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Teddy Gleason, then-president of the ILA, was quoted as saying he “… wanted a ‘good
and healthy’ American shipping industry … ‘the fatter they get the more I can get off
them”” (A. C. J. Roane 1972). This is an example of union leadership understanding the
importance of freight to the livelihood of its members. The labor narrative began as antifreight, but ultimately shifted to a pro-freight narrative in 1986 when labor realized that
automation meant their livelihood depended upon the volume of commerce through the
Port, not solely upon extracting concessions from management.
Strike of 1962
In the strike of 1962, which affected all Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports, the shipping
industry wanted to limit the size of the longshoreman's gangs from 20 members to 17.
The union explicitly said it would not throw any of its people into unemployment for the
sake "of automation." The Port of New Orleans stated that it was losing $250,000 a
week from the strike or over $2 million in 2017 (State Times Advocate 1962b). Note that
automation was already the driving force of labor insecurity in the nation's ports by
1962. The 1962 strike was also about wage and benefit increases. The national ILA was
seeking an increase of $0.50 an hour, $0.26 of which was to be part of a benefits
package. The New York Shipping Association – with whom the ILA as a whole was
dealing – was offering an increase of $0.22 an hour (State Times Advocate 1963).
Dockworkers’ wages at the time were $3.02 an hour. This is $24.48 in 2017, or $50,918
annually. The union was seeking to go to a total of $28.53, or $53,342 annually, putting
them in the lower end of a solid middle-class wage structure, defined as “… incomes
ranging from about $45,200 to $135,600 in 2016” (Fry and Kochar 2018). The strike
was ultimately very damaging to the Port, the city, and the nation. By the time it ended
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on January 25th 1963, it had cost the nation $750 million– almost $6 billion in 2017
(Saving.org 2017). As of 1963, this was the "longest, costliest Atlantic and Gulf ports
strike in history" (Times-Picayune 1963). The result was “… a 37-cent-an-hour hike for
longshoremen over the next two years [broken down into] a 24-cent hourly wage
increase and an additional 13 cents an hour in fringe benefits” (Times-Picayune 1963).
For perspective, this meant a $1.94 an hour wage increase, or over four thousand
dollars a year, in 2018, and a $1.05 an hour 2018 fringe benefits increase, or over two
thousand dollars a year. Consider that a 2018 “Bronze” Obamacare plan for a 35-year
old single male smoker longshoreman (because it can be safely assumed that most
dockworkers smoked in 1963) costs about $427 a month, or $5124 a year, meaning that
the fringe benefit increase would cover about half of the dockworker’s 2018 healthcare
costs (HealthCare.gov 2018).
Strike of 1968
The strike of 1968 was also a general issue strike for all Atlantic and Gulf Coast
ports. The ILA struck on September 30, 1968 when its contract expired, as in 1962. The
primary issues were over pensions and a guaranteed wage. There was no movement
toward either of these from the New Orleans Steamship Association. Again, the main
negotiations were in New York; again, the New Orleans steamship Association tried to
negotiate separately with the ILA locals here. The national ILA wouldn’t have it (Morning
Advocate 1968). The New York ILA was setting the pace with demands for a $1.60 an
hour wage and benefits package increase ($23,699 a year in 2017). However, the
president of the New Orleans Steamship Association, James Howell, said that was not
possible because New York is a container port, whereas New Orleans is a bulk port
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(even though it was the second largest port in the nation at that time by tonnage):
“Howell said slower cargo movement and higher labor costs in New Orleans ruled out
any $1.60 an hour wage/benefit package. ‘If they are successful in getting the best
contract in the country by insisting on stuffing the New York package down our throats,
they are going to dry up the port’” (State Times Advocate 1968). So, in this case, again,
the union was pro-wage, but not necessarily pro-freight. They were not seeing their
wage structure as being tied to freight flows, but rather to management decisions. The
strike lasted for 63 days, from December 20, 1968 to February 22, 1969. It cost the port
about $1 million a day; over $7 million in 2017 (CPI Inflation Calculator 2017). The only
cargo handled during the strike was bananas, and military supplies for Vietnam.
Strike of 1977
An example of the weaponization of freight occurred during the strike of 1977.
Here, the New Orleans management representative feared that giving the union the
option to strike all varieties of carriers over the Guaranteed Annual Income (GAI) gave
Teddy Gleason "...'police power,’ rather than keeping the matter an agreement among
[ocean] carriers" (Mongelluzo 1977). Freight was not seen as the workers’ income flow;
management was.
The strike of 1977 was nuanced, however. The New York-based ILA called for a
general strike on all East Coast and Gulf Coast ports specifically for containerized cargo
only, not bulk cargo. This strike was directly oriented towards obtaining compensation
for those longshoremen who had been made redundant by shipping container
technology. The longshoremen of New Orleans, however, chose on their own to strike
all cargo, container and bulk, bulk still being most of the cargo at the Port. The
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longshoremen in New York handled almost exclusively container cargo by that time
(Mongelluzzo 1977b). However, Teddy Gleason, national president of the ILA,
eventually ordered the longshoremen at the Port of New Orleans to resume handling
bulk cargo, possibly from fear of federal intervention that would jeopardize the
container-only strike– which president Carter had promised not to intervene in, as long
as it was confined to container cargo only (Mongelluzzo 1977d; Treadway 1977). The
general strike at the Port had "...cost the city about $2 million a day," over $8 million in
2017 (Mongelluzzo 1977d).
The economic impact of these three strikes – the withholding of freight – makes
them collectively an “anti-freight” narrative. Even in 1977, however, we can see the
beginnings of a pro-freight shift. When Teddy Gleason of the national ILA ordered the
New Orleans longshoremen back to work—the New Orleans ILA had continued to strike
even after the national ILA signed a contract with the Council of North Atlantic Shipping
Associations (CONASA)—Paul Guillory, the vice president of ILA local 1419 in New
Orleans, supported Gleason, charging that the New Orleans ILA locals were playing
politics with the contract vote.
I remember when the presidents of local 1515 and 1800 negotiated with
the fruit companies and bragged they had the best banana contract in the
United States...They are still sitting there with their contracts, but there is
not a man to work for them. They ran the fruit companies out of town. We
can not run all the work away from New Orleans..." (Mongelluzzo 1977a).
This is the germ of Cliven Cormier's acceptance of the pro-freight narrative which
brought an end to the 1986 local issue ILA strike.
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Strike of 1986
The strike of 1986 was a local issue strike, called by ILA local 3000 (Port director
one 2017). On October 10, 1986, over a thousand dockworkers walked off the job and
picketed after contract talks with the New Orleans Steamship Association (NOSA)
bogged down. The old contract had expired on September 30. NOSA was seeking
reductions in pay and holidays, and overtime changes. Overtime was the main issue.
Under the old contract, the longshoremen got overtime pay for nights and weekends,
working for a variety of stevedoring companies. The NOSA wanted them to be working
for a single company for 40 hours prior to receiving overtime (Associated Press 1986).
The locals had already agreed to wage cutbacks of 18% to 30% in 1985. According to
then-director of the Port, Ron Brinson, "the strike could not be more untimely, not only
for the port but for the community. We were just beginning to see little signs of a
business turnaround"(Associated Press 1986).
In 1985, the ILA was competing with non-ILA labor from the New Orleans
Teamsters Union. Even so, there were no concerns on the part of the ILA that the
Teamsters would cross the picket lines during the strike of 1986. ILA members were
willing to take pay cuts under duress. They had agreed in 1985 to have work crews
reduced to 25% to 30%, from 10 to 7 longshoremen. "For some guys, the cuts added up
to a loss of $3000-$4000 per year ($6,700 to $8,933 in 2017). The idea was to get
management at a competitive edge to get the work. We still lost it" said Cliven Cormier,
president of New Orleans ILA local 3000 (Associated Press 1986). In giving
concessions in 1985 The ILA was deferring to the narrative of freight as livelihood.
Unacceptable further cuts produced a return to the narrative of freight as weapon. This
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time, however, the net effect on freight at the Port of the 1986 strike was the
advancement of the narrative of freight as employment.
The strike ended on October 15 1986. In terms of labor costs, the contract put
the Port of New Orleans on even footing with a large swath of the other Gulf ports. It did
not make it more competitive for shippers in terms of the price of labor. The Port would
"...have to rely on its reputation for productivity, its location and better marketing..."
(Perales 1986). The Port was also counting on a promise from Cliven Cormier of the
longshoremen to work with management to set regular labor prices for the shipping
companies. In its settlement, the ILA did give wage concessions, "... $12 ($26 in 2017)
an hour for...bulk cargo and $14 ($31) an hour for...general cargo" (Perales 1986). This
was down from "...$17 ($37) an hour for all cargo..." (Perales 1986). Non-ILA workers
made from $8 ($17) to $10 ($22) an hour. This was the first ILA strike-settled union
contract with wage concessions ever in New Orleans. However, even though many of
the union rank and file were bitterly upset over the new contract, "... everyone agreed
the cheaper labor is an impetus to bring in more cargo through the port..." (Perales
1986). In addition, Cormier agreed to go on Port marketing trips with Ron Brinson,
specifically to market the ILA labor productivity advantages available to shippers at the
Port of New Orleans. Note that the wage concessions were in relation to general and
bulk cargo, "...37.7 million tons..." in 1985 (Perales 1986). Containerized cargo was still
handled under the terms of the contract negotiated in the strike of 1977. The Port’s
approach to take regarding how the increases in automation and containerized cargo
were impacting the longshoremen—in particular the Black middle class community—
was to “…try our best to take the flows of cargo and grow them” (Port director one
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2017). See Figure 27 for an illustration of the decline in ILA membership at the Port
since the strike of 1962 (note that changes in technology and freight patterns related to
containerization had the same effect on ILA membership at ports across the country).
Figure 27. Decline in ILA Membership at the Port of New Orleans.
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On June 22nd, 2015, there was a strike—perhaps more accurately referred to as
a work stoppage, since the truckers were not formally unionized—of independent
truckers at the Port over the issue of having to transport damaged shipping containers
around the Port without compensation. This was an example of an anti-freight narrative,
with the expressed intent of using freight as a weapon in negotiations, rather than
growing freight flows to increase work. One trucker was quoted as saying, specifically in
reference to Louisiana’s chemical plants, “…we're hoping that at some point the ships
can't get in because they can't move the freight” (Lipinski 2015a).
When there is no money tied to a class of freight—in this case, damaged
shipping containers—the labor narrative quickly becomes anti-freight. There was no
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economic incentive to move the damaged containers; therefore, the truckers went back
to the anti-freight narrative—against all freight, not just the damaged containers—of
freight as weapon. The truckers did not view handling the damaged containers in a
broader context of the operations necessary to grow freight flows at the Port. This is
because truck drivers at American ports are paid by the “turn”, not the hour. That is,
they are paid whenever they pick up or drop off a shipping container at a port, not for
the time spent driving damaged containers around.
For the truckers, this went to a deeper sense of not feeling respected (WDSU
News 2015). The issue at hand was not being compensated for the extra container
moves, but the truckers felt more broadly that their “Protections [had been] broken”
(Parsons 2015). In addition to the issue with returning broken containers, truckers
stated at the April 2015 Freight Roundtable at the RPC that they had to bear the brunt
of many Port inefficiencies that were beyond their control, such as freight congestion
and “last minute orders”; not being able to inspect containers for damage upon receiving
them, being responsible for the repair of containers and the chassis (truck bed on
wheels) they ride on, and that it is their responsibility to prove that they themselves did
not damage the container or chassis (Parsons 2015:11). Perhaps more cogently in
terms of last mile freight congestion, and the advancement of a pro-freight narrative, the
truckers explicitly said they wanted the historic arterial truck routes to be reopened; for a
Leake Avenue access to the Port to be created, and for the Port to open an additional
truck access point to the one at Felicity and Religious streets (Parsons 2015:19). For
the ILA (which in 1977 numbered 3000, and in 2017 numbered 450, the issues were
about job security (Baldwin 2017). Specifically, the ILA voiced concerns about not
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having the guaranteed number of work hours necessary to qualify for health insurance.
Additionally, the union brought attention to uneven labor utilization at the Port and the
use of “skeleton crews” (Parsons 2015:13).
This work stoppage only lasted three days, but it came to encompass over 100
independent truckers. The terminal operators, Ports America and New Orleans Terminal
settled quickly with the truckers that they would be paid $40 for each return of a
damaged container (Lipinski 2015b). The wasted turns returning the damaged
containers were costing the truckers up to $300 per day (Lipinski 2015a).
The most recent labor narrative is unequivocally pro-freight and relates to
President Trump’s anti-NAFTA / protectionist actions. It concerns Trump’s trade
protections on American steel, to help the domestic industry by making imported steel
more expensive. The members of ILA local 3000 at the Port are squarely against this,
because it damages the freight-related trade flows at the Port– and not just at the Port
of New Orleans: “He's trying to stop imports from other countries, but that's our main
revenue. You start messing with revenue, that's when s--- hits the fan … [trade is] how
the United States keeps going … ” (The Washington Post 2017). The dockworkers
know that because freight-impacting tariffs—in this case specifically for steel—have
been enacted, the impact on the Port-related Black middle class will be devastating.
They are keenly aware of how employment at the Port has a beneficial economic ripple
effect on the Black community. One dockworker related the story of how his father’s
Port employment as a union longshoreman brought his family into the middle class,
which was continued by the son’s own Port work: "People don't understand how the
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waterfront helps people … I can tell you how it trickles down - my niece is an
anesthesiologist from Yale" (The Washington Post 2017).
The labor narrative began as anti-freight but had shifted to pro-freight by1986.
The pro-freight discourse on the part of modern labor at the Port had the unionized
dockworkers siding with management in the controversy over whether to scrap or
undercut NAFTA. Modern ILA labor at the Port strengthens the pro-freight narrative by
emphasizing the unsustainability of current last mile freight congestion. It also does this
by acknowledging the importance of the flow of NAFTA-related trade from Mexico into
the Port of New Orleans for the continued survival of the existing dockworkers

175

Chapter 6. Tourism/Convention Industry
Historical Overview of the Narrative
The seeds of the narrative of tourism as the road to economic vitality for New
Orleans were sown during the Decatur Street anti-freight discourse. As early as 1980,
the French Market in close proximity to the Café du Monde was described as having the
same tourism / economic potential as Quincy market in Boston (Kelso 1980). The 1984
World’s-Fair-derived riverfront development, which eliminated the prospect of a freightcarrying surface roadway from Elysian fields to Canal Street, was foreshadowed as
early as 1981, although with full provision for this roadway (Katz 1981). After the final
removal of freight traffic from the French Quarter, its tourism-derived potential as a
major economic driver for the city was no longer wishful thinking (Webre 1984). This
coincided with the fall of the Port’s employment share due to the increasing use of
containerization and automation in the industry, as well as the defeat of the Port’s
CENTROPORT ambitions in St. Bernard as discussed in chapter four. The narrative of
tourism and conventions as economically superior to the Port took root due to the Port’s
declining employment share, as well as the oil and gas industry bust of the mid-1980s,
but the accumulation of freight-blocking narratives contributed to this declining
employment.
Early 1980s: Decline of the Port
The Port of New Orleans suffered a general decline in its productivity and
employment share during the early 1980s. This decline is summarized in a series of
articles in the Times-Picayune by Christopher Drew from June 13-June 20, 1982. The
primary factor in this decline involves the failure of the Dock Board to focus on
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containerization (Lewis 2002:73). The Port was also hampered by the advent of the
rail-based Midwest to west coast “land bridge” for freight traffic to Asia in the very early
70s (Drew 1982b:1). Nevertheless, Drew reports that the Port was also “outhustled” by
more aggressive freight forwarders from Miami and Houston, with Miami acquiring much
of the Port’s Latin American trade and Houston parlaying its substantial port upgrades
to become a major player in the oil and gas industry (Drew 1982b:1, 16, 1982d, 1982c).
Additionally, the Port was suffering from fierce competition from other Gulf ports;
Gulfport Mississippi even managed to get a significant share of New Orleans’ banana
trade (Drew 1982e).
By 1984 the narrative of the Port in decline was firmly in place. An editorial piece
from that year prophesied the end of the Port’s day in the sun as the nation’s #2 port,
citing re-regulation of the 70s that made it cheaper for cargos to rail east-west;
containerization; and competition from other ports; as well as the loss of " ... 10,000 jobs
since 1977 ... and also ... some of its most lucrative general and containerized cargos"
(Katz 1984b). In addition, according to a UNO study of the local economy at the time, a
trade imbalance was hurting the Port because it was (and still is) focused on exports,
and imports were taking more of a share of cargo (Montgomery 1984). This general
decline in Port employment—due in no small measure as well to mechanization—in
addition to the collapse of the oil and gas market in 1985, combined to push tourism to
the fore economically (Lewis 2002:155).
The Port was also being hemmed in on the riverfront by aggressive touristoriented development (Drew 1982a). Indeed, already by 1982 the primacy of tourism
over the Port as the city’s economic engine was seen by some (Drew 1982b:16). These
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riverfront developments were a precursor to the 1984 world’s fair, which was the real
genesis of the expansion of the NOCC that threatens Port access today
(wyesondemand 2016).
By the mid-1980s, the global emphasis on container shipping had significantly
intensified. The Port’s first order of business in 1986 was to emphasize containerization
at the upriver wharves.
…containerization was and is a reality, we realized that we had to develop
modern container facilities on the Mississippi River. Up until that point, all
of the container facilities were on the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, I think
at France Road and Jourdan Road. From the day I got to New Orleans, I
could never see a long term future for the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet”
(Port director one 2017).
This was a secondary angle of attack. The strategy after the failure of CENTROPORT
was the ill-fated “Millennium Port”, which was to be located at the mouth of the
Mississippi and capable of handling all types of maritime freight (Lewis 2002:117).
However, the cost was prohibitive (over $1 billion) and the timeline therefore unknown,
so the Port undertook the reconstruction of the Napoleon, Louisiana Avenue, and
Nashville wharves as container facilities (ibid:118). Because of the now-ubiquitous
nature of container shipping and its associated technologies, however, this did not
translate into an increase in longshore jobs: “…I think it was a 20-year period from ‘67 to
‘86, a full 20 year period, where we saw cargo and the number of tons of cargo handled
at our wharves had increased, I think, threefold, but the demand for longshore labor had
declined by a factor of, I think, 60%” (Port director one 2017). Additionally, the Port
moved to get freight traffic off the uptown arterials.
…it was very clear for a very long period of time that port trucks were just
roaming all over those uptown and Garden District streets, and
connectivity is a real key to planning for modern facilities, so our best
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option, one of the only options, was to create a Tchoupitoulas Parkway,
the Clarence Henry Truckway. It is not a perfect connectivity
infrastructure, but it did clear the way for new rules, new ordinances to
take trucks off those streets, and to that extent I think it has worked really
well (ibid; (Parsons 1997).
By about the mid-90s to the early 21st century, tourism and the service economy
finally eclipsed the Port and the oil and gas industry as the primary economic drivers of
the city (Campanella 2012:10). This put the city in a precarious spot, due to the
seasonally-derived instability of a tourist economy (Lewis 2002:71). In addition to
seasonal economic fragility, long-standing concerns had been expressed about the
potential of a tourist-driven economy to ruin the very culture which is being marketed.
“A little bit (of tourism) is all right, but much more than a little bit, it can get really
out of hand," Lewis said. "The kind of tourism that is attractive to most people is a
place that has a genuine quality to itself. When tourism starts cranking up, there
is a tendency of the developers to assume that they know what the tourist wants.
And what you get is Disneyland (Warner 1997).
Overview of Tourism / Conventions vs Port Narrative
In 1980, people—most notably the city’s mayor, Ernest “Dutch” Morial—were still
speaking in terms of tourism and the Port (referenced as “trade”) being “the main pillars”
of the New Orleans economy (Massa 1980). Even then, however, people were speaking
of tourism as being “…the fastest growing segment in the local economy…” and setting
their sights on expansion of the Convention Center as the way to promote this growth
(Katz 1980). In fact, the city was, by 1982, experiencing an economic boom in the face
of a national recession. This boom was fueled by “…the port, oil and gas, tourism and
construction…” (Katz 1982a). The construction component was partly due to
expansions on the Convention Center in anticipation of the 1984 world’s fair, which was
projected to accelerate the city’s economy (ibid).
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A counternarrative to the benefits of tourism did exist, however: “‘Although
tourism creates income and jobs, it can suffocate local culture and change a community
into a plastic caricature of itself…’ said Dr. Max Preglau of the University of Innsbruck at
the UNO-sponsored ‘Tourism and Culture’ symposium” (Katz 1983). However
anticipation of the tourism benefits of the upcoming fair was high (Dansker 1982; Katz
1984a). The fair did not pan out as expected—it went bankrupt and actually damaged
the local economy—but the seeds of the continuing NOCC expansion and the
gentrification of the Warehouse district can be directly traced to it (Cole 1985; Finley
2013; The Times-Picayune 2017; WDSU Digital Team 2018).
Another aspect of the early 80s counternarrative to tourism concerns the
relationship of the Port to the Almonaster-Michoud industrial corridor. This is the area
east of the industrial canal between Chef Menteur Highway to the north and the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway to the south. In 1982, this large parcel of land was the target of
some intense pro-Port boosterism, with a distinctly minimalizing attitude towards
tourism. In an opinion piece reporting on an advertising campaign by New Orleans East
Inc. to market the city to industry on the merits of access to the Almonaster-Michoud
corridor, we read
One major Gulf Coast City still has the land, the energy and the attitude to
make your business work. And it ain't Houston. It's New Orleans” … It was
clear to us that if New Orleans was ever to be more than a onedimensional tourism mecca, there would have to be some changes of
image, says [Charles D. Sullivan, director of marketing for New Orleans
East Inc.]…The Port of New Orleans is the third largest in the world in
terms of tonnage, is 50 percent larger than Houston's Ship Canal…” (Katz
1982b).
The piece goes on to remind readers that industrial development in this corridor was
seen by Dutch Morial as the best hope for combatting the city’s poverty (ibid).
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In the 1990s, there was a distinct back-and-forth between the narratives of
tourism—particularly that which focused on riverfront development—and Port freightbased manufacturing as the way out of the oil and gas bust. In the mayoral race of
1990 this narrative dichotomy was explicit. Then-mayor Sidney Barthelemy was running
on a platform of specifically tourism-convention based economic development, while his
opponent, Donald Mintz—a Dock Board member—was promoting a strategy based
upon collecting small manufacturing companies to process materials that come through
the Port (Warner 1990). Specifically, Mintz referenced the oil and gas bust as a warning
of the need to diversify the city’s economy: "We cannot put all our eggs in one
basket…We should have learned our lesson from the oil and gas depression" he said,
referencing the economically strategic position of New Orleans on the river as a key
selling point to industry. Even as he conceded that the age of heavy “smokestack”
industry had passed, he advocated for “value-added” manufacture processing for some
of the massive amounts of bulk materials which pass through the Port (Warner 1990).
Barthelemy, meanwhile, pointed out that manufacturing was leaving America: "We can't
compete with the Pacific rim countries where the cost of labor is cheap” (ibid).
Barthelemy staked his hopes for the city on the influx of visitors to the expanded NOCC,
as well as major sporting events (ibid).
This pendulum swing between the two narratives led to minimizing the
importance of the Port, as when then-board chairman of the NOCC described the
Mississippi River as “…a major economic resource beyond the Port of New Orleans”
(Montgomery 1990). However, Timothy Ryan, a UNO economist at the time, pointed out
that even though a modest economic recovery underway was indeed creditable to
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tourism, it was imperative for the economy to diversify, and he too referenced the Port
and manufacturing as key to sustaining the city’s slow rebound, and picking up the pace
of recovery (The Times-Picayune 1990b). Fritz Wagner, then-dean of the College of
Urban and Public Affairs (CUPA) at UNO, saw it differently. His prescription for the city
was full-on tourist oriented development of the New Orleans riverfront along the lines of
San Francisco, Boston, and Baltimore: “You don't get a chance to do this again…What
we build now is what will define us for the next hundred years” he said, and the TimesPicayune proclaimed that “Tourism has supplanted shipping as the dominant industry”
(Brooks 1990).
This back-and forth went on through decade. At times the Port and the NOCC
were seen as working almost in tandem to lift up the area’s economy: “port business
and shipbuilding are expected to offset the decline in petroleum industry jobs to some
degree ... The completion of the New Orleans Convention Center addition in June is
expected to give the convention business an important lift” (The Times-Picayune 1991).
Nevertheless, while the NOCC was seen as primary throughout the decade, the Port
was at times portrayed as secondary to the economy. The complete withdrawal of St.
Bernard from the Port was cited, along with delays in the construction of the new freighteasing Tchoupitoulas corridor / Clarence Henry Truckway– while at the same time the
“…tourism industry [had] a banner year with big conventions filling up the expanded
[NOCC]” (The Times-Picayune 1992). Indeed, by 1994 the president of the NOCC
board felt free to designate the NOCC “the most productive and important building in
Louisiana” (Anderson 1994).
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By contrast, Timothy Ryan seems to have been something of a mild booster for
the Port, never neglecting to highlight its contributions: “Activities through the port and
the Morial Center alone generated $8.5 billion in economic activity and $1.5 billion in
income for local residents”; “Tourism and the port are the big guys of the local economy”
(Blaine 1995; The Times-Picayune 1999c). The Port was considered strong in 1996,
due to Ron Brinson’s reconstruction of the uptown wharves, as well as the upcoming
Tchoupitoulas Corridor (Blaine 1996; Hughlett et al. 1996).
In 1997 “The Port turned in its most active year in history, with more than 11
million tons of general cargo pushing local wharves to their limits in the fiscal year that
ended in June” (Scott 1997). Nevertheless, the two narratives were neck-and-neck
again.
A strong tourism attraction kept New Orleans on the convention and
visitors' map. Conde Nast magazine rated New Orleans the second most
visited city in the United States and the fifth most popular in the world. To
meet the demand, a hotel boom that started in 1996 continued this year,
with thousands of new rooms expected to be added in the downtown area
in hotels of all sizes (ibid).
By 1998, we see an overview of how the New Orleans economy was starting to
diversify. Areas included plastics, petrochemicals, and technology services. The main
areas of economic growth were in " ... tourism ... health care, temporary services and
retail trade" (Judice 1998). Tourism and oil and gas were still the economic mainstays,
however. "Tom Cunningham, an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ...
[said] 'Diversifying for the sake of diversity doesn't seem like a good strategy when you
have winners ... You guys have two winners' [oil and gas and tourism]” (ibid). Note the
absence of the Port from Cunningham’s assessment.
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By the year 2000, the Port was making a major move to diversify by getting into
the cruise ship terminal business (Darce’ 2000). As of 2018, the Port hosts four cruise
lines: Carnival, Norwegian, American, and American Queen Steamboat Company (Port
of New Orleans 2018c). This was not always smooth sailing however, as once again
Gulfport attempted to upstage New Orleans in this regard, at one point taking Carnival
Cruise Line’s largest ship away from New Orleans in what was seen as “ … a black eye
for the city … ” and a measurable dent in the riverfront tourist industry during the
incident (Mowbray 2003). The narrative on the need for economic diversification through
state investments in ports came through clearly. “‘Mississippi has been aggressively
developing its port. The fact that they were able to step in and fill that gap, it does show
that Mississippi continues to pursue a sound growth program’ [said Brian Schwaner,
vice president of public relations at the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce]” (ibid).
The narrative of tourism, and particularly the NOCC, as the city’s economic
mainstay continued to expand. A fourth, massive phase of construction on the NOCC
was approved—potentially bringing its footprint to include a block between Orange and
Race streets—and the NOCC was touted as being the most robust of its kind during a
national contraction of the convention business (Eggler 2001:4; Mowbray 2001). All of
that changed on September 11th, 2001.
The Narrative Impact of 9/11
The attacks of 9/11 severely crippled the travel and tourism industries globally
(Lewis 2002:158). And, at least temporarily, the narrative in the Times-Picayune shifted
from touting tourism as an economic panacea to pointing out that “For years, New
Orleanians have feared that a growing reliance on tourism had left the area vulnerable
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to a sharp economic downturn … ” including a reference to how “In an effort to diversify
the economy [after the oil bust], politicians and business leaders rallied around the
tourism and meeting industries, with much of the focus on the "Great Hall" at the
riverfront created for the 1984 World's Fair...” (Yerton 2001). Again, Port-derived freightbased value-added manufacturing was portrayed as the cornerstone of defense against
overreliance on a single industry. “Although port traffic remains strong, development
officials would like to see New Orleans capitalize on manufacturing and services that
extend from that trade activity, rather than being just a point of passage. New Orleans'
coffee importing and roasting industry and the region's refineries are examples of how
this is done ...” (ibid). By 2002, the Port was receiving equal emphasis with “The New
Orleans area’s convention and tourism industry…universities, hospitals and
petrochemical plants [as] the engines of the state’s economy” (The Times-Picayune
2002).
Hurricane Katrina– Back to Tourism
The storm proved the Port-as-economic-engine narrative to be short-lived: “Not
only does the city face a massive reconstruction estimated to be in the tens of billions of
dollars, but it must rebuild a tourist industry that is New Orleans' life blood …” (Walsh,
Lewis, and McQuaid 2005). The Port was deemed to be in no trouble.
The ports will be out of commission longer than oil and gas production, but
eventually should return to pre-hurricane levels of economic activity,
[Bernard Weinstein, a professor of applied economics at the University of
North Texas in Denton] said … Because of the railroads and the pipelines
that converge in and around New Orleans, I can't believe they're going to
suffer any long-term business loss…” (ibid)
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However, the Port was not portrayed as a key to the recovery of the city (ibid). What
was proposed by Mayor Ray Nagin was a massive expansion of casino gambling, in
essence to turn the Canal St. hotel district into a New Orleans version of the Las Vegas
strip. At this time, in another reversal, the Times-Picayune again called out the tourismdriven economy for its inherent weaknesses, interestingly while giving
acknowledgement to the Port:
… the city was hobbled well before Katrina struck. The economy was so
out of whack that it was utterly dependent on the low-paying tourism jobs,
and now it looks like many of those are gone too. So now, along with a
more sensible but utterly overshadowed scheme to draw new customers
to the port, the mayor has decided to try to undo decades of poor
planning, shortsighted decisions and downright crookery -- on the fly...
(Grace 2005).
The most recent boost to the Port narrative came with the short-lived Obama
administration’s opening of relations with Cuba– barring a full cessation of the 1962
embargo. Aside from the forgone disapproval of this rapprochement by the CubanAmerican community, local business leaders—especially representatives of the Port—
were enthusiastic.
Before the creation of the trade embargo in 1962, New Orleans was the
United States' largest trading partner with the communist nation. Port of
New Orleans President and CEO Gary LaGrange suggested that tourism
and trade between the city and Cuba could substantially improve if talks
proceed. “Should Cuba open its doors to us, cruise ships could start
heading to Cuba and use New Orleans as a home port," LaGrange said. A
Cuban port of call, he added, would make seven-day cruises to Key West,
Nassau and Havana an obvious draw...Should [the Obama
administration’s] announcement lead to the removal of the U.S.-Cuba
trade embargo…Some estimates show that [this] would mean a trade
opportunity of $21 billion [for the national economy] in the first five years.
For LaGrange, that day cannot come soon enough. 'That's when we'll be
singing, 'Happy days are here again,'’ he said (Lipinski 2014).
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However, President Trump has all but nullified this arrangement.
By 2015, when The Data Center published “The New Orleans Index At 10,” the
focus was on economic development due to “… an increase in jobs spurred by greater
investment, entrepreneurship, [and] ‘knowledge-based’ industries (nola.com The TimesPicayune 2015). Tourism was seen as the loser in this new economy according to some
observers, who believed that “… the increase in wages reflects job losses in low-wage
industries like tourism as opposed to higher wages across the board” (ibid). In the 2016
statewide recession, however, the Port and tourism were once again portrayed to be
working in tandem to cushion the blow to New Orleans: “[Greg Albrecht, chief economist
for the Louisiana Legislative Fiscal Office] said New Orleans has seen a decline in job
growth, but at a slower pace than other metro areas. The city is less dependent on the
oil and gas industry than it used to be, and tourism and port trade are thriving ...”
(nola.com The Times-Picayune 2016).
This brings us to today, with the proposed Trade District and the constraints this
would put on the Port of New Orleans– the tourism narrative poised to choke off freight
at its uptown source. However, Port-related value-added industry is making its way back
into the public discourse, per the following statement by recent New Orleans mayoral
candidate Michael Bagneris.
Bagneris rolled out several economic development ideas, first criticizing the
primary industry in New Orleans, tourism, as a low-wage industry. He says New
Orleans can't be a 'one-trick pony,' and questioned why the city hasn't capitalized on
more activity from the Port of New Orleans. 'We import large quantities of steel,'
Bagneris said. 'Why can't we manufacture nuts and bolts?'” (Litten 2017).
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And even though some are openly questioning, again, the city’s continuing
overreliance on tourism, the likely success of the Trade District may well be the final
narrative-driven blow against the Port’s uptown freight efficacy (Morris 2017). It is telling
that in the Port’s latest strategic master plan, the focus concerning its last mile
Tchoupitoulas issues is on “[Partnering] with state and regional entities to enhance “last
mile” truck access along the Tchoupitoulas Corridor to Felicity Street Access Gate,”
rather than with the city itself (Port of New Orleans 2018b:89).
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Chapter 7. Gentrification Discourse
This chapter discusses the impact of the city’s economic strategy of
gentrification upon freight at the Port. I will show that the gentrification of the
Warehouse District and the St. Thomas neighborhood took away Port-related land
which could have been used for freight-based manufacturing, or, more recently,
chassis storage. See Figure 28.
Figure 28. Warehouse District and St. Thomas Neighborhood.

Source: Base map Google My Maps.
The gentrification discourse was a planned economic choice that repurposed
land away from potential Port reinvestment.
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Aftermath of the World’s Fair
The original discourse surrounding the aftermath of the world’s fair was mostly
negative, due to the fact that it went bankrupt, did not revive the city’s flagging tourist
industry, was tainted with an air of political corruption, and actually hurt the local
economy (Cole 1985:85; Perales 1985). Nevertheless, the gentrification of the
Warehouse District was a direct result of the fair (wyesondemand 2016). Initially, due
to the controversy surrounding the fair, there was a back-and-forth about its merits
and detriments.
Jane Brooks, in 1985, an associate professor of urban and regional planning at
UNO, said "[Warehouse District] Redevelopment had already begun. But
unquestionably the money and energy brought forth by the fair compressed
redevelopment from 10 to 15 years to a one- to two-year period" (Perales 1985:A4).
Post-fair boosters were pointing to seven new apartment complexes going up in the
Warehouse District, the Rouse Riverwalk, and convention center expansions, among
other developments. Critics pointed out the debt, under-capacity hotel rooms which
rushed to completion for the fair, and the non-revival of the tourism industry. They also
said many of the complexes were planned before the fair (ibid).
Beginnings of Warehouse District Gentrification
However, the nascent redevelopment was deliberately targeted to then newlyemerging professional/FIRE employees, rather than the established middle class. One
real estate focus piece from 1985 described 12 yuppie bachelors starting to move into
Julia Place because they desired to walk to work (although one would be driving to
work in Metairie). Developers kept faith in the Warehouse District even during the
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post-fair malaise: “‘The number and quality of people who work downtown will assure
a sufficient clientele for our project’ [developer Henry Lambert] said” (Stuart 1985b).
One tenant from Virginia talked about being enamored of inner city living his whole
life, and not having locals’ preconceived notions about the neighborhood. Prices
ranged from $450 - $750/month, $1040 - $1733 in 2017. One tenant worked " ... as a
producer/director for WGNO-TV ... "; one as " ... a vice president in the trust
department at First National Bank of Commerce" (ibid). Note the use of the word
"quality" when Lambert is describing the tenants.
This gentrification was portrayed as a significant economic stimulus, if not
salvation, for the city during the oil and gas bust and declining Port employment,
specifically because it incorporated the building of the Riverwalk marketplace by the
Rouse corporation. In a booster piece for Rouse Riverwalk, we read: "The
marketplace won't bring back the oil and gas business or the port, but it will be a
significant boost for the tourist industry" (Kelso 1986). Note the use of the “Port is no
help” trope. The piece goes on to pin downtown revitalization hopes on the Riverwalk,
per
... Rouse's Faneuil Hall Marketplace [in] Boston and Harborplace [in]
Baltimore. Both markets have been major parts of those cities' downtown
areas. They are both reasons in themselves to visit Boston or Baltimore"
(Kelso 1986).
Investors from some of these very areas were the ones who were initially most active
in this gentrification, rather than locals. One Boston-area developer said in 1985: “In
five years, people will drive through the Warehouse District and see a completely new
neighborhood and say 'I wish I had invested there,' especially the local bankers… Outof-towners are much more optimistic about the future of this city than New Orleanians
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are" (Stuart 1985a). He saw the Rouse Riverwalk as a catalyst for further Warehouse
District development.
In 1985, Alan Katz wrote a report on the efforts of a group of developers, led by
Kathleen Young, to develop the riverfront neighborhood and Warehouse District to
fulfill the economic promise of the world's fair. This was the cultivation of Riverfront
Awareness Week. Katz discusses a litany of New Orleans economic barriers: the oil
and gas bust; construction losses; the decline in Port employment—due to automation
and competition—and the unrealized development of the Almonaster-Michoud corridor
for industry. He hopes for a beginning of recovery for the city to be spurred by efforts
for riverfront development, spearheaded by Riverwalk and Warehouse District
apartment complexes, to create a vibrant "...neighborhood along the Mississippi River,
offering a classic New Orleans style of life that will be especially attractive to people
who work in the Central Business District" (Katz 1985a).
Rouse Riverwalk
The Rouse Riverwalk was seen as especially promising in this context. In the
details of festivities for the opening of Riverwalk, we read that until the advent of the
world's fair, Rouse had told " ... local real estate consultant Robert Tannen [that] ' ...
New Orleans was a beer and T-shirt town, and they weren't interested in coming
here'". The success of the project would initially be tourism-dependent because of the
poor economy. It would also be competing with the recently opened Jackson Brewery
in the French Quarter. The two projects are compared to "...successful festival
shopping centers Rouse has built in Boston, New York, Baltimore, and other cities”
See Figure 29.
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Figure 29. Cartoon of the Promise of Riverwalk.

Source: Forsyth 1986

This was the salvation by riverfront festival / shopping discourse. In all of this,
the metacommunication was that the Port, like oil and gas, is no longer relevant to the
New Orleans economy. In addition to the statement that "The [Rouse] marketplace
won't bring back the oil and gas business or the port, but it will be a significant boost
for the tourist industry," we read in an overview of reasons developers were banking
on the riverfront and Warehouse District.
New Orleans has always been a town that has gone through boom cycles
and bust cycles...But even in the times of bust, there is still enough
economic activity to justify a good investment. And I think that the
riverfront from the Mississippi River bridges to French Market and the old
Warehouse District are getting ready to boom” [said developer Henry
Lambert] (Katz 1986; Kelso 1986).
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Lambert talks about "'...the revival of a 19th-century neighborhood that had been
abandoned...'" (Katz 1986). Katz notes "...the enthusiasm and willingness to assume
financial risks that is at the heart of all this economic activity when it's the bad times
that are rolling in Louisiana," and quotes Lambert as saying "A lot of people are
betting on the riverfront as the place to be in the 1990s... If they're right, the river and
the Warehouse District will be the new residential and retail centers of New Orleans in
the 1990s" (ibid).
Salvation by Gentrification
This is the economic development through gentrification discourse. No sense is
communicated here that the Mississippi is still a working river. When looking for
reasons for the investments, Katz initially asks "...why. Virtually all the economic
news is gloomy. It may be years before the oil and gas industries rebound. The Port
of New Orleans is struggling. Tourism is showing a marked improvement in 1986, but
still has a long way to go before all the hotels are filled" (Katz 1986).
The gentrification of the Warehouse District, later to be expanded to the whole
city, was a planned economic redevelopment strategy. In 1988, Mark Seghers wrote
John Wilson says the city planners saw it coming. Reflecting on the early
1970s, the assistant director of city planning describes a recipe for innercity growth: Soften building and restoration restrictions, thus giving
developers a freer hand, and establish historical districts to protect the
downtown area’s flavor ... the 1984 World's Fair enters the scene - and
with it the primping of the business and warehouse areas … Try putting in
a slowdown of the flight to the suburbs as people begin to search for a
home closer to work … Add to this the Preservation Resource Center's
efforts to encourage development, and what do you have? You have the
warehouse district, a revitalized area with sophisticated urban dwellings,
complete amenities and prices that some say is New Orleans' future
neighborhood ... planners ... are trying to enhance more of the downtown
area and ... attract people to it ... " (Seghers 1988).
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This is a chosen economic development strategy. The city could have made a
conscious effort to try and lift the Port during its slowdown time in the early to mid-80s
by revamping the Warehouse District with a Port focus– particularly one oriented
towards freight-based manufacturing, doing with the rubber and wood and steel which
come through the Port that which is done with coffee. These discourses all led up to
the narrative of promoting tourism over, even at the expense of, the Port.
However, the redevelopment of the Warehouse District as a city and state
investment in Port-related assets was unlikely on the state’s part because it had
already bailed out the fair and the local NFL team, The Saints (Katz 1985b). If the
Port had retained use of this neighborhood, it could also have been used today for
chassis storage yards (a chassis is the wheeled undercarriage on which a shipping
container is fixed).
St. Thomas Neighborhood Gentrification
The real legacy of the Warehouse District gentrification, however, was the
ensuing, ongoing, gentrification of the St. Thomas neighborhood. The St. Thomas
redevelopment is an example of “stealth” gentrification. When we first read about it, it
is in a description of the historic preservation tax credit-powered renovation of "The
area downriver from Jackson Avenue between Magazine Street and the river, once
the very definition of a solid, working-class New Orleans neighborhood, ...now
dominated by the St. Thomas housing project" (Eggler 1990). The impetus was to be
the conversion of the ecclesial Redemptorist buildings into housing for the lowincome elderly, managed by the Catholic Archdiocesan Christopher Homes.
If all goes as we hope," [said Ed Boettner of Historic Renovation
Incorporated] 'this will be the catalyst around which we can see the
195

redevelopment of the St. Thomas project and the whole Lower Garden
District. These will be lovely, lovely apartments, but this is not a
gentrification project. Our aim is to serve the poor, not the yuppies'”
(Eggler 1990).
However, the article also states that “When the renovation project was announced in
December, officials said they hoped it would encourage development in the Lower
Garden District and lure (sic) home buyers back into the area as well as provide
affordable housing for elderly New Orleanians” (ibid).
The Warehouse District-St. Thomas gentrification/Riverwalk development
discourses were intrinsically anti-freight in that these elements of the overall story
functioned to take valuable real estate away from the Port and repurpose it to
economic uses which are more vulnerable to shifting demographics, economics,
natural disasters, and overall perceptions of the city than is its historic purpose as a
primary node in global freight transportation. The Port may have been in decline in the
1980s, but a failure of leadership on the part of the city at that time led it away from
investments in Port freight infrastructure to the more tenuous economic strategies of
tourism and gentrification, following the failed promise of the world’s fair. With the
current and continuing increase in container volumes through the Port due to the
expansion of the Panama Canal, it would have been better for the Port to have its
robust historic warehouse access, or off-site chassis storage or simply extra room to
expand its intermodal container terminal footprint. The recently announced sale of the
former site of the Avondale Shipyard in Jefferson parish makes this especially
pertinent. See Figure 30.
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Figure 30. Avondale in Relation to the Port of New Orleans

Sources: Base map Google Maps, overlay
https://www.portnola.com/business/real-estate/available-properties
On October 4th 2018, it was announced that “Virginia-based T. Parker Host and
Illinois-based Hilco Redevelopment Partners, finalized the purchase of the 254-acre
property from Huntington Ingalls Industries … ” (Moore 2018). The site is to be
repurposed as a freight logistics and warehousing hub with some manufacturing
capacity. The now Port-owned NOPB is planning to build a rail spur to connect itself to
the location, bringing the real possibility of Port freight-based manufacturing to the
region (ibid). A tire factory is a heavily favored concept, due to the Port’s primacy in
shipping rubber and steel, as well as the near location in Louisiana for the carbon
blacking necessary for the project.
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Chapter 8. Discussion
This research has shown that narrative contributes significantly to freight
transportation infrastructure spaces. Narrative, rather than being simply one element
among many, is a primary factor in the advancement—or, in most of the illustrations
which preceded, discouragement—of these freight spaces.
Overview of Narrative Dynamics
The nine freight oppositional narratives were communicated via five major
discourses. These discourses were promoted by a variety of major tropes, some of
which were overlapped with each other. The five discourses were historic preservation,
quality of life, environmentalism, race / class warfare, and parochialism / antiregionalism. For historic preservation, the major tropes were the endangerment of
historic buildings, urban renewal is bad, and tourism will be impeded. For quality of life,
the major tropes were noise, danger, and property values. The property values trope
consisted of the materialities of noise, vibration, dust / dirt, and air pollution. The
environmentalism discourse consisted of the tropes of harm to wetlands, harm to
fisheries, and toxic chemicals. For race/class warfare, the major tropes were that only
big business benefits from the freight options, that the shipping / trucking industries
benefit at everyone else’s expense, and environmental racism. The parochialism
discourse consists of the overarching trope of a neighborhood being special or set
apart. It can be further parsed as our neighborhood is historic, small town (“Mayberry”),
or poor and black. See Figure 31 for a summary of how these discourses and tropes
manifested in the nine freight oppositions.
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Figure 31. The Discursive Properties of the Freight Opposition Narratives.
Freight Option
Riverfront Expressway

Discourse(s)
Historic preservation

Decatur Street

Quality of life

Uptown & LA Avenue

Quality of life, Race/class
warfare

Leake Avenue Extension

Quality of life,
Environmentalism, Antibusiness
Quality of life,
Environmentalism, Safety,
Parochialism
Environmentalism, Safety

Violet Cut

MRGO
IHNC Lock Project

Quality of life,
Environmentalism, Safety,
Parochialism. Race/class
warfare, Anti-business

NOPB vs UTNA
Sinclair Tract

Quality of life
Quality of life, Parochialism

Trope(s)
Historical buildings, Urban
renewal is bad, Tourism
potential of French Quarter
Noise, Vibration, Property
Destruction
Noise, Pollution, Vibration,
Danger, LA Ave targeted
because of housing project
Noise, Pollution, Vibration,
Danger, Zoo, Extension only
benefits shipping and trucking
“Parish will be cut in half,”
Traffic, Wetlands, Flooding,
Anti-Port/New Orleans & ACE
Destruction of Wetlands and
Fishing, “Hurricane Highway”
Construction debris, Toxic
chemicals, Katrina flooding, ACE
is the enemy, Lower Ninth Ward
is special-poor & black,
Environmental racism, project
only benefits shipping
Noise, Vibration, Safety
Construction debris, traffic,
anti-Port/New Orleans

Source: Author
Answers to Research Questions
1. What were the pre-freight-proposal dynamics which generated the freight-opposing
narratives?
The spirit of late 60s generated a sense of citizen empowerment. This vitalized
the discourses of historic preservation, environmentalism, resistance to racism (actual
or perceived); and the anti-federal, anti-New Orleans, and anti-business discourses. In
addition, changing uptown demographics and freight increases due to containerization
enlivened quality of life discourses.
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2. What did freight transportation infrastructure mean for the different stakeholders
through time?
For the Port of New Orleans, these different options represented freight access,
economic development, and jobs. For residents of the affected areas, they meant
impingement upon people’s personal lives.
3a. What were the dynamics of power in this story?
As the Port’s economic employment share declined, The Port’s economic power
was no longer effective compared to the discursive power of the affected residents.
Narrative leveled the playing field with a shift in the means of production from freight to
tourism
4. How did changing national policies affect questions 1-3?
The four main policies were the National Historic Preservation Act.; the DOT Act,
FHWA Act, the NEPA Act, and President Clinton’s environmental justice directive,
Executive Order 12898
Theoretical Ramifications for Urban Studies
From the perspective of urban studies, I most closely align with the work of Henri
Lefebvre in The Production of Space. Recall that for Lefebvre, space is not a
geographic given, but the result of an interaction of competing social, political, and
economic forces. I have shown that narrative is the ground on which these competing
forces interact to facilitate “spaces of freight.” Freight transportation spaces are not
geographic givens. Contra Lefebvre, however, the perspective of this work is that freight
spaces have an intrinsic use value qua freight spaces, not just their overt exchange
value. Per George 2013, every human activity is dependent upon some form of freight
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transportation, as “90% of everything” is ultimately derived from maritime shipping. This
is increasingly subsumed within the domain of containerization. Nevertheless, freight
transportation is narratively depicted in the Complete Streets / New Urbanism
metacommunication as the quintessence of capitalist urbanization impinging upon the
rights of people. Many residents in the cases studied, especially those in the Lower
Ninth Ward, treated the proposed freight transportation alternatives as capital, in the
form of the shipping and trucking industries, and / or the state of Louisiana, being
unmindful of everyday people. I hold that this is incorrect, because everyday people are
dependent upon containerized freight transportation for their survival, regardless of their
degree of possession of social / political / economic capital (George 2013; Levinson
2008). “‘The [everyday urban resident; little person] should always fight against a plan of
logic, of technical perfection, of formal rigor, of functions and structures’” (Lefebvre
2003:213 in Merrifield 2005:699). This is the net result of the various generational antifreight discourses which have hampered the Port's efforts to facilitate freight access.
The Port and potentially freight-affected residents have been narratively fighting over
“turf,” over whose symbols and images will be “conceived” by state officials, planners,
and others, thereby being experienced in people’s daily lives (Swyngedouw 1992).
These spaces of freight, as use value, must become a central focus of the discipline of
urban studies.
Of Lefebvre's reference to the Paris Commune, Merrifield writes that "An urban
revolution had made its glorious debut, re-energizing public spaces and transforming
everyday life" (Merrifield 2005:701). This "...re-energizing [of] public spaces and
transforming everyday life" are the goals of Complete Streets / New Urbanism. I posit
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that without efficient and effective freight transportation fully integrated into this mix,
however, "public spaces and everyday life" will suffer.
Molotch wrote of Lefebvre’s contrast between space dominators and spatial
altruists (Molotch 1993:889). This does not consider the universal human dependence
upon freight transportation for survival, or even for the necessary accoutrement to
socially "appropriate" a given space. Every piece of every bicycle, every component of
every running shoe, the concrete and the tools needed to form / transform that concrete
into people-friendly spaces, all of these exist only because of freight transportation. I
argue that freight transportation spaces are a form of "absolute space" because they
have an intrinsic "use value" by moving the materials and products necessary for "Folks
[to] make their way through life to secure satisfactions of livelihood, sexual fulfillment,
and family gratification" (Molotch 1993:889).
I hold that space is facilitated by narrative, focusing on Lefebvre’s concept of
“conceived space,” in which the symbols and images are communicated through
competing stories which act upon the “imagination(s)” of the various stakeholders, the
victorious narrative(s) being the one(s) which ultimately encourage, or inhibit, the
spaces of freight transportation. I also show how the “materialities” of freight
transportation are some of the driving forces of the anti-freight narratives (Rogers 2015).
In acknowledging the dual status of freight transportation as both essential to and
inimical to urban life, it is possible then to classify freight transportation as one of “…
the contradictions of capitalism” (Swyngedouw 1992:318).
Briefly, these contradictions of capitalism refer to phenomena such as the fact
that as profits increase, so does automation, and so therefore does the oversupply of
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labor; or that capitalist economies inexorably cycle through financial crises (see
“Capital” in Tucker 1978). If freight transportation is foundational to Lefebvre’s capitalist
usurpation of the “production of space,” yet is simultaneously disruptive to the
production of the use value of space, leading residents to thwart freight’s existence—
and thus its exchange value—then it is one of these contradictions.
The Complete Streets / New Urbanism movement seeks to wrest "...the outcome,
the concrete expression in space..." from the "forces" of freight to the Complete Streets /
New Urbanism’s version of the common good (Abu-Lughod 1979:194, emphasis in
original). I show that narrative is the primary ground of this struggle. To paraphrase
Harvey 1970, the Complete Streets / New Urbanism movement bills itself as a way for
people to “fashion space rather than be fashioned by it.” I posit narrative as the primary
way in which space is fashioned.
I also echo Fainstein’s equity, in the sense of “freight equity.” That is, the
narratives explored in this research uncovered the sense that no one wants freight
transportation in their neighborhoods, and that historically, poor and minority
communities have been less powerful to block it. Fainstein’s concerns of equity and
democracy are those most frequently indexed by the narratives of freight opposition in
chapter four of this research. However, both the successful racial oppression narratives
of the Louisiana Avenue freight arterial blockage and the continuing successful race and
class-based opposition to the IHNC lock replacement by residents of the Lower Ninth
Ward show the capacity for narrative to override the disadvantages of economic
marginalization and minority status. Freight equity then, acknowledging per Feinstein
that successful planning solutions are “… limited to what appears feasible within the
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present context of capitalist urbanization in wealthy, formally democratic, Western
countries,” seeks the promotion of a more even distribution of freight spaces in urban
areas, so that the rich, the poor, and the middle class all equally bear the necessary
pressures of freight transportation (Fainstein 2010:5 in Tonkiss 2010:584). This more
communitarian approach would, nevertheless, threaten the historical authenticity of
some urban spaces to varying degrees.
Concerning elite theory in urban studies, Rocco’s 1997 interrogation of the
colonial formation of Brazil has implications for the creation of New Orleans as a space,
because it is in a sense a “colony” of the oil and gas industry and the Port (Rocco 1997;
Watts 2012). Therefore, when these economic institutions suffer, the city struggles to
survive by cultivating its local, tourist-based economy. Glaeser’s work on social capital
theory dovetails with the findings of this research. The social capital of residents,
strengthened by the communal action of freight resistance, was able to dominate the
economic capital of both the Port and the business community (Glaeser 2000). This has
policy implications concerning the necessity for Port to find a way to incorporate itself
into the communal categories of meaning of freight-impacted citizens, if it is to thrive.
Uppal’s findings concerning “Hallmark events” are directly related to the
experiences of many populations concerning freight transportation infrastructure. The
perception on the part of residents, whether they be poor or not, has been that the trope
of economic development is simply “hyperbole” designed by the Port to obfuscate the
materialities of the proposals (Uppal 2006:7). Salvati and Zitti’s work on the 2004
Athenian Olympics has direct implications for this research because it dovetails with the
historic observation about the tenuous nature of New Orleans’ tourist economy, and the
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modern untapped potential for the city as a center of Port freight-based industrial
development.
Odoom’s work contesting the “resource curse” is significant because I use a
similar historical methodology to investigate the narrative obstacles to New Orleans’
return to a former state of maritime primacy (Obeng-Odoom 2012). Condor’s work on
comparative globalism resonates with my findings that local narratives can overpower
the economic capital of elites moving under the pressures of globalization (Condor
2015). Globalization, which is fueled by containerization, did not prevail over the freightoppositional narratives.
The Ramifications for Anthropology
Within anthropology, I hold that freight infrastructure is an enacted social
potentiality, per Humphrey 2005, i.e. “Ideology does not just exist in linguistic form; it
also appears in material structures” (Humphrey 2005:39). Narratives—stories—are the
linguistic forms which facilitate freight transportation infrastructures. Reeves’ argument,
that “For an infrastructure to come into being and to work as infrastructural…often
requires a collective political and social effort…” is supported by what I have shown
(Reeves 2017:718 emphasis in original). Even before this political and social effort can
take place, though, a pro-infrastructure narrative must be in place. According to Khalaf,
economic and material conditions generate symbology, "…perceptions, images and
worldviews do not have a functional autonomy of their own. Images always need to be
grounded" (Khalaf 1992:84). I maintain that narratives, composed of “…perceptions,
images and worldviews…” do indeed function “autonomously” to facilitate the presence
or absence of freight transportation infrastructure.
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Vitalis’ critical-race nuance on conflict theory is another perspective (Vitalis
2002). This resonates with accusations on the part of some Louisiana Avenue residents
and the understanding of many Lower Ninth Ward residents.
In the New Orleans area, the lack of adequate freight transportation, facilitated by
narrative, indexes Reeves’ "… [longings] for a peaceful and territorially integral future"
(Reeves 2017:716). That is, Port-related freight transportation infrastructure projects are
not seen by the residents as bringing economic development or job growth, but rather
as encroachments on their sovereignty and independence. Similar to Laura Bear, my
research also shows how narrative reveals “ … popular ethics and identities formed at
the conjunction of global, national, and local politics that set groups and people apart”
(Bear 2015; Majumder 2016:649). The global scale concerns the advent and increase
on containerization adherent to a globalizing economy. The national is the importance of
the Port to US commerce, and the local is the historical resistance of New Orleans area
residents to the construction of Port-related freight transportation infrastructure. This
resistance is rooted in the issue of who owns space.
Andrew Newman’s work speaks to the tension involved in the fluidity of
constructs of space between which spaces are private and which are public. This
tension addresses the question of appropriation of freight spaces for the Complete
Streets / New Urbanism paradigm. This planning approach represents itself as
demanding private (freight) space claimed by industry and repurposing it for public use.
However, the denigration of freight spaces ultimately has a negative effect upon the
same public.
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However, I contest the most recent literature on the anthropology of infrastructure
on many fronts. Where Reeves writes of “… the infrastructuralisation of state power,” I
focus on the “infrastructuralisation” of anti-freight (and in many cases explicitly anti-Port
and anti-ACE) narratives which override “state power” (Reeves 2017:716). I add a
nuance to her position in its analysis of the role of narrative in the “…mobilising of
elected representatives…” The elected representatives mostly, but not always, favored
the proposed projects. I examine how the “…languages of abandonment and territorial
loss …” came to be so consistently successful in defeating proposed freight
transportation solutions for the Port (Reeves 2017:711).
In response to Penelope Harvey’s query about “when is” rather than “what is” an
infrastructure, I respond that an infrastructure is "when" the parties interested in its
successful development have control of the narrative (Harvey 2017:674). This did not
happen in any of the cases studied, except for the continued deployment of NOPB rail
cars behind Leake Avenue; although even in this instance the ways in which these cars
are deployed has been modified by the aggressive use of narrative. Similarly to
Penelope Harvey, I “…[unpack a] material problem as a social problem…” (Harvey
2017:679). I do this in reverse fashion from her, looking at narratives as “social
agreements [facilitating]” (or blocking) freight transportation infrastructure, rather than
seeing the infrastructure as facilitating social agreements (Harvey 2017:683). In these
cases, narrative encouraged the current freight status quo.
Chalfin represents the case of the Ghanian restroom facility as “… [reassembling] social relations,” but I do the opposite (Chalfin 2017:648). I show how
"social relations" (communicated by narrative) deconstructed the freight transportation
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agenda. In opposition to Chalfin’s assessment that human excreta, for example, could
be the first causes of social relations, I show that “social relations,” (communicated by
narrative) discouraged freight transportation (Chalfin 2017:648). Whereas the public
facility in Chalfin’s study was all-inclusive per the nature of “public goods,” the
proponents of freight transportation in this study consistently failed to make this case for
the public good to the affected populations (ibid:651-52). Loss of the narrative equaled
the loss of freight transportation, of infrastructure. Whereas Chalfin holds that
“Infrastructure exerts a force…it attracts people, draws them in, coalesces and expends
their capacities,” in the cases studied, narrative exerted this force, wielding the energy
to discourage freight transportation (Chalfin 2017:660). While in Chalfin’s research,
“…the very ground of infrastructure consists of bodily materials,” in this research this
ground consists of narrative (Chalfin 2017:666).
Per Gregory 1998, this research argues that the same dynamics of “… history
and politics …” are at play in both white and black community freight opposition
(Gregory 1998:18). Specifically, race is an unspoken element in the continuing story of
St. Bernard’s opposition to any expansion of the Port in the parish. St. Bernard parish
has a history of disparaging the city of New Orleans as a black city (Cannizaro 1990;
Raber 1984). This factors in to the overall anti-New Orleans, and by extension anti-Port,
sentiment of the parish.
However, while Gregory’s work seeks to show “… the role that relations of power
and political processes play in determining the significance of race, class, and place in
American society,” I have gone in the opposite direction, showing the significance of
these three factors in determining the relations of power and political processes

208

between the Port and the parishes of Orleans and St. Bernard (Gregory 1998:24). In
other words, the Port, the ACE, the business community, and the “political class” were
not the drivers of significance for race, class, and place (Bourdieu and (John
Brookshire) 1991). Race, class and place were the drivers of significance for the Port,
ACE, business community, and the political class. While Gregory was “…puzzled by the
enthusiasm, resolve, and endurance…” of the activists he worked with in the context of
“…the rewards of their efforts [seeming] few and far between,” this contrasts with the
consistency with which neighborhood activists across racial and class lines successfully
blocked Port-based freight transportation solutions in New Orleans and St. Bernard
(Gregory 1998:28). The various “… collective identities …” formed in the promulgation
of the freight oppositional discourses were definitive “… critical [axes] of conflict …” in
the numerous successful battles of residents against freight (Gregory 1998:29).
Per Bourdieu 1991, the Port, ACE, and the business community lack(ed) “social
capital” in the neighborhoods where the various freight transportation solutions were /
are proposed (Bourdieu and (John Brookshire) 1991). The opponents of the freight
transportation alternatives had greater "social position and authority" within their
respective neighborhoods and geographies than the Port, the ACE, or the business
community, and the political class only had “social position and authority” in those
instances where it supported the freight oppositional discourses and narratives, as was
the case of local politicians siding with the residents of the Lower Ninth Ward against
the IHNC lock replacement (Edelman 1992:718).
The discourses and narratives of freight opposition functioned as "[regionally /
class differentiated contexts] for conflict and competition" with the Port and the ACE
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(Heritage 1993:213). The Port and the ACE attempted to combat the "...'heretical'
discourses..." of the freight oppositional groups by deploying the traditionalist language
of economic development (Heritage 1993:213). The "cultural capital" of freight
opposition superseded that of persons and institutions traditionally in possession of this
capital, the Port, the ACE, the "business community" (Heritage 1993:213). Freight
oppositional discourses and narratives overcame "The power of instituted authorities to
make words into truths and laws..." (Kelly 1993:1200). They usurped the "... symbolic
power [of the traditional] ...elites .... " (Kelly 1993:1200). If "discourses are always to
some extent euphemisms" (Bourdieu and (John Brookshire) 1991:78), then the freight
oppositional discourses turned the euphemisms of the Port and the ACE on their heads.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
Community engagement, in the form of public hearings, is the first required step
in the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) process. However, this
research has shown that community buy-in is better understood, not as one aspect of a
regulatory process, but rather as crucial to the facilitation of freight transportation
infrastructure spaces. If the economic benefits of the project, as promoted by its
purveyors, are not part of the deep symbolism of the relevant population, or fail to
become such, then the freight transportation infrastructure will not exist.
Quid Pro Quo
One possible solution to the problem of how to inculcate freight transportation
into the deep symbolism of a population is the method of Quid Pro Quo. This conclusion
is based upon how frequently encountered in the archives was a sense of people
believing they were being asked to suffer and gain nothing in return.
Some historical “what if’s” of quid pro quo.
For the Riverfront Expressway, perhaps the most expensive version, the
depressed roadway, to minimize visual impact on the Quarter should have been built.
This is what the residents found grudgingly acceptable. It would have required the
building of a coffer dam where the Expressway skirted the river. For the Leake Avenue
extension, the Port could have purchased a new animal exhibit and the necessary
habitat reconfiguration. In the very difficult case of the St. Bernard lock and ship
channel, the only viable Quid Pro Quo would be ensuring multiple crossings of the
development, especially for the sake of efficient first responder movement. Additionally,
as Gov. Edwin Edwards stipulated, all the necessary infrastructure on both sides of the
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channel, power grids, sewage and water, etc., would have to be in place before the
channel was built. For the uptown arterials, using Napoleon Avenue only, with speed
controls, high-grade pavements, and sound baffles with murals could be a solution. This
may seem an outlandish proposal, but there are two good reasons for having freight
trucking access down Napoleon Avenue to the Port. The first is that it would give direct
access to the most important terminals on the river, the Napoleon Avenue container
terminal and the Napoleon Avenue intermodal facility. The second involves questions of
“freight equity.” That is, historically, poorer Black areas of town have borne the brunt of
freight transportation, not only in New Orleans, but everywhere else generally as well.
The classic example the Claiborne overpass (US 90 West) which cut through the Treme
neighborhood. If economic development were to mean a sense of “all being in this
together,” then that should be the case. Possibly, the MRGO could have been
engineered with concrete linings to prevent erosion, as the ACE does on some sections
of the Mississippi River. This could have answered some of the objections of the
environmentalists, although, of course, no one foresaw the paucity with which the city’s
internal levees had been engineered.
Current recommendations.
The IHNC lock project may never come to fruition post-Katrina. Although a
school, park, or library were all suggested by one of the residents, and indeed, at one
point there were plans to build a middle school in the Lower Ninth Ward with ACE
mitigation money, the trope of the ACE as murderous villain may be too strong to
overcome. Even if the ACE were to build, for example, a STEM-focused research
academy high school, specifically for the residents of the Lower Ninth Ward, it is highly
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unlikely that they would come to terms with the lock expansion. Some cultural, symbolic
edification of the people in exchange for the infrastructure should be put in place for the
project to move forward, but what this is remains to be seen. For the Sinclair Tract,
restructuring the Dock Board from seven members to six, giving St. Bernard one more
representative and taking two away from New Orleans, thereby giving each stakeholder
parish (Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard) equal representation on the Dock Board,
could be a way to temper the anti-New Orleans discourse. The Governor could serve as
a tie-breaker vote when necessary.
A more aggressive, anthropological marketing of the economic development
discourse is called for in the case of the Sinclair Tract. People do not respond to charts
and graphs, nor to a generalized mantra of “economic development/jobs.” People
respond to people. One possibility is a presentation which can be delivered consisting of
videos of actual workers doing the exact jobs that would be derived both from the
construction of these container facilities and permanently after they are in place, with
tangible proof of the benefits of such employment; i.e., “Look at my house; look at my
swimming pool; look at my huge flat-screen TV”; etc. It would be even better if these
videos could be augmented by live appearances from such persons. The residents of
Meraux need to incorporate within themselves the understandings and categories of
meaning about these jobs from real employees. Perhaps this strategy could generate
some traction for the IHNC lock expansion as well.
In the case of the Trade District, the Port could “allow” its development in
exchange for the Trade District developers and the NOCC contributing to the expense
of a dedicated truck-only flyover ramp from US 90 West to the entrance of the Port. This

213

could be combined with a linkage between the now Port-owned NOPBR to the business
of the NOCC. Perhaps Public Belt tours of the Port could be a value-added option for
conventioneers.
Directions for Further Research
Coding this dataset for theme frequencies would be useful for generating an
interview schedule to be used in an applied ethnography. This application could be in
the Lower Ninth Ward neighborhood and the Sinclair Tract to facilitate the Port’s
understanding of the residents’ categories of meaning. These categories should be
understood in any successful attempt at Quid Pro Quo.
Comparative ethnographies could be performed in neighborhoods which are Port
success stories, such as the area surrounding the former Avondale site. Additional
comparative ethnographies could be performed with ports and populations that have
appropriately navigated last mile issues. On example is the greening of the port of Los
Angeles / Long Beach, which has committed to cultivating a zero-emissions truck fleet
in response to the concerns of residents. The Port of New Orleans is already
implementing its own green trucks initiative.
Ethnographic marketing research could be performed in the neighborhoods
surrounding the Port. Tourists and convention-goers should be included in this project.
Per Zukin 1995, the Port could investigate how to “Disneyize” freight at the entrance to
the Clarence Henry Truckway, and the port in general. The goal would be to make the
freight operations of the Port attractive to tourism, instead of being an opposing
narrative. The Port is taking steps in this direction by incorporating monthly tours into its
operations.
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Zukin’s concern for authenticity segues into contested claims of authenticity for
the last mile to the Port of New Orleans. The historic authenticity of this stretch of road
is bound up with freight transportation. A new, ersatz, commercialized authenticity
based upon marketing the commodification of New Orleans’ unique culinary and
musical heritage, blended with the Complete Streets / New Urbanism's focus on
pedestrians and cyclists, is contesting the historic authenticity of this freight-vital space.
In the Port's last mile conundrum, the city is experiencing a conflict between its historic
focus on freight-based production and its newer one on tourist-based consumption. This
shift from a production to a consumption economy is not unique to New Orleans. New
Orleans is being "meticulously repackaged for elite consumption" right up to the
doorstep of the Port (Brown-Saracino 2010:864). The repurposing of waterfront space
no longer used by the Port is analogous to the Brooklyn development of the Redhook
IKEA discussed by Zukin, except that IKEA was developed in areas no longer used by
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Zukin 2010:160). The proposed NOCC
expansion and developments, however, impinge upon a working port. Complete Streets
/ New Urbanism as practiced in New Orleans, especially in its emphasis on pedestrian
trails and bike paths so close to the Port, poses the danger of rebranding of the city
even further away from freight, and towards consumption by tourist elites.
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